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ABSTRACT 
The multi-trillion-dollar market for, what was at that time 
wholly unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives (“swaps”) is 
widely viewed as a principal cause of the 2008 worldwide 
financial meltdown. The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law on 
July 21, 2010, was expressly considered by Congress to be a 
remedy for this troublesome deregulatory problem.  The 
legislation required the swaps market to comply with a host 
of business conduct and anti-competitive protections, 
including that the swaps market be fully transparent to U.S. 
financial regulators, collateralized, and capitalized. The 
Greenberger discussing the loophole in Dodd-Frank); Zephyr Teachout & 
Morris Pearl, Voters Can Help Avoid Another Costly Bail Out,
TIMESUNION (August 11, 2018), https://www.timesunion.com/opinion/ 
article/Voters-can-help-avoid-another-costly-bail-out-13149693.php 
(agreeing that a loophole exists in Dodd-Frank with “foreign” swaps 
dealers); Marcus Baram, Big banks are exploiting a risky Dodd-Frank 
loophole that could cause a repeat of 2008, FAST COMPANY (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90178556/big-banks-are-exploiting-a-
risky-dodd-frank-loophole-that-could-cause-a-repeat-of-2008 (interview 
with Michael Greenberger); Jim Zarroli, Big Banks Are Once Again 
Taking Risks With Complex Financial Trades, Report Says, NPR (June 
19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621543525/big-banks-are-o 
nce-again-taking-risks-with-complex-financial-trades-report-says (citing 
Michael Greenberger’s paper); Claire Boston, Swap Loophole Leaves U.S. 
Taxpayers on Hook for Trades, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-19/swap-loophole-
leaves-u-s-taxpayers-on-hook-for-trades-report; Pam Martens & Russ 
Martens, Wall Street’s Derivatives Nightmare: New York Times Does a 
Shallow Dive, WALL STREET ON PARADE (July 24, 2018), 
http://wallstreetonparade.com/2018/07/wall-streets-derivatives-night 
mare-new-york-times-does-a-shallow-dive (citing the Flitter article). This 
article was completed on April 30, 2019. Since that time, national and 
international banking regulations and institutions may have gone 
through further change. 
© Michael Greenberger, 2019. 
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statute also expressly provides that it would cover foreign 
subsidiaries of big U.S. financial institutions if their swaps 
trading could adversely impact the U.S. economy or 
represent the use of extraterritorial trades as an attempt to 
“evade” Dodd-Frank. 
In July 2013, the CFTC promulgated an 80-page, 
triple-columned, and single-spaced “guidance” implementing 
Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial reach, i.e., that manner in 
which Dodd-Frank would apply to swaps transactions 
executed outside the United States. The key point of that 
guidance was that swaps trading within the “guaranteed” 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding company swaps 
dealers were subject to all of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulations 
wherever in the world those subsidiaries’ swaps were 
executed. At that time, the standardized industry swaps 
agreement contemplated that, inter alia, U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers’ foreign subsidiaries would be 
“guaranteed” by their corporate parent, as was true since 
1992. 
In August 2013, without notifying the CFTC, the 
principal U.S. bank holding company swaps dealer trade 
association privately circulated to its members standard 
contractual language that would, for the first time, 
“deguarantee” their foreign subsidiaries. By relying only on 
the obscure footnote 563 of the CFTC guidance’s 662 
footnotes, the trade association assured its swaps dealer 
members that the newly deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries 
could (if they so chose) no longer be subject to Dodd-Frank.   
 As a result, it has been reported (and it also has been 
understood by many experts within the swaps industry) that 
a substantial portion of the U.S. swaps market has shifted 
from the large U.S. bank holding companies swaps dealers 
and their U.S. affiliates to their newly deguaranteed 
“foreign” subsidiaries, with the attendant claim by these 
huge big U.S. bank swaps dealers that Dodd-Frank swaps 
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regulation would not apply to these transactions. The CFTC 
also soon discovered that these huge U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers were “arranging, negotiating, and 
executing” (“ANE”) these swaps in the United States with
U.S. bank personnel and, only after execution in the U.S., 
were these swaps  formally “assigned” to the U.S. banks’ 
newly “deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries with the 
accompanying claim that these swaps, even though executed 
in the U.S., were not covered by Dodd-Frank. 
In October 2016, the CFTC proposed a rule that would 
have closed the “deguarantee” and “ANE” loopholes 
completely. However, because it usually takes at least a year 
to finalize a “proposed” rule, this proposed rule closing the 
loopholes in question was not finalized prior to the 
inauguration of President Trump. All indications are that it 
will never be finalized during a Trump Administration.  
Thus, in the shadow of the recent tenth anniversary of 
the Lehman failure, there is an understanding among many 
market regulators and swaps trading experts that large 
portions of the swaps market have moved from U.S. bank 
holding company swaps dealers and their U.S. affiliates to 
their newly deguaranteed foreign affiliates where Dodd-
Frank swaps regulation is not being followed. However, what 
has not moved abroad is the very real obligation of the lender 
of last resort to rescue these U.S. swaps dealer bank holding 
companies if they fail because of poorly regulated swaps in 
their deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries, i.e., the U.S. 
taxpayer.  
While relief is unlikely to be forthcoming from the 
Trump Administration or the Republican-controlled Senate, 
some other means will have to be found to avert another 
multi-trillion-dollar bank bailout and/or a financial calamity 
caused by poorly regulated swaps on the books of big U.S. 
banks. This paper notes that the relevant statutory 
framework affords state attorneys general and state financial 
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regulators the right to bring so-called “parens patriae”
actions in federal district court to enforce, inter alia, Dodd-
Frank on behalf of a state’s citizens.  That kind of litigation 
to enforce the statute’s extraterritorial provisions is now 
badly needed. 
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Too Big to Fail—U.S. Banks’ Regulatory Alchemy: 
Converting an Obscure Agency Footnote into an “At 
Will” Nullification of Dodd-Frank’s Regulation of the 
Multi-Trillion Dollar Financial Swaps Market
MICHAEL GREENBERGER
I. SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
It is now accepted wisdom, indeed, it is embedded in the 
popular culture,1 that it was the non-transparent, under-
capitalized, and wholly unregulated over-the-counter 
(“OTC”) swaps/derivatives (“swaps”) market that lit the fuse 
that exploded the world economy in the fall of 2008.2
1 See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 
200–26 (2011); see also THE BIG SHORT (Paramount Pictures 2015) 
(winning the academy award for Best Adapted Screenplay, the film 
achieved critical acclaim for its effective translation of complex financial 
instruments to the big screen); INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics 2010) 
(winning the 2010 Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature, Inside 
Job was also screened at the 2010 Cannes Film Festival); see also Sridhar 
Natarajan, Pope Calls Derivatives Market a ‘Ticking Time Bomb’,
BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2018, 11:46 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2018-05-17/pope-goes-off-on-cds-market-calls-derivatives-
ticking-time-bomb.  
2 See Ben Moshinsky, Stiglitz says Banks Should Be Banned from CDS 
Trading, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2009, 6:28 AM), https://jessescross 
roadscafe.blogspot.com/2009/10/stiglitz-banks-must-be-restrained.html; 
Paul Krugman, Looters in Loafers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/opinion/19krugman.html?dbk; 
Alan S. Blinder, The Two Issues to Watch on Financial Reform — We Need 
an Independent Consumer Watchdog and Strong Derivatives Regulation. 
Industry Lobbyists are Trying to Water Them Down, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 
2010, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487041 
33804575197852294753766; Henry T. C. Hu, ‘Empty Creditors’ and the 
Crisis, WALL ST. J.  (Apr. 10, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB123933166470307811. 
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Because tens of trillions of dollars of notional value 
embedded in these swaps were, inter alia, pegged to the 
economic performance of an overheated and highly inflated 
housing market, the sudden collapse of that market triggered 
huge unfunded payment obligations under credit default 
swaps (“CDS”) and so-called “naked”3 CDS that were forms 
of insurance guaranteeing the full value and sustainability of 
the subprime (and then later the prime) residential mortgage 
market.   
The defaulting and near defaulting CDS and naked 
CDS “insurer” swaps counterparties, substantially composed 
of big banks, their affiliates, some hedge funds, and insurers, 
were also counterparties to many other interconnected swaps 
in this almost six hundred trillion dollar notional value 
worldwide market, including, inter alia, interest rate, 
currency, foreign exchange, and commodity swaps.4
Defaults on any significant portion of these swaps 
would have affected the entirety of the swaps markets and 
upended the world economy with cascading multi-trillion-
dollar shortfalls, threatening to leave insurmountable 
financial holes in the balance sheets of, inter alia, banks and 
other financial institutions, corporations, non-profits and 
governments worldwide. The primary “solution” to stave off 
this worldwide calamity was principally to have United 
States (“U.S.”) taxpayers saddled with paying trillions of 
dollars of bailouts for these real and threatened huge capital 
3 For a full explanation of “naked” CDS, see infra Part III.A and 
accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 167–174 and accompanying text for the many dozens of 
authorities making clear that defaults, or threatened defaults, in the 
swaps market were the principal cause of the 2008 meltdown. Included 
therein is an assessment of a competing theory about the cause of the 
meltdown, i.e., the so-called “run on repos,” which is shown to be 
derivative of the threatened swaps meltdown and cannot fairly be said to 
be the principal cause of the meltdown. 
MICHAEL GREENBERGER
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deficits that would otherwise have led to a worldwide Second 
Great Depression.5
As it was, the world experienced a devastating Great 
Recession, which “was the most severe economic downturn 
and longest-persisting recession since the Great 
Depression.”6  In 2008-2009 in the United States alone, 8.4 
million jobs were lost, constituting 6.1% of all payroll 
employment.7  While the U.S. unemployment rate stood at 
5% in December 2007, it topped out at 10% by October 2009.8
U.S. housing prices fell on average of about 30% from mid-
2006 to mid-2009.9  The U.S. net worth of household and 
nonprofit organizations fell from $69 trillion in 2007 to a low 
of $55 trillion in 2009.  Real gross U.S. domestic product fell 
4.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2007 to its low in the 
second quarter of 2009, “the largest decline in the postwar 
era[.]”10
5 See Moshinsky, supra note 2; Krugman, supra note 2; Blinder, supra 
note 2; Hu, supra note 2. 
6 Andrew Fieldhouse, 5 Years After the Great Recession, Our Economy 
Still Far from Recovered, HUFFPOST (June 26, 2014, 12:38PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-fieldhouse/five-years-after-the-
grea_b_5530597.html; see infra notes 33, 175, and accompanying text 
showing that theories about the “run on repos” were the result of defaults, 
and threatened defaults, on the worldwide swaps market and thus were 
not the principal cause of the financial meltdown. 
7 The Great Recession, STATE OF WORKING AMERICA, http://stateof 
workingamerica.org/great-recession/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2019). 
8 Robert Rich, The Great Recession: December 2007–June 2009, FED.
RESERVE (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/ 
great_recession_of_200709. 
9 Id.
10 Id.
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In a direct answer to this economic calamity, the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) was signed into law on July 21, 2010.11
A principal purpose of that statute was to assure U.S. 
taxpayers (themselves battered, and many still so, by the 
resulting financial storms) that they would never again be 
called upon to bail out, inter alia, the very biggest bank 
holding companies.12 Among the many financial reforms 
prescribed, the most important gave United States financial 
regulators the tools to prevent another meltdown of the 
previously unregulated, several hundred trillion dollar 
notional value, swaps markets.13 It did so by requiring, inter 
alia, that the swaps market be fully transparent to federal 
regulators, properly collateralized and capitalized, and 
subject to pro-competitiveness principles and business 
conduct standards.14
The chief U.S. swaps regulator established by Dodd-
Frank is the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”), which oversees 95% of the U.S. OTC derivatives 
market.15 The CFTC, in the three years after the passage of 
11 Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22 
regulate.html?_r=0. 
12 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (describing the law’s purpose 
as “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to 
fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.”). 
13 See infra Part V. 
14 Id.
15 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES 
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS 117 (2017), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/documents/a-financial-
system-capital-markets-final-final.pdf.  
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Dodd-Frank, put in place over fifty substantive rules 
implementing the Dodd-Frank swaps regulatory regimen.16
During the closing stages of the Dodd-Frank 
legislative process, key drafters of that statute responded 
directly and immediately to what was then a three-day-old 
United States Supreme Court case, Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank, Ltd.,17 which made clear that if a statute is 
to have extraterritorial effect, Congress must state so 
clearly.18 As a result, the lead Senate drafters of Dodd-Frank, 
on June 24, 2010, added an extraterritorial provision to that 
legislation, which became section 722(i) of the act. That 
section provides that Dodd-Frank’s regulation of swaps must 
apply to swaps executed outside the U.S. if that trading has 
“a direct and significant connection with activities in, or 
effect on, commerce of the United States”; or if those swaps, 
by their extraterritorial execution, “contravene such rules 
and regulation as the [CFTC] may prescribe or promulgate 
as are necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of any 
provision of [Dodd-Frank].”19
In July 2013, the CFTC promulgated its so-called 
“guidance,” implementing Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial 
provision.20 For purposes of this paper, the key point of that 
CFTC guidance was that “guaranteed” foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were to be subject 
to all of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulations wherever in the 
world the subsidiaries’ swaps were executed.21 At that time, 
and for more than two decades prior to that time, the 
standard industry-wide swaps documentation drafted by the 
16 See infra notes 346–348 and accompanying text. 
17 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
18 See infra notes 344-48 and accompanying text; see infra Part IX.B. 
19 Id.
20 See infra Part VI.B. 
21 Id.
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International Swaps Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) (which 
swaps dealers are required to use) contemplated that 
corporate parents would expressly guarantee any liability of 
those subsidiaries in their swaps transactions with third 
parties.22    
About one month after promulgation of the July 2013 
extraterritorial guidance, ISDA, relying on parts of footnote 
563 within that document’s 80 pages (triple columned, single 
spaced), provided standardized model swaps contract 
language to its members allowing them to “deguarantee” 
their foreign subsidiaries by checking a “deguarantee” box in 
a written declaration, thereby proclaiming that those newly 
“deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries were not subject to 
Dodd-Frank.23 In result, it has been reported and understood 
among swaps industry experts that a large portion of the U.S. 
swaps market shifted from the largest U.S. bank holding 
companies, and their U.S. affiliates, to their newly 
deguaranteed “foreign” affiliates, even though those swaps 
remained on the consolidated balance sheets of these U.S. 
institutions. Once attributed to the “foreign newly 
deguaranteed” affiliate, U.S. bank holding company swaps 
dealers in many important instances treated these swaps as 
being outside the reach of Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulation.24
Roughly three years later, the CFTC also addressed 
the then newly discovered fact that, inter alia, these huge 
U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers were often 
“arranging, negotiating, and executing” (“ANE”) these 
purported “foreign” swaps in the U.S. through U.S personnel, 
but then “assigning” those fully executed swaps to their 
newly “deguaranteed” foreign subsidiaries, asserting that 
22 See infra Part II.F. 
23 See infra notes 422–24 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra Part IX.B. 
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these swaps were not covered by Dodd-Frank even though 
completed in the United States.25   
The CFTC, at first unknowingly, and then for over 
three years unquestioningly, allowed, inter alia, the four 
largest U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers, that 
control 90% of the U.S. swaps market, to use the 
“deguarantee” and ANE tactics to evade Dodd-Frank at 
theirddiscretion.26 Those four U.S. swaps dealers are: 
Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and Bank of 
America.27   
As a result, swaps fully executed in the U.S. by U.S. 
bank personnel could, after complete execution in the U.S., 
be assigned to newly deguaranteed U.S. bank holding foreign 
subsidiaries where they could be deemed not to be regulated 
under Dodd-Frank. Moreover, as a result of CFTC staff—not 
Commission—action, truly foreign swaps dealers that are 
registered with the CFTC to do swaps dealing in the U.S. 
25 Id.
26 See infra Part IX.E & F. In December 2013, a CFTC staff advisory 
stated that the use of ANE by non-U.S. persons registered with the CFTC 
would subject those swaps to some, but not all, CFTC swaps regulations. 
Letter from Stephen Hall, Legal Director & Sec. Specialist, Better 
Markets Inc., to Christopher Kirkpatrick, Secretary, Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n (Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with Better Markets). That 
advisory was vigorously challenged by U.S. swaps dealers and its 
application was so tenuous that the CFTC had to include in an October 
18, 2016 proposed rule that ANE swaps were subject to CFTC 
jurisdiction. Id. This conclusion, however, only made clear that the 
CFTC’s business conduct standards would apply to ANE trading, and 
further application of all other swaps regulation to ANE swaps. Id. at 8–
9. But the general tenor of the October 18, 2016 proposed rules was that 
the use of ANE to evade Dodd-Frank in any way was to come to an end. 
Id. Of course, as shown below, the October 18, 2016 proposed rule was 
never made final before the beginning of Donald Trump’s Presidency, and 
it is unlikely during his Presidency to be made final. 
27 See infra note 388 and accompanying text. 
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with, inter alia, U.S. counterparties, but are from countries 
that do not have a full panoply of basic swaps regulations, 
are as of July 2017 indefinitely freed from following Dodd-
Frank even if their home country has no, or inadequate, 
swaps regulatory protections.28
Each of the four big U.S. bank holding swaps dealers 
described above may now, at their discretion, avoid Dodd-
Frank swaps regulation, inter alia, through the deguarantee 
and ANE loopholes. Each is headquartered in the U.S. and 
has its principal place of business there.29  Collectively, these 
four big U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers handle 
close to 90% of U.S. swaps trades.30 They have all been 
labeled “systemically important” under Dodd-Frank by the 
U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council, meaning that in 
another financial meltdown, they would almost certainly 
need to be financially bailed out by U.S. taxpayers to avoid a 
Second Great Depression.31
Of course, each of these banks benefitted from 
substantial U.S. taxpayer subsidies after the 2008 financial 
28 See infra notes 512–20 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra note 350 and accompanying text. On this ground alone, there 
is no question that U.S. jurisdiction over these four banks can be had in 
almost every, if not every, U.S. federal district court in the nation. 
Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 UMKC L. REV.
965, 971–72 (2012). Indeed, any financial institution conducting swaps 
business that has a “direct and significant” connection to U.S. commerce 
and is doing business in the United States would be subject to U.S. federal 
court jurisdiction where it is doing business. Id.
30 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY 
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES at 14 (Fourth 
Quarter 2017), https://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-mar 
kets/derivatives/dq318.pdf. 
31 See infra note 350 and accompanying text. 
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meltdown.32 In this regard, studies have shown that the 
present widespread expectation within the financial sector 
that U.S. taxpayers will rescue these huge banks in times of 
economic peril has been capitalized within the stock prices of 
these banks to increase those prices above the level that 
would be present in the absence of U.S. taxpayers’ expected 
status as their lenders of last resort.33 While many U.S. 
32 See, e.g., Mike Collins, The Big Bank Bailout, FORBES (July 14, 2015, 
4:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/07/14/the-big-
bank-bailout/#20a7755a2d83 (“The Special Inspector General for TARP 
summary of the bailout says that the total commitment of government is 
$16.8 trillion dollars with the $4.6 trillion already paid out.”); John 
Carney, The Size of the Bank Bailout: $29 Trillion, CNBC (Dec. 14, 2011, 
5:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/id/45674390. Of the $29 trillion, $8.2 
trillion went to the U.S.’s six largest banks, including the four banks 
discussed at length in this paper. BETTER MARKETS, WALL STREET’S SIX
BIGGEST BAILED-OUT BANKS: THEIR RAP SHEETS & THEIR ONGOING CRIME 
SPREE 4 (2019), https://bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Better%20 
Markets%20-%20Wall%20Street%27s%20Six%20Biggest%20Bailed-Out 
%20Banks%20FINAL.pdf.
33 Edward J. Kane, Perspectives on Banking and Banking Crises 6–8 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“In good times and in bad, 
being too big to fail simultaneously lowers both the cost of a firm’s debt 
and the cost of its equity.  This is because too-big-to-fail guarantees lower 
the risk that flows through to owners of both classes of securities.  These 
guarantees chop off bondholders’ and stockholders’ losses at a specified 
point and direct the flow of further losses to taxpayers . . . . The only time 
AIG’s stock price approached zero—and it did so twice—was when the 
possibility of a US government takeover fell under active discussion, so 
that the probability of stockholders’ continued rescue was falling.  As soon 
as this course of action was tabled, the stock price surged again because 
TBTF policies handed the value of the stop-loss back to AIG’s 
stockholders.”); Marc Labonte, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42150, 
SYSTEMATICALLY IMPORTANT OR “TOO BIG TO FAIL” FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS (2018) 5 (“In some cases, shareholders have borne some 
losses through stock dilution, although their losses may have been 
smaller than they would have been in a bankruptcy”); IMF Survey: Big 
Banks Benefit from Government Subsidies, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/ 
Too Big to Fail 
214 Journal of Business & Technology Law 

taxpayers have yet to fully recover from the Great 
Recession,34 these four big U.S. bank holding companies have 
thrived.35
It was not until the spring of 2014 that CFTC staff first 
learned about the “deguarantee” loophole sponsored by ISDA 
and adopted by, inter alia, the four big U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers.36 It appears that it was not until 
2016, that the CFTC first addressed the companion ANE 
loophole, which allows swaps fully executed in the U.S. by 
U.S. bank personnel to evade Dodd-Frank swaps regulations 
by later “assigning” those completed swaps to U.S. bank 
holding companies’ newly deguaranteed “foreign” bank 
subsidiaries.37
04/53/sopol033114a (“In its latest analysis for the Global Financial 
Stability Report, the IMF shows that big banks still benefit from implicit 
public subsidies created by the expectation that the government will 
support them if they are in financial trouble.”).   
34 See infra note 375 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Lydia DePillis, 
10 Years After the Recession Began, Have Americans Recovered?, CNN
MONEY (Dec. 1, 2017, 10:30 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/12/01/ 
news/economy/recession-anniversary/index.html (“. . . Americans still 
carry the scars of the recession, some of which will never heal.”); Abigail 
Summerville, A Decade after Great Recession, 1 in 3 Americans Still 
Haven’t Recovered, CNBC (July 13, 2017, 1:48 PM), https:// 
www.cnbc.com/2017/07/13/a-decade-after-great-recession-1-in-3-america 
ns-still-havent-recovered.html. 
35 See, e.g., Matt Egan, Too-Big-To-Fail Banks Keep Getting Bigger, CNN
MONEY (Nov. 21, 2017, 3:43 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/21/ 
investing/banks-too-big-to-fail-jpmorgan-bank-of-america/index.html; 
Stephen Gandel, By Every Measure, the Big Banks are Bigger, FORTUNE
(Sept. 13, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/09/13/by-every-measure-the-
big-banks-are-bigger/. 
36 See infra note 444 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 366–67, 457–59 and accompanying text; moreover, a 
recent ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit strongly 
suggests that the execution of the swap in the United States alone means 
that the transaction is not extraterritorial, but a “domestic transaction” 
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In November 2014, the then new CFTC Chairman, 
Timothy Massad, first questioned the use of the deguarantee 
loophole to avoid Dodd-Frank.38 By May 2016, the CFTC 
closed the deguarantee loophole for a portion of only one of 
the thirteen types of Dodd-Frank swaps regulations, i.e., 
swaps regulation dealing specifically with applying Dodd-
Frank swaps margin requirements to uncleared swaps.39
However, in October 2016, the CFTC proposed a rule 
and interpretations that, upon becoming final, would have 
ended completely the deguarantee loophole for all of its swaps 
regulations.40 At that time, the CFTC also first noted the 
existence of the ANE loophole and then attempted to end it 
completely in the proposed rule.41 However, the October 2016 
proposals were never finalized by the CFTC before the 
inauguration of President Trump, and all indications are that 
the proposals will never be finalized during a Trump 
Administration.42 In sum, the deguarantee and ANE 
loopholes will remain in effect at the very least for years to 
come.43
Because of the lack of transparency concerning swaps 
trading before Dodd-Frank went into effect and because so 
and therefore completely subject to Dodd-Frank even if the swaps was 
later “assigned” to a foreign subsidiary. Choi v. Tower Research Capital 
LLC, 890 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2018). 
38 See infra note 445 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra Part IX.E. 
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See also infra notes 517–23 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
yet a further unlimited CFTC complete exemption from Dodd-Frank 
swaps rules authored—not by the CFTC itself—but the CFTC staff for 
foreign swaps traders registered to do swaps trading by the CFTC with 
non-U.S. persons. Id. This exemption is afforded as a matter of 
“international comity” so as not to conflict with foreign swaps law even 
when there is no applicable foreign swaps law to be applied. Id.
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much of the trading was done through deguaranteed foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. swaps dealers after Dodd-Frank’s 
passage, a fully accurate accounting of the extent to which 
swaps have moved abroad from the U.S. is difficult. However, 
many market experts noticed a very significant movement of 
swaps abroad after the deguarantee loophole was created. 
Moreover, a  highly cited study by Reuter’s calculated that up 
to 95% of certain lines of swaps trading had moved outside 
the U.S. under the deguarantee loophole and thus were 
considered not to be subject to Dodd-Frank swaps 
regulations.44 However, while the trading has likely moved 
abroad in great numbers, those trades would still be reflected 
in the consolidated balance sheets of, inter alia, the four big 
U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers. Moreover, those 
trades have only “moved” from the U.S. parent swaps dealers 
and their U.S. affiliates to their newly “deguaranteed” 
foreign subsidiaries. What has not moved abroad is the 
obligation of the lender of last resort to these four big U.S. 
banks: i.e., the U.S. taxpayer, who is understood throughout 
the financial world to be subject to a call for funds to bail out 
these banks should a new crisis threaten worldwide 
cascading swaps defaults that, if not stopped, will lead to 
financial Armageddon.45
To understand the significance of, inter alia, the 
deguarantee and ANE loopholes, it is first important to 
understand what, in fact, swaps are and how unregulated 
swaps have caused many serious financial dysfunctions, and 
then, ultimately in September 2008, the full destabilization 
of the world economy. That information is provided in the 
next section of this paper.  
This background is important because the swaps 
market is widely recognized by economists, financial 
regulators, members of Congress, and other financial market 
44 See infra notes 358–365 and accompanying text. 
45 See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 33. 
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experts to be the most poorly understood of all financial 
markets.46 As Senator Chris Dodd said, after passage of 
Dodd-Frank: 
One of the problems that I had as a 
member of Congress on this issue, is 
financial literacy is not [just] a 
general problem with the public, it’s 
a general problem with too many 
people, including my colleagues . . . It 
is not well understood . . . .  Too often, 
in the banking [area] . . . when your 
Bill is on the floor of the Senate, the 
question would be not [be] “explain to 
me the derivatives section,” . . . the 
question is “is [the derivatives 
section] okay” . . . and that was 
basically the only question you’d 
get.47
Because swaps markets are so poorly understood, the 
import of these extraterritorial loopholes from Dodd-Frank’s 
regulation of these markets is, similarly, misunderstood.  
Ending these loopholes and a return to protecting the U.S. 
taxpayer against multi-trillion-dollar bank bailouts are made 
that much more difficult by this lack of knowledge.48
46 See Discover GW, Sen. Chris Dodd: Cohen Lecture at The Shape of 
Things to Come, YOUTUBE (Jan. 17, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=WlIUcO-OGwE; see also Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher, 
President & CEO, Better Markets Inc., to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, U.S. 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (October 26, 2015) (on file with Better Markets) 
(describing the swaps market, Secretary of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Brent Fields states, “[D]erivatives are so complex 
and poorly understood by even sophisticated market participants . . . .”). 
47 See Discover GW, supra note 46. 
48 See, e.g., A User’s Guide for the Bank Holding Company Performance 
Report, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, (Mar. 
2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/BHCPR_Publica 
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Moreover, with all the attention being given to 
President Trump’s claims that Dodd-Frank will be “rolled 
back,” there is a surprising reticence on the part of the big 
Wall Street banks and the Trump Administration about 
rolling back specifically Dodd-Frank swaps regulatory 
provisions. 49
One could rationally conclude that, with the benefit of 
the “deguarantee and ANE” loopholes to evade application of 
Dodd-Frank swaps rules, there is no need for these too big to 
fail U.S. banks to “roll back” U.S. Dodd-Frank swaps rules by 
new legislation.50 Moreover, there are recent important 
Congressional statements by even outspoken supporters of 
weakening Dodd-Frank showing a strong political distaste 
for Congressionally enacted deregulation that helps the very 
biggest U.S. bank holding companies;51 and any legislation 
advanced to repeal Dodd-Frank swaps regulation for those 
huge banks might also be the target of a legislative rider to 
reinstate a “modern day” Glass-Steagall in a format which 
could force these big U.S. swaps dealer banks tostructurally 
and completely suspend that part of the bank that buys and 
tion_2017_03_FINAL.pdf (explaining the meaning of data contained 
within quarterly reports of Financial Holding Companies by Peer Group); 
see also Bank Holding Company Performance Report, Peer Group Data,
Peer Group 01, at 10 (Sept. 2016), BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM, https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/BHCPRRPT 
/REPORTS/BHCPR_PEER/Sept2016/PeerGroup_1_September2016.pdf; 
Silla Bush, Wall Street Faces New U.S. Scrutiny of Derivatives Tactic,
BLOOMBERG (July, 30 2014, 8:48 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-07-30/wall-street-facing-new-u-s-scrutiny-of-deriva 
tives-rule-tactic (describing a CFTC staff letter, discussing how five 
banks “control 95 percent of cash and derivatives trading for U.S. bank 
holding companies as of March 31, according to the Office of Comptroller 
of the Currency.”). 
49 See infra notes 374–410 and accompanying text. 
50 See infra note 419 and accompanying text. 
51 See infra notes 379–400 and accompanying text. 
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sells investments, including the sales and purchase of swaps, 
which might not then be included in the commercial bank 
functions, wherein only federally insured deposits and loan 
making might be done.52 Investments and swaps might then 
only be done by wholly separated investment banks—and 
thus JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, and Bank of America at 
least would likely have to either completely or substantially 
abandon swaps trading.53   
The deguarantee and ANE loopholes, which originated 
in the Obama Administration’s CFTC, are certainly not likely 
to be closed in the Trump Administration. Relief is also 
unlikely to be found in a Congress with a Republican-
controlled Senate. However, the relevant swaps statutory 
framework now affords state attorneys general and state 
financial regulators the right to bring so-called “parens 
patriae” actions in federal district courts to enforce, inter alia,
Dodd-Frank on behalf of a state’s citizens.  State attorneys 
general, for example, have aggressively litigated in federal 
district courts to enjoin U.S. banks’ financial irregularities.54
However, little (if anything) has been done by the states in 
the swaps arena. This is because there is so little knowledge 
of swaps even in the otherwise highly capable offices of state 
attorneys general and state financial regulators.   
It is the hope that this paper may remedy that lack in 
understanding of a market that has brought, and, if not 
properly regulated, will once again bring, the most severe 
adverse economic consequences imaginable worldwide. A 
history of the market and its traditional poor regulation 
begins in the next section of this paper. 
52 See infra notes 401–10 and accompanying text. 
53 See infra notes 406–10 and accompanying text. 
54 See infra Part XII. 
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Finally, as is also shown in detail below,55 there are 
well publicized pronouncements, most prominently by 
President Trump, Congressional Republicans and Fed chair 
Jerome Powell56 that the U.S. economy is booming with low 
unemployment, solid GDP growth and benefits purportedly 
to be derived from the touted stimulus effect  of the passage 
of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017; and it is not now 
foreseeable under conventional wisdom that the “too big to 
fail” U.S. banks could face the insolvency or the threatened 
insolvency that occurred in 2008.  It is this sense of financial 
euphoria that undergirds arguments for Dodd-Frank 
deregulation.  
However, the short term effects of the purported 
stimulus to be derived from the tax cut are at best, as of this 
writing, fast wearing off.57 Many have characterized any 
stimulus from the tax cut as a “brief sugar high.”58 Indeed, 
many Americans are facing additional hardship from 
unexpectedly smaller tax refunds under the new tax 
55 See infra notes 272–75 and accompanying text. 
56 Id.
57 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, US Business Confidence Recedes from 
Post-Tax Cut High, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/e06122d2-4b1f-11e9-8b7f-d49067e0f50d (“An index of CEOs’ 
economic confidence compiled by the Business Roundtable, one of 
Washington’s most prominent business groups, declined for the fourth 
quarter in a row, falling 9.2 points to 95.2.”). See also Ruchir Sharma, The 
Miracle Years are Over. Get Used to It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/opinion/economy-debt-inflation.ht 
ml (“Stimulus measures like the Trump tax cuts can lift growth above 
this path, but at best temporarily, at the risk of higher deficits and debt.”); 
Paul Krugman, The Incredible Shrinking Trump Boom, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/opinion/the-incredible-
shrinking-trump-boom.html (contending that the tax cut is a “brief sugar 
high”). 
58 Id.
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legislation.59 Moreover, there is an equally persuasive, if not 
as well publicized, counter assessment by distinguished 
financial observers that there are too many similarities 
between today’s economy and the seemingly strong economy 
leading into the 2008 meltdown.60 The country is now again 
awash in defaults on consumer indebtedness in the multi-
trillion dollar credit card, student loan, and auto loan 
markets.61 Even worse, the indebtedness in these markets is 
accompanied by the very same financial engineering 
infrastructure, including swaps, that collapsed in the 2008 
mortgage crisis.62 These observers have persuasively argued 
that the rising defaults and the likely resulting failure of the 
accompanying financial engineering structures could very 
well lead to the next financial meltdown and a new call for 
U.S. taxpayer bailouts.63 Therefore, this is certainly not the 
time to gamble with the world economy by creating massive 
loopholes in the application of Dodd-Frank swaps regulation.  
59 See, e.g., Martha C. White, Smaller Tax Refunds Compound Financial 
Worries for the 30 Percent of Americans with More Debt Than Savings, 
NBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-
news/smaller-tax-refunds-compound-financial-worries-30-percent-ameri 
cans-more-n971756 (“29 percent of respondents who said their debts 
outstripped their savings is the highest number recorded” which 
“underscores the unevenness of the economic recovery.” This resulted in 
“the hashtag #GOPTaxScam trending on Twitter as users detailed the 
extent to which the new law changed their own taxes”). 
60 See infra notes 277–307 and accompanying text. 
61 Id. See also Steven Pearlstein, Beware the ‘Mother of all Credit 
Bubbles’, WASH. POST (Jun. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/beware-the-mother-of-all-credit-bubbles/2018/06/08/ 
940f467c-69af-11e8-9e38-24e693b38637_story.html?noredirect=on&utm 
_term=.a007d7c21fb3 (warning that 2018 is reminiscent of the run up to 
the 2008 crash and that that next meltdown will concern corporate debt 
now reaching “record levels” aggravated  by “another round of financial 
engineering that converts equity into debt.”). 
62 See infra notes 277–307 and accompanying text. 
63 Id.
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II. THE TROUBLED HISTORY OF THE SWAPS 
MARKET AND ITS POOR REGULATION
Beginning in 1865, farmers and grain merchants organized 
in Chicago to hedge price risk in corn, wheat, and other 
grains in what are thought to be the earliest sustained 
derivatives transactions in this country.64 These kinds of 
derivatives have been historically referred to as “futures 
contracts.”65
Since their creation, these futures contracts were 
recognized as being subject to price distortion, i.e., rather 
than providing the intended successful commercial hedging, 
they can cause hedging entities and their consumers to pay 
excessive or (in the case of producers) unduly low, 
unnecessary and unexpected spot (or market) prices. This 
price distortion happens through excessive speculation, 
fraud, and/or manipulation within those markets.66 As one 
disgruntled farmer told the House Agriculture Committee in 
1892:  
[T]he man who managed or sold or 
owned those immense wheat fields 
has not as much to say with the 
regard to the price of the wheat than 
some young fellow [i.e., futures 
trader] who stands howling around 
the Chicago wheat pit [i.e., futures 
64 Jonathan Ira Levy, Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the 
Problem of Commodity Exchange in the United States, 1875-1905, 111 
AM. HIST. REV. 307, 307–09 (2006). 
65 NICK BATTLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMODITY FUTURES AND 
OPTIONS 17–18 (2d ed. 1995). 
66 See Levy, supra note 64, at 310. 
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exchange] could actually sell in a 
day.67
A. The Origins and Purposes of the Commodity 
Exchange Act’s Regulation of Derivatives 
Because excessively low farm prices wreaked financial havoc 
on America’s agriculture sector shortly before and during the 
Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
recommended to Congress, as one of his earliest financial 
market reform proposals, legislation that became the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (“CEA”).68 When 
introducing this legislation in 1934, President Roosevelt 
said: “[I]t should be our national policy to restrict, as far as 
possible, the use of these [futures] exchanges for purely 
speculative operations.”69  Accordingly, the 1935 Report of 
House Agriculture Committee, which led to the 1936 Act, 
stated:
The fundamental purpose of the 
measure [i.e., the CEA] is to insure 
fair practice and honest dealing on 
the commodity exchanges and to 
provide a measure of control over 
those forms of speculative activity 
which too often demoralize the 
markets to the injury of producers 
67 Id. at 307 (quoting Fictitious Dealings in Agricultural Products: 
Hearing on H.R. 392, H.R. 2699, and H.R. 3870, Before H. Comm. on 
Agric., 52d Cong. (1892)). 
68 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, 3 PUB. PAPERS 81 (1938); see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 6–27 (2006) (as 
amended). 
69 Roosevelt, supra note 68, at 91. 
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and consumers and the exchanges 
themselves.70
Thus, the CEA, as amended, required that all futures 
contracts be traded on a regulated exchange providing full 
transparency to regulators of trading behavior and to the 
public of the formation of futures prices.71 The exchange-
trading requirement of the CEA was so central to that 
statute’s effectiveness that it is still a felony to knowingly 
violate it, and substantial criminal penalties or civil fines 
may be levied upon offending traders and their employees.72
B. The Nature of Futures Contracts 
The most prominent treatise on derivatives defines a “futures 
contract” as follows: 
The traditional futures contract is an 
agreement between a seller and a 
buyer that the seller (called a short) 
will deliver to the buyer (called a 
long), at a price agreed to when the 
contract is first entered, and the 
buyer will accept and pay for, a 
specified quantity and grade of an 
identified commodity during a 
defined time in the future.73
70 Donald A. Campbell, Trading in Futures Under the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215, 223 (1958). 
71 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2009) (as amended). 
72 Id. § 13(b). 
73 PHILLIP M. JOHNSON & THOMAS L. HAZEN, 1 DERIVATIVES REGULATION,
§1.02[3] at 25 (2004) [hereinafter JOHNSON & HAZEN].
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While futures contracts were first developed for the 
agricultural sector, they ultimately expanded into hedging 
vehicles for metals and energy markets.74 “[T]here has been 
a continual [further] expansion of the futures and derivatives 
markets [to] [f]inancial futures—on government securities, 
private debt issues, foreign currencies, and stock indices—an 
increasingly important part of the commodities world.”75
Standardization of [the] terms is a 
key feature of publicly traded futures 
contracts.  [Under] a futures contract, 
[al]most [all] customers do not expect 
to take delivery. There is an 
opportunity to offset the delivery 
[obligation], and the customer has a 
right to liquidate rather than take [or 
make] delivery.76
Indeed, it is very rare that delivery is executed under 
a futures contract.77 (A full explanation of the hedging 
mechanism provided by future contracts is beyond the scope 
of this paper but is otherwise fully explained by sources cited 
in the margin).78 Only through the use of highly standardized 
74 Id. § 1.02[1] at 7–8. 
75 Id. § 1.02[1] at 11.   
76 Id. § 1.02[3] at 24–25 n.97 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).   
77 PRAKASH G. APTE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: A BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 
149 (2009) (“[I]n most futures markets, actual delivery takes place in less 
than one percent of the contracts traded.”). See also Andrew Hecht, 
Taking Delivery of Commodities via the Futures Market, THE BALANCE 
(Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/taking-delivery-of-comm 
odities-via-the-futures-market-4118366 (explaining that “less than 5 
percent of futures with a delivery mechanism result in parties making or 
taking delivery of a commodity”).  
78 BATTLEY, supra note 65, at 7–11 (explaining that the basic purpose of 
trading out of a futures contract “is to use the futures market to prevent 
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futures contracts can the necessary liquidity be developed 
that allows traders the much-needed ability to offset quick 
delivery commitments in order to avoid unwanted (indeed, 
often impossible) delivery obligations but still hedge market 
spot prices.79
or minimize the effects of adverse price movements in the physical 
commodity" by effectively, “seek[ing] an outright profit in future [trade] 
to offset a potential loss in physicals”). Battley delineates this technique 
into two categories: a “producer hedge,” which protects against the 
market price falling and a “consumer hedge,” which protects against the 
market price rising.  Id. at 8. To illustrate a producer hedge, Battley sets 
out the example of an oil refiner who, despite current physical market 
costs at $145, expects those prices to drop, so the refiner sells oil futures 
at $144.  Id. at 8–9.  As expected, the market price drops to $140, which 
creates a $5 loss for the refiner on the physical market; however, the 
futures price also drops to $139. Id. To offset the $5 loss in the physical 
market, the refiner “squares out his [futures] position . . . by buying . . . 
at $139.” Thus, because when the refiner sold the futures, he received 
$144, and when he bought at the lower price, he only paid $139, in effect 
the refiner nets $5 to completely offset the physical market loss. Id. at 9.  
To illustrate the consumer hedge, Battley presents the oil market 
example from an oil distributor's perspective, summarizing that, in this 
context, the consumer's fear is a rise in the physical market price, and to 
“minimize the effects of such a price movement, [consumers] may buy on 
the futures market so that, should the physical price move up thereby 
forcing them to pay more than they anticipated for their oil, the 
[corresponding] increase in the futures price will provide . . . an offsetting 
profit.” Id. at 10; see also JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at § 1.03[2] 
(addressing the “hedging function” and analogizing the “hedge” to an 
insurance policy on investment). 
79 APTE, supra note 77. See also CFTC, The Economic Purpose of Futures 
Contracts, https://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/ec 
onomicpurpose.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2019) (stating “[futures 
contract] standardization enhances liquidity . . . [which] makes the 
contract more useful for hedging” but not as “a merchandising vehicle” 
and that commodity providers typically “offset the contracts before the 
delivery date” rather than make the delivery). One more recent accepted 
method of “avoiding delivery” is to “cash settle” the futures transaction 
based on the market price of the futures contract, a settlement process 
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C. The Contours of the CEA’s Exchange Trading 
Requirement 
As would be expected of a market regulation bill that followed 
in the wake of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, the 
contours of the CEA’s futures exchange regulation mirrors 
the regulation of the equities markets, i.e., futures contracts 
were required to be traded on publicly-transparent and fully-
regulated exchanges supported by clearing mechanisms to 
ensure that contractual commitments would be backed by 
adequate collateral and capital of the futures contract 
counterparties and the clearinghouse.80
Under the CEA, regulated exchanges ensured that 
futures contracts were subject to: (1) public and transparent 
price formation based on market demand; (2) disclosure of 
the real trading parties in interest to federal market 
regulators; (3) regulation of intermediaries, i.e., brokers and 
their employees; (4) stringent rules for customer protection; 
(5) self-regulation by exchanges directly supervised by a 
federal regulator to detect unlawful trading activity; (6) 
prohibitions against fraud, market manipulation, and 
excessive speculation; and (7) enforcement of all these 
requirements by a federal regulator, private individuals, and 
the states.  The latter two remedies are afforded by private 
rights of action for adversely-affected traders and customers; 
and by state parens patriae suits to be brought by state 
attorneys general and state financial regulators, 
respectively.81
As an essential part of this regulatory format, futures 
contracts have to be “cleared,” i.e., a well-capitalized and 
that has been deemed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”) to be wholly permissible under the CEA; JOHNSON & HAZEN,
supra note 73, at § 1.03[8], at 146–47. 
80 See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at §§ 1.02[2][E], 1.02[8][F], 1.05. 
81 7 U.S.C. § 6 (2006). 
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regulated intermediary institution is required to stand 
between the counterparties of a futures contract to ensure 
that commitments undertaken pursuant to those contracts 
are adequately collateralized through the collection of 
margin to prevent counterparty harms from contractual 
defaults.82 Any contractual default by a counterparty is 
guaranteed by the clearing facility, a financial commitment 
that serves to ensure that the clearing facility has a strong 
incentive to enforce strictly the collateralization of each 
trade, through highly disciplined daily assessments of the 
market prices of futures positions, as well as the immediate 
collection by the clearing facility of two types of margin from 
the counterparties: (1) the payment of initial margin upon 
executing and listing a futures contract; and (2) the payment 
of variation margin when the contract price moves against a 
counterparty to the trade.83
D. The Development and Characteristics of 
Swaps 
By the 1980s, a variant of futures contracts was developed, 
commonly referred to as swaps.84 When first addressing 
swaps contracts, the CFTC defined them as “an agreement 
between two parties to exchange a series of cash flows 
measured by different interest rates, exchanges rates, or 
prices with payment calculated by reference to a principal 
base (notional amount).”85
Similarly, ISDA, the major private, self-regulatory 
body of swaps dealers which must be ISDA members to have 
82 See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at § 1.05. 
83 See id.
84 See id. at § 1.02[8][A]. 
85 Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694, 
30,695 (July 21, 1989).   
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the right to trade swaps using ISDA’s widely-used, 
copyrighted, contractual templates, defines a swap as “[a] 
derivative where two counterparties exchange streams of 
cash flows with each other. These streams of cash flows are 
known as the ‘legs’ of the swap and are calculated by 
reference to a notional amount.”86
The classic example of a swap is an interest rate swap 
where one party to the agreement exchanges with the swaps 
dealer a floating interest rate obligation on an existing loan 
for a fixed rate obligation to the dealer.87 Usually, the person 
swapping the floating rate for a fixed rate is expecting (or 
hedging against the future possibility that) the fixed rate will 
be lower than the floating rate.88
In other words, the underlying loan is almost never 
negotiated or renegotiated under the swap.89 It is an assumed 
amount written into the swap, most often (but not 
necessarily, especially in cases of interest rate speculation) 
reflecting an actual outstanding loan of one of the swap’s 
counterparties from a creditor or lender upon which, 
pursuant to a loan, the floating rate is to be paid.90 Under an 
interest rate swap, the fixed interest rate payments paid (in 
lieu of an adjustable rate specified in the loan document) 
under the swap by the counterparty “the borrower” to the 
swaps dealer would also be specified in the transaction, as 
86 INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., DCG GLOSSARY,
https://www.isda.org/1970/01/01/glossary/#s (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
87 Id.; see also SATYAJIT DAS, TRADERS, GUNS AND MONEY: KNOWNS AND 
UNKNOWNS IN THE DAZZLING WORLD OF DERIVATIVES 37 (rev. ed. 2010). 
88 The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing before the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 111th Cong. 3–4 (2010) (testimony 
of Prof. Michael Greenberger, Univ. of Md. Carey School of Law) 
[hereinafter Greenberger Testimony]; see also BATTLEY, supra note 65, at 
5–12. 
89 Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88. 
90 Id.
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would the manner in which the floating rate is to be 
calculated.91 Thus, rather than buying/selling a single future 
rate or price (as would be true in a traditional futures 
contract), there is a “swapping” of commitments, with one 
party buying the fixed rate and selling the floating rate 
(usually the non-dealer), while the other party (usually the 
dealer) is buying the floating rate and selling the fixed rate.92
In the interest rate swap scenario described above, the 
counterparty with a loan is “hedging” against increased 
interest rates to be paid as a floating rate obligation. The 
bank swaps dealer counterparty may be deemed to be 
speculating that interest rates will not increase, but it 
usually hedges that risk both by the substantial fees paid by 
the non-dealer counterparty to the swap dealer for the right 
to enter into the interest rate swap; and by the swaps dealer 
itself often hedging its swaps exposure through a mirror but 
opposite interest rate swap.   
Most important, there was (and is) no bar to either or 
both counterparties speculating on the future price of 
interest rates through such a swap. That is, the 
counterparties are free not to hedge any existing credit 
exposure but instead can be “betting” on the future direction 
of interest rates. As a Wall Street Journal editor and author 
recently observed, in a thorough analysis of manipulation in 
the speculative use of interest rate swaps: “[Interest rate] 
swaps [are] simply another vehicle with which banks could 
bet on the future direction of interest rates . . . . By 2010, 
some $1.28 trillion of these interest rate swaps changed 
hands on a daily basis . . . .”93
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 DAVID ENRICH, THE SPIDER NETWORK: THE WILD STORY OF A MATH 
GENIUS, A GANG OF BACKSTABBER BANKERS AND ONE OF THE GREATEST 
SCAMS IN FINANCIAL HISTORY 35 (2017). 
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As will be shown below, it is most often speculation in 
the use of swaps, i.e., betting on the price direction of the 
index on which the swap is based, that has caused serious 
financial dislocations, e.g., in the 2008 financial meltdown, 
where swaps naked “shorts” bet that mortgages which they 
did not own would fail, thus entitling those shorts to recover 
the complete amount of the actual loss on those mortgages 
even though they did not own them. It was the indebtedness 
of, inter alia, U.S. swaps dealers or their affiliates to pay off 
those mortgage “losses” guaranteed to the shorts that 
punched a major hole in the world economy because, inter 
alia, the U.S. swaps dealers, or their affiliates, operating in 
the pre-Dodd-Frank unregulated environment, had neither 
sufficient capital nor collateral in reserve to fall back on to 
pay off the successful, shorting counterparties; nor were 
these transactions cleared, thereby insuring a third party 
guarantee of the of the defaulting counterparties’ contractual 
obligations.  
Similarly, many of those U.S. bank holding company 
swaps dealers themselves, upon recognizing mounting risk in 
the mortgage markets, shorted the U.S. mortgage market 
using naked CDS, with their counterparties, essentially 
insuring full mortgage payments for mortgage defaults. In 
turn, that led to the likelihood of non-payment to the bank 
holding company swaps dealers of the “insurance” they had 
purchased from their cash-strapped counterparties when the 
mortgage market collapsed. 
To avoid cascading massive defaults on the viability of 
the failing U.S. mortgage market, it was the U.S. taxpayer 
that shelled out trillions of dollars to bail out these, inter alia,
huge U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers both in their 
inability to pay the “insurance” and in their threatened 
inability to collect the insurance from their defaulting 
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counterparties when those swaps dealers were themselves 
shorting the housing market.94   
E. Swaps and the CEA’s Exchange Trading 
Requirement 
After swaps had been developed in the 1980s, with a 
simultaneous recognition that swaps contained the features 
of a futures contract, the question arose whether swaps 
would be subject to the mandatory exchange-trading 
requirement of the CEA.95 In a 1989 Policy Statement, the 
CFTC set forth the criteria for the kind of swaps for “which 
regulation under the CEA and Commission regulations [of 
swaps would be] unnecessary.”96 The CFTC concluded that 
swaps at that time required:  
[t]ailoring . . . through private 
negotiations between the parties and 
may involve not only financial terms 
but issues such as representations, 
covenants, events of default, term to 
maturity, and any requirement for 
the posting of collateral or other 
credit enhancement.  Such tailoring 
and counterparty credit assessment 
distinguish swap transactions from 
exchange transactions, where the 
94 Cezary Podkul et al., 10 Years After the Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 
2018), http://graphics.wsj.com/how-the-world-has-changed-since-2008-fi 
nancial-crisis/ (“The financial crisis cost the U.S. economy some $6 trillion 
to $14 trillion in lost output, and ended only after the government 
promised aid worth an estimated $12.6 trillion.”). 
95 See supra note 85, at 30,694. 
96 Id. at 39,037. 
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contract terms are standardized and 
the counterparty is unknown.97
Accordingly, the CFTC exempted swaps from the CEA 
exchange-trading requirement, by stating that “swaps must
be negotiated by the parties as to their material terms, based 
upon individualized credit determinations, and documented 
by the parties in an agreement or series of agreements that 
is not fully standardized.”98 Another condition of the 
exchange trading exemption is that “[t]he swap transactions 
must not be marketed to the public.”99
Because the CEA provided no explicit statutory 
provision authorizing the CFTC to grant this kind of 
exemption from the CEA’s exchange trading requirement, 
the large U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers, inter 
alia, complained to Congress that there was “uncertainty” as 
to the legal effect of the CFTC’s 1989 policy statement.100
Thus, to accommodate these large swaps dealers, in 1992 
Congress passed the Futures Trading Practices Act (“FTPA”), 
which authorized the precise criteria for the CFTC to create 
an exemption from the CEA’s mandatory exchange trading 
requirement for, inter alia, “swap agreements” that “are not
part of a fungible class of agreements that are standardized 
as to their material economic terms.”101   
The Commission later explained this statutory bar to 
standardization of swaps as follows:  
This condition [that swaps be 
individually negotiated] is designed 
97 Id. at 39,038. 
98 Id. (emphasis added). 
99 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at 53. 
100 Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88, at 4. 
101 Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 
3631 (emphasis added). 
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to assure that the exemption does not 
encompass . . . swap agreements, the 
terms of which are fixed and are not 
subject to negotiation, that functions 
essentially in the same manner as an 
exchange but for the bilateral 
execution of transactions.102
Pursuant to the CFTC’s then new-found ability to 
grant exceptions to the CEA’s exchange-trading requirement, 
the CFTC by rule in 1993 provided an exception from the 
CEA’s exchange-trading for swaps that were, inter alia, “not
part of a fungible class of agreements that are standardized 
as to their material economic terms[.]”103  Moreover, exempt 
swaps agreements were not to be “traded on or through a 
multilateral transaction execution facility[.]”104 In laymen’s 
terms, “a multilateral transaction execution facility” consists 
of one party offering electronically a swaps agreement to 
many different other parties, rather than merely offering 
agreements on a strictly bilateral or one-on-one basis.105
102 Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5590 
(Jan. 22, 1993). 
103 17 C.F.R. § 35.2(b) (2009) (emphasis added). 
104 Id. § 35.2(d). 
105 See A New Regulatory Framework for Multilateral Transaction 
Execution Facilities, Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 38,986, 38,989 (June 22, 2000) (“The Commission is proposing to 
define MTEF as ‘an electronic or non-electronic market or similar facility 
through which persons, for their own accounts or for the accounts of 
others, enter into, agree to enter into or execute binding transactions by 
accepting bids or offers made by one person that are open to multiple 
persons conducting business through such market or similar facility.’”); 
Membership, ISDA, https://www.isda.org/membership/ (“ISDA has over 
900 member institutions from 70 countries.”) (last visited Mar. 28, 2019). 
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F. The Standardization of Swaps through the 
ISDA Master Agreement 
However, even before the 1993 CFTC exchange-trading 
exemption had been finalized, calling for “tailored” 
negotiation of each of the material economic terms of a swap 
to be exempt from exchange trading, ISDA promulgated, in 
1992, a standardized and copyrighted Master Agreement and 
related standardized and copyrighted schedules to govern the 
execution of a swap.  ISDA “was chartered in 1985 and today 
has over [875] member institutions.”106 Under ISDA’s rules, 
one could not trade swaps unless trading with an ISDA 
member that had the exclusive rights to use ISDA’s 
standardized, copyright agreements. As will be seen, these 
standardized ISDA-created contracts substantially undercut 
the CFTC 1993 exchange trading exemption for the 
“tailoring” of swaps, i.e., ISDA swaps contractual template 
made swaps look exactly like standardized futures contracts 
and thus, under the CEA, had to be traded on an exchange.107
In this regard, the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement was 
24 pages long with standardized, boilerplate clauses, and 
each page carried with it a copyright in ISDA’s name.108 The 
Agreement included the fundamental provisions without 
which the swaps transaction could not be understood.  
Included among the many contractual points resolved by the 
ISDA Master Agreement are “Interpretation” principles (¶1); 
106 Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black 
Hole with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic 
Economic Destabilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion 
Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 135 (2011) (quoting 
News Release, ISDA, Eraj Shirvani New Chairman of ISDA (Apr. 16, 
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also MASTER AGREEMENT,
ISDA, 1992. 
107 See supra notes 95–105 and accompanying text. 
108 See ISDA, MASTER AGREEMENT (1992) at 1–24. 
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“Obligations,” including “Liability” (¶2); “Representations” 
(¶3); “Agreements” (¶4); “Events of Default and Termination 
Events” (¶5); “Early Termination” (¶6); “Transfer” (¶7); 
“Contractual Currency” (¶8); “Remedies” (¶9); “Expenses” 
(¶11); “Notice” (¶12); “Governing Law and Jurisdiction” 
(¶13); and forty-three “definitions” governing the swaps 
transactions (¶14).109
Accompanying the ISDA Master Agreement is a 
“Schedule,” six pages long, derived directly from a 
standardized ISDA template, which, in turn, provides a 
standardized menu of limited choices to further define terms 
of the ISDA Master Agreement.110 The ISDA template for the 
Schedule is itself copyrighted on every page in ISDA’s name.  
The ISDA standardized template for the Schedule is 
dependent upon, and references only, the ISDA Master 
Agreement.111
Also, accompanying the ISDA Schedule is a 
standardized ISDA Credit Support Annex, which is sixteen 
pages long and includes copyrights in ISDA’s name on every 
page except those relating to the last of thirteen paragraphs 
of the annex.112 The Credit Support Annex is the mechanism 
by which parties to the swap transaction would adjust the 
credit arrangement underlying the swap. For example, and 
critical for a discussion of the U.S. bank-created “de-
guarantee loopholes” below, this latter document 
traditionally served as a downstream guarantee of a swaps 
dealer subsidiary to a swaps non-dealer counterparty.  
109 Id. at 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11–14. 
110 Id. at 19–24. 
111 Id.
112 See ISDA, MASTER AGREEMENT, CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX TO SCHEDULE
(1992). 
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G. The CFTC’s May 1998 Concept Release 
Suggesting the Regulation of Swaps 
By 1998, swaps were growing at a rapid pace.113 As the CFTC 
noted in May 1998:  
Use of OTC derivatives has grown at 
very substantial rates over the past 
few years.  According to the most 
recent market survey by [ISDA], the 
notional value of new transactions 
reported by ISDA members in 
interest rate swaps, currency swaps, 
and interest rate options during the 
first half of 1997 increased 46% over 
the previous six-month period.  The 
notional value of outstanding 
contracts in these instruments was 
$28.733 trillion, up 12.9% from year-
end 1996, 62.2% from year-end 1995, 
and 154.2% from year-end 1994.  
ISDA’s 1996 market survey noted 
that there were 633,316 outstanding 
contracts in these instruments as of 
year-end 1996, up 47% from year-end 
1995, which in turn represented a 
40.7% increase over year-end 1994.114
113 Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,114–15 (May 
12, 1998) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 34 and 35). 
114 Id. at 26,115 (internal citations omitted). Throughout this paper, the 
metric for the value of swaps is listed as the “notional value.”  As the 
concept release itself makes clear, the “actual value” of a swap may more 
accurately reflect the amount at risk in the swaps trade. The concept 
release shows that the “actual value” of a swap is about 3% of the notional 
value. Id. Even so, 3% of the notional value of swaps (about $593 trillion) 
at the time of the 2008 meltdown, still amounts to almost $18 trillion 
dollars, a large enough number of value at risk to set off the 2008 
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In addition, by the mid-to-late 90s, swaps, because of 
the ISDA Master Agreement, were so standardized that they 
could be traded electronically on a multilateral basis, thereby 
exhibiting all of the trading characteristics of traditional 
exchange-traded, standardized futures contracts.115 Because 
swaps were increasingly standardized and traded 
multilaterally, however, that market was not within the “safe 
harbors” of the CFTC exemption from the CEA’s exchange 
trading requirement provided by the 1989 Swaps Policy 
Statement or the 1993 Swaps exemption, both of which 
required bilateral “tailoring” of material terms by the swaps 
counterparties and barred the trading of swaps 
multilaterally.116
On May 7, 1998, the CFTC promulgated a “concept 
release” concerning swaps, finding that these products were 
so standardized and traded multilaterally that they were 
almost certainly subject to the CEA’s mandatory exchange 
trading requirement (and therefore were trading in violation 
of the CEA).  The concept release called for public comment 
on the development of various proposed alternative 
regulatory schemes that would create a workable exemption 
financial panic. See also OTC Derivative Statistics at End-December 2017,
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (May 3, 2018), https://www.bis.org/ 
publ/otc_hy1805.htm (stating that Bank for International Settlements 
finds the value at end-June 2017 of outstanding swaps to have a notional 
value of $542 trillion, recognizing that the gross market value is $13 
trillion or about 2.5% of notional value); James Rundle, The Risky 
Business of Splitting Hairs, WATERS TECH. (Jun. 8, 2018), https:// 
www.waterstechnology.com/industry-issues-initiatives/3683551/the-risk 
y-business-of-splitting-hairs (noting that regulatory efforts are in play, 
inter alia, at the CFTC to move away from notional amount metric, and 
that resistance to any change is premised on the fact that the EU, 
Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore and Canada now use the notional 
amount metric for market regulation). 
115 See supra note 113 at 26,115–16. 
116 See id. at 26,116–18. 
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now authorized by the CEA from that statute’s mandatory 
exchange trading requirement.117   
The concept release made clear, however, that any new 
regulatory system would only be applied “prospectively,” with 
the then-existing swaps market retroactively permitted 
under the relatively new exchange trading exemption 
authority within the CEA.118
The concept release was published in the Federal 
Register, and it asked commenters to give their opinions on 
how and which traditional CEA regulatory requirements 
should be applied to the swaps market, e.g., reporting and 
disclosure, capital and collateral adequacy, clearing, 
exchange trading, regulation of intermediaries, and self-
regulation or application of anti-fraud and anti-manipulation 
principles.119 The CFTC expressly stated that it had no 
preconceived notion of the answer to these questions.120
H. The Serious Pre-May 1998 Swaps Market 
Dysfunctions 
The motivation for this May 1998 CFTC inquiry derived from 
the fact that unregulated swaps had, by that time, caused 
many troublesome financial calamities.121  The CFTC noted: 
A number of large, well[-]publicized, 
financial losses over the last few 
years have focused the attention of 
the financial services industry, its 
regulators, derivatives end-users, 
and the general public on potential 
117 Id.
118 Id. at 26,114. 
119 Id. at 26,119–22.  
120 Id. at 26,114, 26,116. 
121 Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,115 (May 12, 
1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 34 and 35). 
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problems and abuses in the OTC 
derivatives market. Many of these 
losses have come to light since the 
last major regulatory actions by the 
CFTC involving OTC derivatives, the 
swaps and hybrid instruments 
exemptions issued in January 
1993.122
Among the most prominent scandals deriving from 
unregulated swaps by May 7, 1998 included the 1994 
bankruptcy of Orange County, the largest county default in 
the Nation’s history at that time.123 Orange County was one 
of the country’s wealthiest counties and the fifth most 
populous.124  Having executed many poorly understood 
interest rate swaps, the county suddenly found itself facing 
massive debt under those swaps for which it had no 
reserves.125 Orange County lost approximately $1.6 billion.126
Merrill Lynch agreed to pay $400 million to Orange County 
to settle claims involving the fraudulent nature of the swaps 
execution that caused Orange County’s bankruptcy.127
122 Id. See also id. at n.6 (the CFTC cited “Jerry A. Markham, 
Commodities Regulation: Fraud, Manipulation & Other Claims, Section 
27.05 nn. 2-22.1 (1997) (listing 22 examples of significant losses in 
financial derivatives transactions) [and] a 1997 GAO Report 4 (stating 
that the GAO identified 360 substantial end-user losses).”). 
123 MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY 
BANKRUPTCY 1 (1998). 
124 Id.
125 Id. at 2. 
126 Id. at 3. 
127 Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, Ending Suit, Merrill Lynch to Pay 
California County $ 400 Million, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 1998), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1998/06/03/business/ending-suit-merrill-lynch-to-pay-
california-county-400-million.html?pagewanted=all. 
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Also beginning in 1994, two large corporate swaps 
clients of Bankers Trust, Gibson Greetings, and Procter & 
Gamble, successfully sued that bank for defrauding them in 
the sale of complicated unregulated swaps, thereby causing 
large losses by those two institutions.128 Central to that 
litigation’s success were over 6,500 tape recordings of 
Bankers Trust employees acknowledging to each other that 
the bank’s clients did not understand the adverse impact the 
executed swaps transactions would have on them.129
The SEC and CFTC took cooperative enforcement 
actions against Bankers Trust for violating the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities and commodities laws in 
connection with the swaps it marketed.130 The SEC found 
that Bankers Trust violated various sections of the securities 
laws, including making false statements or omissions in the 
sale of securities, supplying materially inaccurate valuations 
of derivatives transactions, and failing to supervise 
128 See Bloomberg Business News, Former Bankers Trust Trader Settles 
Charges in Derivatives Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 1996), http://www. 
nytimes.com/1996/03/01/business/former-bankers-trust-trader-settles-
charges-in-derivatives-case.html (“Gibson said it lost more than $6 
million in derivatives trading and sued Bankers Trust. The companies 
settled the suit in November 1994.”); Saul Hansell, Bankers Trust Settles 
Suit with P.& G., N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 1996), http://www.nytimes. 
com/1996/05/10/business/bankers-trust-settles-suit-with-p-g.html 
(“Paying a steep price to end a bitter battle, the Bankers Trust New York 
Corporation agreed yesterday to forgive most of the nearly $200 million 
the bank contended it was owed by Procter & Gamble over two complex 
transactions in 1993.”). 
129 Kelley Holland & Linda Himelstein, The Bankers Trust Tapes,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 1995, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/1995-10-15/the-bankers-trust-tapes. 
130 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-98-5, OTC DERIVATIVES:
ADDITIONAL OVERSIGHT COULD REDUCE COSTLY SALES PRACTICES 
DISPUTES 8 (1997). 
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marketing personnel.131 The CFTC asserted that Bankers 
Trust, by its conduct, had, inter alia, violated the antifraud 
provisions of the CEA.132
I. Opposition to the CFTC’s Suggestion That 
Swaps Regulation Was Needed 
The CFTC’s sister financial regulatory agencies (i.e., the 
Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the 
SEC) within the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets (“PWG”) were strongly opposed to the CFTC’s 
concept release inquiry.133 In response to a request from the 
bank opponents of the concept release,134 on the day the 
concept release was formally published, these agencies 
pressured Congress to stop the CFTC from continuing with 
the inquiry. Congress eventually enacted a six-month 
statutory moratorium to the CFTC concept release.135
J. The Long-Term Capital Management Crisis 
By the beginning of September 1998, Long-Term Capital 
Management (“LTCM”) was the country’s largest and most 
131 Id. at 44. 
132 Id. at 46. 
133 See generally Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 
20, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/etc/script. 
html (discussing how members of the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets opposed the CFTC’s concept release). 
134 See generally SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL 
STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010). 
135 See REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THE-
COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 13, 
15 (1999) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP, OTC (NOV. 1999)] (discussing 
legislation limiting the CFTC’s rulemaking authority and the Working 
Group’s conclusion that “Congressional action is necessary” to address 
the CFTC concept release).   
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successful hedge fund “with a massive derivatives 
portfolio.”136 LTCM had assured its investors that it was so 
skilled at hedging risk with swaps that the most it “could ever 
lose in a day of trading was $35 million.”137  However, in 
September 1998, it nearly collapsed from the loss, over a 
period of weeks (beginning with a one day loss of $550 
million)138 of $4.6 billion (or about 90% of its capital) on bad 
speculative bets made almost completely with unregulated 
swaps.139
The New York Federal Reserve feared that LTCM’s 
collapse would create a cascading failure of many of the 
nation’s biggest banks, which were both the hedge fund’s 
creditors and swaps counterparties.140 So concerned were 
those financial institutions about the systemic effect of an 
LTCM collapse that, under the New York Federal Reserve’s 
orchestration (in what has been called “a small dress 
136 Alan Pyke, The Story Behind Clinton’s Jab at Sanders’ One Wall Street 
Vote, THINKPROGRESS, (Feb. 5, 2016, 7:37 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/ 
the-story-behind-clintons-jab-at-sanders-one-wall-street-vote-86c87cffdb 
a6/. 
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See REP. OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE 
FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT 12-16 (1999) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP, LTCM (Apr. 
1999)] (discussing how LTCM’s market actions and a lack of oversight 
contributed to its near collapse); see also WORKING GROUP, OTC (NOV.
1999), supra note 135 at 16, 33-34 (referencing the Working Group’s prior 
recommendations for enhanced risk assessments resulting from the 
LTCM events). 
140 See WORKING GROUP, LTCM (Apr. 1999), supra note 139 at 15 
(describing how LTCM’s counterparties’ exposures were “not adequately 
assessed, priced, or collateralized relative to the potential price shocks 
the markets were facing at the end of September 1998, and relative to the 
creditworthiness of the LTCM Fund at that time”). 
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rehearsal”141 for the 2008 collapse), on September 23, 1998 
(with about 48 hours’ notice of the likely LTCM failure), 
fourteen of those institutions contributed a total of $3.6 
billion to buy out the fund to keep it from failing and from 
creating worldwide economic havoc.142
K. The President’s Working Group’s (“PWG”) 
April 1999 Report on LTCM Suggesting Some 
Regulation of Swaps 
After a full day of hearings before the House Financial 
Services Committee on October 1, 1998 about the LTCM 
crisis, the President’s Working Group was asked by that 
committee to prepare a report on the LTCM near-failure and 
recommend actions to prevent such a potentially- systemic 
financial collapse in the future.143 In April 1999, the PWG 
issued that report.  It noted therein: “The near collapse of 
[LTCM], a private sector investment firm, highlighted the 
possibility that problems at one financial institution could be 
transmitted to other institutions, and potentially pose risks 
to the financial system.”144
One of the major recommendations of the April 1999 
PWG report was that the SEC, the CFTC, and the Treasury 
receive expanded authority to require swaps counterparties 
141 Roger Lowenstein, Long-Term Capital: It’s a Short-Term Memory, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at AR97. See also Tyler Cowen, Was Bailing Out 
Long-Term Capital Management a Good Idea?, MARGINAL REVOLUTION 
(Dec. 27, 2008, 10:14 AM), https://marginalrevolution.com/marginal 
revolution/2008/12/was-bailing-out.html (stating, “[I]n so many ways 
[LTCM] was a micro-dress rehearsal for our later problems”). 
142 WORKING GROUP, LTCM, supra note 139 at 13–14. 
143 See generally id. at 29–43 (summarizing the conclusions and 
recommendations by the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets). 
144 Id. at viii. 
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to provide: (1) swaps credit risk information; (2) 
recordkeeping and reporting; and (3) data on concentrations, 
trading strategies, and risk models, as well as providing an 
as yet-to-be-designated federal regulator the ability to 
inspect risk management models relating, inter alia, to 
swaps exposures.145 Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan 
declined to endorse this set of recommendations but deferred 
to those PWG regulators with supervisory market regulation 
authority.146 None of these April 1999 PWG recomm-
endations were ever adopted. 
L. The November 1999 PWG Report 
Recommending the Deregulation of Swaps 
By November 1999, LTCM had long since been saved and, 
once saved, quickly closed by the new bank owners.  At that 
time, the PWG (in a complete reversal from its April 1999 
Report) recommended to Congress that swaps expressly be 
totally deregulated.147 The makeup of the PWG had changed 
since its April 1999 Report. Lawrence Summers had replaced 
Robert Rubin as Secretary of the Treasury and Chair of the 
PWG; and William Rainer had replaced Brooksley Born as 
Chair of the CFTC and as one of the four principals of the 
PWG. Rubin (supported by Gary Gensler, then Under 
Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance and future 
Obama Chairman of the CFTC) and Brooksley Born had been 
the driving forces behind the April PWG report, recognizing 
in varying degrees that swaps trading was not self-regulating 
and was also systemically risky.148 The transition to 
145 Id. at 39–40. 
146 Id. at 39 n.23. 
147 See generally WORKING GROUP, OTC (Nov. 1999), supra note 135. 
148 Brooksley Born is now widely recognized as the highest profile 
regulator first to sound the warning alarms about the dangers of 
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Summers and Rainer, notable opponents of swaps regulation, 
led to the November 1999 change in the deregulatory swaps 
policy direction of the PWG.149
In a cover letter for that November 1999 PWG report, 
the PWG chairman, Treasury Secretary Summers, explained 
the PWG’s new rationale for seeking the express statutory 
deregulation of derivatives: 
Over-the-counter derivatives have 
transformed the world of finance, 
increasing the range of financial 
products available to corporations 
and investors and fostering more 
precise ways of understanding, 
quantifying, and managing risk. 
These important markets are large 
unregulated OTC derivatives, a decade before the 2008 financial 
meltdown occurred. See generally Frontline: The Warning, supra note 
133. After the LTCM fiasco, Robert Rubin said that Treasury had its own 
concerns about the risks of then unregulated derivatives. Typifying this 
attitude is a conversation he retells in his memoirs with his then under-
secretary Lawrence Summers; in response to Rubin’s suggestion that 
comprehensive margin requirements would be a net positive swaps rule, 
Summers responded that such rules would be like “playing tennis with 
wooden rackets.” Jacob Weisberg, In Defense of Robert Rubin, SLATE (May 
1, 2010, 7:24 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2010/05/robert-
rubin-is-the-wrong-guy-to-blame-for-the-financial-crisis.html.  
149 For a concise review of Summers’s record on swaps during the Clinton 
administration, see Michael Hirsh, The Comprehensive Case Against 
Larry Summers, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 13, 2013), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/business/archive/2013/09/the-comprehensive-case-against-
larry-summers/279651/. William Rainer’s advocacy for deregulation 
began immediately upon taking office. See Michael Schroeder, CFTC 
Chairman Seeks to Deregulate Trading, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 1999), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB941126414489211010 (explaining that 
William Rainer, as the new chairman of the CFTC, immediately planned 
to “lighten the burden” of the CFTC’s “cumbersome hands-on 
regulation”).   
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and growing rapidly.  At the end of 
1998, the estimated notional value of 
OTC derivative contracts was $80 
trillion, according to the Bank for 
International Settlements.  In 
addition, these global markets have 
been marked by innovation in 
products and trading and settlement 
mechanisms. 
A cloud of legal uncertainty has hung 
over the OTC derivatives markets in 
the United States in recent years, 
which, if not addressed, could 
discourage innovation and growth of 
these important markets and damage 
U.S. leadership in these arenas by 
driving transactions off-shore. . . .150
The central and key recommendation within the PWG 
November 1999 Report with respect to swaps was that 
Congress provide “[a]n exclusion from the CEA[’s regulatory 
requirements] for bilateral transactions between 
sophisticated counterparties (other than transactions that 
involve non-financial commodities with finite supplies) . . . 
.”151
M. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
of 2000’s Complete Deregulation of Swaps 
Accordingly, on the last day of the lame duck 106th Congress, 
December 15, 2000 (“while the media was focused on the 
[Presidential election’s] recounts”)152, Congress, with the 
150 WORKING GROUP, OTC (Nov. 1999), supra note 135 (letter to Al Gore 
from Summers and Greenspan) (emphasis added). 
151 Id. at 2. 
152 Paul Blumenthal, How Congress Rushed a Bill that Helped Bring the 
Economy to Its Knees, HUFFPOST (May 11, 2009, 5:52 PM), 
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hearty endorsement of then-Secretary Summers on behalf of 
fellow PWG principals Levitt, Greenspan, and Rainer,153
passed (with only four dissenting votes in the House) a 262-
page rider to an 11,000-page omnibus appropriation 
measure—with only that day’s consideration of the rider’s 
legislative language154 (which was widely reported as having 
been “unread by [most]” members of Congress).155 On 
December 21, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”).156
The CFMA removed swaps transactions from all
requirements of exchange trading and clearing under the 
CEA, as well as from federal anti-fraud and anti-
manipulation provisions, so long as the counterparties to the 
swap were “eligible contract participants.”157 Generally 
speaking, a counterparty was an “eligible contract 
participant” if it had in excess of $10 million in total assets 
with some limited exceptions allowing lesser amounts in the 
case of an individual using the swap for risk management 
purposes.158   
Thus, after passage of the CFMA, the swaps market 
(at the time, according to Secretary Summers, amounting to 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-blumenthal/how-congress-rushed-a-
bil_b_181926.html. 
153 See 146 CONG. REC. S11,946-47 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2001) (Statement of 
Sen. Sarbanes) (introducing a letter from the President’s Working Group 
on Financial Markets supporting the Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act of 2000). 
154 Blumenthal, supra note 152. 
155 See Pyke, supra note 136. 
156 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
114 Stat. 2763 (2001). “Also, hidden within the bill was an exemption for 
energy derivative trading, which would later become known as the ‘Enron 
loophole’ – this loophole would provide the impetus for Enron’s nose dive 
into full blown corporate corruption.” Blumenthal, supra note 152. 
157 See Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88, at 9. 
158 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at 328–29. 
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$80 trillion in notional value) was exempt from the CEA’s 
capital adequacy requirements; reporting and disclosure; 
regulation of intermediaries; self-regulation; bars on fraud, 
manipulation,159 and excessive speculation; and require-
ments for exchange trading and clearing. The SEC was 
similarly barred from “securities” swaps oversight except for 
quite limited fraud jurisdiction.160
Recognizing that the deregulation of swaps would 
remove the CEA’s bar to excessive speculation through 
swaps, the CFMA, in order to expressly and to clearly afford 
an unfettered statutory right to speculate with swaps, 
preempted state gaming and state anti-bucket shop laws.  
Thus, using swaps to place bets on the direction of virtually 
every financial index was completely authorized without any 
federal or state oversight.161
Finally, to ensure that not even violations of the 
CFMA itself by swaps dealers could be used as a basis to 
challenge the legality of a swap, the Act provided that: 
159 Unlike financial swaps, which were “excluded” from the exchange-
trading requirement, including fraud and manipulation prohibitions, 
energy and metals swaps, while relieved of the exchange-trading 
requirement, continued to be subject to fraud and manipulation 
prohibitions; they were therefore labeled by the CFMA as “exempt”
transactions. Id. See also CHARLES W. EDWARDS ET AL., COMMODITY 
FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2000: LAW AND EXPLANATION 28 (2001) 
(quoting remarks of Sen. Tom Harkin, 146 Cong. Rec. S11896 (Dec. 15, 
2000) (“The Act continues in full effect the CFTC’s antifraud and 
antimanipulation authority with regard to exempt transaction in energy 
and metals derivative markets.”)). By exempting metals and energy 
swaps from the exchange-trading requirement, Congress disagreed with 
the unanimous recommendation of the PWG that swaps concerning 
“finite” supplies not be removed from the exchange-trading mandate of 
the CEA. Id. 
160 See Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88. 
161 Id.
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[n]o agreement, contract, or 
transaction between eligible contract 
participants . . . shall be void, 
voidable, or unenforceable . . . based 
solely on the failure . . . to comply with 
the terms or conditions of an 
exemption or exclusion from any 
provision of this chapter or 
regulations of the Commission.162
Thus, a central premise of hundreds of years of the Anglo-
American common law governing contracts, i.e., that illegal 
contracts are subject to a judicial declaration of 
unenforceability, was abolished by the CFMA as a legal 
remedy in the swaps market.163   
In effect, after the passage of the CFMA, almost no law 
of any kind applied to the swaps market.164 As would be 
expected, it has since been widely observed that the rushed 
passage of the CFMA “was a propellant of the 2008 [financial] 
crises.”165
162 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
163 See Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88.  
164 Id.
165 See Paul Blumenthal, How Congress Rushed a Bill that Helped Bring 
the Economy to Its Knees, HUFFPOST (May 11, 2009), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/paul-blumenthal/how-congress-rushed-a-bil_b_1819 
26.html; Sophie Roell, The Causes of the Financial Crisis, SALON (Apr. 9, 
2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/04/09/the_causes_of_the_financial_cr 
isis/; David Corn, Foreclosure Phil, MOTHER JONES (July/August 2008), 
http:// www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/05/foreclosure-phil; JENNIFER 
TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE 
REGULATORS AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME MORTGAGES A THRILLING 
BUSINESS 238 (2014); Interview: Joseph Stiglitz, FRONTLINE (July 28, 
2009), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/interviews/stigl 
itz.html; David Min & Pat Garofalo, Regulating  Derivatives Traffic, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 19, 2010), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/economy/news/2010/04/19/7597/regulating-derivatives-traffic/; see 
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III. THE 2008 ECONOMIC MELTDOWN AS A 
PRODUCT OF UNREGULATED SWAPS 
Although many factors contributed to the financial meltdown 
of 2008, it is now almost universally recognized that principal 
among them was the collapse of the unregulated swaps 
market. Credit default swaps (the buying and selling of 
insurance on the viability of assets actually owned by an 
insured counterparty), especially “naked” CDS (the buying 
and selling of insurance of assets not owned by the insured), 
provided the trigger that launched the mortgage crisis, credit 
crisis, and systemic fiscal crisis that threatened to implode 
the global financial system, save for the multi-trillion dollar 
U.S. taxpayer bailout.166
A. CDSs’ and “Naked” CDSs’ Foremost Role in 
the Meltdown 
At the time of the crisis, the unregulated swaps market was 
estimated to have a notional value of $596 trillion, including 
generally PERMANENT SUBCOMM. INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON 
HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, WALL STREET AND THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (April 13, 2011), 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Financial_Crisis/FinancialC
risisReport.pdf?attempt=2. 
166 See generally Vikas Bajaj, Surprises in a Closer Look at Credit-Default 
Swaps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B5; Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard 
New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A1; Jon 
Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, With No End Yet in Sight, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1; The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal 
Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
110th Cong. 15 (2008), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg55 
764/pdf/CHRG110hhrg55764.pdf (prepared testimony of Dr. Alan 
Greenspan); Doug Sword, Frank, of Dodd-Frank, is concerned over Trump 
regulators, 2017 WL 3085011; 17 C.F.R. § 1.3; 156 Cong. Rec. S5870 
(2010). 
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approximately $58 trillion in CDS and naked CDS,167 yet 
federal and state regulators were almost completely barred 
from swaps oversight and from any knowledge of that 
market.168 Before explaining below the manner in which CDS 
(especially “naked” CDS) fomented this crisis, it is worth 
167 Naohiko Babo & Paola Gallardo, OTC MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE 
SECOND HALF OF 2007, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (May 2008), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0805.pdf  
168 Michael Greenberger, Is Our Economy Safe? A Proposal for Addressing 
the Success of Swaps Regulation, (2010), http://www.michaelgreen 
berger.com/files/greenberger-roosevelt-inst-paper-doddfrank.pdf.  
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citing those many economists,169  regulators,170 investigating 
commissions,171 market observers,172 and financial 
columnists173
169 See Moshinsky, supra note 2; Blinder, supra note 2; Hu, supra note 2; 
Krugman, supra note 2; Wall Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can 
Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing 
Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, 111th Cong. 127 (2010), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg63555/pdf/CHRG-111shrg 
63555.pdf (statement of James K. Galbraith, Lloyd Bentsen, Jr. Chair in 
Government/Business Relations, Lyndon B. Johnson Sch. of Pub. Affairs, 
The Univ. of Texas at Austin); Ravi Velloor, In Good Company: Ex-IMF 
Chief Economist Raghuram Rajan, The Man Who Foresaw 2008 
Financial Crisis, STRAITS TIMES (May 28, 2017), http:// 
www.straitstimes.com/opinion/man-who-foresaw-2008-financial-crisis 
(“Among the speakers that year was Dr. Raghuram Rajan, the chief 
economist of the International Monetary Fund who was given the job two 
years earlier at age 40. It was meant to be a celebration of the Greenspan 
era but what the audience, which included Mr. Greenspan, heard from 
Dr. Rajan was a prognosis of dire tidings to come. Dr. Rajan warned 
against credit-default swaps, which act as insurance against bond 
defaults, going sour and said there was also immense systemic risk if 
banks failed to meet their obligations.”); Jack Rasmus, Financial Asset 
Bubbles: From Subprimes and Credit Default Swaps (CDS) in 2008 to 
Bitcoin, Cryptocurrency and Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in 2018,
GLOBAL RESEARCH (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.globalresearch.ca/ 
financial-asset-bubbles-from-subprimes-and-credit-default-swaps-cds- 
in-2008-to-bitcoin-cryptocurrency-and-exchange-traded-funds-etfs-in-
2018/5622737; Protecting Financial Stability and Enhancing 
Competitiveness in the Derivatives Markets: Hearing on Legislative 
Proposals Regarding Derivatives Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Feb. 
14, 2018) (statement by Andy Green), (transcript available at 
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/02.14.2018_andy_green
_testimony.pdf). 
170 Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/ 
economy/24panel.html; Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong, WASH.
POST (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2008/10/14/AR2008101403343.html; Peter S. Goodman, 
Taking Hard New Look at the Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 
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2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/economy/09greensp 
an.html; Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. 
Economy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 79 
(Nov. 20, 2008), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg51569/ 
pdf/CHRG-110hhrg51569.pdf (prepared testimony of Eric R. Dinallo, 
Superintendent, N.Y. State Insurance Dep’t) [hereinafter Dinallo 
Testimony]; Gary Gensler, Remarks at OTC Derivatives Reform, 
Chatham House, London (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.cftc.gov/ 
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-35 (stating that “OTC 
derivatives were at the center of the 2008 financial crisis” and that 
“[c]apital requirements should take into account the unique risks that 
credit default swaps (CDS) pose”); Greg Robb, Roots of Credit Crisis Laid 
at Fed’s Door, MARKET WATCH (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www. 
marketwatch.com/story/roots-of-credit-crisis-found-at-the-feds-door-
says-expert; Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo, Address before 
Derivcon 2018, New York City, New York (Feb. 1, 2018) (transcript 
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/opagiancarl 
o35); Cassandra Jones Havard, Too Conflicted to be Transparent: Giving 
Affordable Financing its ‘Good Name’ Back, 30 LEGISLATION & PUB. POL’Y
45, (2017), available at http://scholar- works.law.ubalt.edu/ all_fac/1059; 
CFTC Commissioner Rostin Behnam, Address at the Georgetown Center 
for Financial Markets and Policy, The Dodd-Frank Inflection Point: 
Building on Derivatives Reform (Nov. 14, 2017) (transcript available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/ opabehnam1) (“Over-the-
counter swaps did not singularly cause the financial crisis, nor would 
their direct regulation have prevented a crisis; but, unregulated, over-
the-counter derivatives certainly played a key part in the crisis, and the 
policy response was appropriately swift.”); Clyde McGrady, CFTC looks 
to Rewrite Swap Data Reporting Standards, 2017 WL 2927943 (July 10, 
2017).
171 See, e.g., MEMBERS OF THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
(2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_fin 
al_report_full.pdf; Scott W. Bauguess, The Role of Big Data, Machine 
Learning, and AI in Assessing Risks: A Regulatory Perspective, 
Champagne Keynote Address: OpRisk North America 2017, New York, 
New York (June 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/bauguess-
big-data-ai; Scott W. Bauguess, Keynote Address: OpRisk North America 
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2017 (June 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/bauguess-big-
data-ai.  
172 See INVESTOR’S WORKING GROUP, U.S. FIN. REGULATORY REFORM: THE 
INVESTORS’ PERSPECTIVE 1 (July 2009), http://www.cii.org/files/ 
issues_and_advocacy/dodd-frank_act/07_01_09_iwg_report.pdf (listing 
the fundamental flaws of the U.S. financial services sector exposed by the 
credit crisis: “. . . gaps in oversight that let purveyors of abusive 
mortgages, complex over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and convoluted 
securitized products run amok; woefully underfunded regulatory 
agencies; and super-sized financial institutions that are both ‘too big to 
fail’ and too labyrinthine to regulate or manage effectively”); Jonathan 
Berr, George Soros Wants to Outlaw Credit Default Swaps, AOL (June 
12, 2009), https://www.aol.com/article/2009/06/12/george-soros-wants-to- 
outlaw-credit-default-swaps/19065423/ (“Credit default swaps, insurance 
contracts on securities in the event of a default, are widely blamed as one 
of the causes of the current financial crisis. The unregulated, $70 trillion 
market became unhinged when the real estate market, particularly 
houses funded through subprime mortgages, collapsed.”); Henny Sender, 
Greenlight Capital Founder Calls for CDS Ban, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2009), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6b1945e6-caf9-11de-97e0-00144feabdc0.html 
(quoting Greenlight Capital founder David Einhorn: “. . . trying to make 
safer credit default swaps is like trying to make safer asbestos . . . [as 
CDSs create] large, correlated and asymmetrical risks”); Janet Tavakoli, 
Washington Must Ban U.S. Credit Derivatives as Traders Demand Gold 
(Part One), HUFFPOST (May 8, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
janet-tavakoli/washington-must- ban-us-cr_b_489778.html (“Congress 
should act immediately to abolish credit default swaps on the United 
States, because these derivatives will foment distortions in global 
currencies and gold.”); LEWIS, supra note 1 (providing a history of the 
2008 financial collapse and demonstrating the central role of derivatives); 
Matthew Henry, Blockchain and Credit Default Swaps – Part 1, An 
Overview, FINTECHBLUE (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.fintechblue.com/ 
2017/09/blockchain-and-credit-default-swaps-an-overview/.  
173 LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE 
OF COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN 
BROTHERS (2009); Robert Johnson, Credible Resolution – What It Takes to 
End Too Big to Fail, in ROOSEVELT INST.: MAKE MARKETS BE
MARKETS 117–33 (2009), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/make-markets-be-
markets (“The recent crisis in the U.S. centered on the collapse of the 
housing bubble and the role of leverage, off balance sheet exposures, and 
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who have described the central role unregulated CDS and 
naked CDS played in the crisis.174 In the margin below, a 
complex OTC derivatives.”); Vikas Bajaj, Surprises in a Closer Look at 
Credit-Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/11/05/business/05swap.html (“Policy makers have 
been unnerved by the rise of the [CDS] market because they are worried 
that sellers of protection may not have enough reserves to pay future 
claims and that default by one party could lead to a cascade of failures 
throughout the financial system.”); Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis 
Since ’30s, With No End in Sight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1 (“The 
latest trouble spot [in the financial crisis] is an area called credit-default 
swaps . . . .”); Jeff Madrick, At the Heart of the Crash, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS
(June 10, 2010) (reviewing LEWIS, supra note 1), http://www. 
nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/heart-crash/?pagination=false 
(“As we now know, derivatives were the instruments that enabled Wall 
Street to stretch capital dangerously far—and were at the center of the 
financial crisis that began that year.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Naked 
Came the Speculators, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2008), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/business/10gret.html (“As the sheriffs 
begin to confront the C.D.S. cowboys, more losses are bound to show up 
in this Wild West.”); Kimberly Amadeo, Credit Default Swap: Pros, Cons, 
Crises, Examples: How a Boring Insurance Contract Almost Destroyed the 
Global Economy, BALANCE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.the 
balance.com/credit-default-swaps-pros-cons-crises-examples-3305920; 
Camilla Hodgson, The Risky Product Blamed for Worsening the Financial 
Crisis is Back on the Rise, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 24, 2017), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/credit-default-swaps-post-financial-
crisis-product-popular-again-2017-8; Ekaterina Klenina & Cesario 
Mateus, Global Financial Crisis and Price Discovery between Credit 
Default Swaps Premia and Bond Yield Spreads, SSRN ELEC. J. (Aug. 
2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319260395_Global_Fin 
ancial_Crisis_and_Price_Discovery_between_Credit_Default_Swaps_Pre
mia_and_Bond_Yield_Spreads.  
174 See supra notes 169–73; Credit Default Swap: Insurance Against Non-
Payment, CORP. FIN. INST. (2018), https://corporatefinanceinstit 
ute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/credit-default-swap-cds/; Kimberly 
Amadeo, The 2008 Financial Crisis: A Look at the Causes, Costs and 
Weighing the Chances of It Happening Again, BALANCE (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.thebalance.com/2008-financial- crisis-3305679. 
MICHAEL GREENBERGER
Journal of Business & Technology Law 257

competing theory advanced as the meltdown’s causation, i.e., 
the so-called “run on repos,” is considered, and while 
recognized as important, it is, nevertheless, deemed 
derivative of the defaults or threatened defaults by 
worldwide financial institutions in the hundreds or trillions 
of dollars notional value in the swaps market.175
175 It has been suggested that the 2008 financial meltdown was 
principally caused by a so-called “run on repos.” See the survey in Edward 
J. Kane, Please Don’t Throw Me in the Briar Patch: the Flummery of 
Capital-Requirement Repairs Undertaken in Response to the Great 
Financial Crisis, in MONEY, REGULATION & GROWTH: FINANCING NEW
GROWTH IN EUROPE 93 (Marc Qintyn et al. eds., 2014); Gary B. Gorton & 
Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, J. FIN.
ECONS. 425 (2011). The run on repos refers to the withdrawal of short-
term (often overnight) extensions of credit to banks needed to maintain 
bank solvency. Repos, or repurchase agreements, are generally overnight 
loans provided to banks by repo lenders (such as money market funds, 
foreign financial institutions, mutual funds, and other unregulated cash 
pools) that are, in turn, secured by a bank’s collateral, such as asset-
backed securities, collateralized-debt obligations (“CDOs”), or credit-
default swaps. Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Who Ran on Repo?, 1
n.1 (NBER, working paper 18455, 2012) (explaining that a repo contract 
is “often over-night”). Prior to the 2008 meltdown, these repurchase 
agreements were withdrawn because of repo lenders’ concerns about 
bank insolvency, and as the repo market increasingly tightened, this 
repo-dependent bank’s probability of insolvency increased. However, the 
“run on repos” theory ignores the underlying and fundamental cause of 
that run: i.e., the real or apparent inability of the bank to perform on 
trillions of dollars of swaps obligations. Those real or pending swaps 
defaults highlighted to their repo lenders the bank’s lack of credit 
worthiness and thus the bank’s inability to finance debt by, inter alia,
using repos. In other words, when these bank counterparties could no 
longer afford to pay off their swaps debts, no lender would risk extending 
repo financing, the repayment of which similarly seemed unlikely. Thus, 
while there can be no doubt that the failure of the repo market 
contributed to the 2008 financial havoc, in the absence of threatened 
defaults in the trillion-dollar swaps market, banks would almost certainly 
have otherwise been deemed creditworthy in the repo market. As a result, 
because of the obvious, impending trillion-dollar defaults in the swaps 
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CDSs were the last step in a mortgage securitization 
process that ultimately undermined the economy in 2008.176
A counterparty investing in a CDS paid a very small 
insurance-like “premium” to another counterparty for the 
latter to agree to “guarantee” in the entirety portions of 
mortgage indebtedness owned by the insured counterparty.  
However, investors soon developed a widely adopted method 
of “shorting” the mortgage market by handpicking (but not 
owning) multi-trillion parts of another financial instrument, 
a collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”), to be insured against 
failure: i.e., a “naked” CDS.  Thus, CDS and naked CDS can 
be seen as a form of insurance on specified tranches of a CDO, 
which in the case of “naked” CDSs, were not owned by the 
“insured.”177 CDOs, in turn, involved the “pulling together 
and dissection into ‘tranches’ of huge numbers of [mortgage-
backed securities (“MBSs”)],” based for their part on actual 
mortgage loans and, in the years before the crisis, subprime 
mortgages in particular.178   
Importantly, by constantly “reframing the form of 
risk” (e.g., moving mortgage loans to inclusion within 
mortgage backed securities (“MBS”) to the inclusion of MBS 
within CDOs, swaps dealers, providing the guarantees or 
insurance of the underlying mortgages through CDS and 
naked CDS, lost the thread on the safety of these 
investments.179 This problem was compounded by “mis-
leadingly high evaluations” (often investment grade ratings) 
by credit rating agencies of the CDOs being insured by CDSs 
markets, banks were largely cut off from one of their most needed sources 
of borrowing: repos. 
176 See U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 171, at 134, 201, 267. 
177 Id.
178 Id. at 155. 
179 Id. at 142.
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and naked CDSs.180 In addition, issuers of these kinds of 
CDSs relied upon the faulty assumption widely held pre-2008 
that housing prices would never go down, so that the provider 
of the “insurance” would never have to pay the guarantees of 
continuous and uninterrupted mortgage payments made 
through the swaps.181
Because of the widespread assumption by the issuers 
of CDSs’ and naked CDSs’ guarantees that mortgages could 
always be paid through refinancing at appreciated housing 
values (and therefore could never fail), it was widely and 
mistakenly understood to be risk-free to guarantee mortgage 
payments.182 Those taking these guarantees, i.e., the 
“shorts,” bet with relatively small insurance-type premiums 
that their handpicked mortgage-based instruments (hand-
selected tranches of CDOs), which they did not own, would 
fail, and those shorting mortgages would then receive a hefty 
payment of the full value of those failed mortgages reflected 
in the CDOs upon collapse of those instruments.183
All of this came to a head when housing prices began 
to plummet.184 Homeowners began to default first on 
subprime mortgages (and then on prime mortgages), leading 
to the failure of CDO tranches, thereby triggering trillions of 
dollars of non-capitalized payments by the CDS and naked 
CDS issuers.185 In addition, because these kinds of swap 
instruments were not required to be, and were not, reported 
180 Id. at 170. 
181 Id. at 132, 194–95, 202. 
182 MEMBERS OF THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 50, 195 (2011), 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_rep 
ort_full.pdf. 
183 Id. at 213. 
184 Id. at 57. 
185 Id. at 195. 
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to financial regulators, the federal financial regulators (and 
investors as a whole) lacked knowledge of the crisis’ “bottom.” 
They were thus shocked when they learned the huge size of 
the swaps market, which, in turn, exacerbated the tightening 
of credit throughout the economy because even apparently 
financially viable institutions could be swaps counterparties 
facing massive swaps defaults, thereby becoming a credit 
risk.186 All of this resulted in the expedited downward cycle 
of the economic meltdown, exacerbated by the fact that 
CDOs, CDSs and naked CDSs existed not just in the 
mortgage market, but in most debt markets.187
Informed estimates are that there were three to four 
times as many “naked” CDS instruments insuring against 
mortgage defaults at the time of the meltdown than those 
CDSs guaranteeing actual lending risk by holders of CDOs 
and MBSs.188 This meant that, to the extent the guarantor of 
a naked CDS (e.g., AIG) had to be rescued by the U.S. 
taxpayer, the chances were very high that that “bail out” 
money ultimately went directly from AIG to those who 
speculated that sets of handpicked mortgage loans would 
fail.189 Prominent members of Congress have maintained 
that the holders of the short bets of these swaps (i.e., those 
that speculated that mortgages they did not own would fail) 
formed a strong political constituency opposing the “rescue” 
of distressed homeowners through the adjustment of 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 MEMBERS OF THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 101 (2011), http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. 
Dinallo Testimony, supra note 170 at 80 (“[I]t appears that swaps on that 
debt could total at least three times as much as the actual debt 
outstanding.”); Krugman, supra note 2. 
189 See Dinallo Testimony, supra note 170, at 79. 
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mortgages in bankruptcy to keep homeowners from mortgage 
defaults and in their homes.190
 In this regard, a recent study by social scientists 
Ferguson, Jorgensen, and Chen shows that campaign 
contributions from financial houses significantly affected the 
way in which Congressional representatives’ voted  on a 
series of bills seeking to aid consumers and/or otherwise 
dismantle Dodd-Frank.191 Because the low number of 
Senators made “reliable statistical analysis [of the Senate] 
problematic,” their study analyzed the voting behavior 
within the House of Representatives.192 The study found that 
the finance and real estate sector contributed “over $90 
million” to representatives in the House “for [a recent] 
election cycle,” a large majority of which contributions they 
found surprisingly went to Democratic candidates, given the 
pro-regulatory bias of that party.193
In their first statistical analysis, which focused solely 
on House Democrats’ voting behavior on Dodd-Frank 
deregulation, the researchers found that “for every $100,000 
that Democratic representatives received from finance, the 
odds they would break with the party[‘s support for Dodd-
Frank] increased by 13.9 percent.”194 Given the magnitude of 
the $90 million contributions from financial interests and the 
relatively low amount of money associated with changing 
House Democrats’ voting behavior, these contributions led 
190 See Thomas Ferguson et al., Fifty Shades of Green, ROOSEVELT INST.
12-25 (May 2, 2017), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/fifty-shades-green 
(describing how bank contributions to Congress members impacts their 
voting); Ryan Grim, Dick Durbin: Banks “Frankly Own the Place,”
HUFFPOST (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/29/ 
dick-durbin-banks-frankly_n_193010.html. 
191 See Ferguson et al., supra note 190. 
192 See id. at 10. 
193 See id. at 26. 
194 See id. at 30. 
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and will likely continue to lead a significant number of 
Democrats voting to dismantle Dodd-Frank regulation.195
Elsewhere in this paper, there is discussion of further 
support for the Ferguson, et al., thesis, i.e., the recent 
bipartisan passage of a Senate Dodd-Frank deregulation bill 
(S.2155), with 17 Democratic Senators joining a straight-line 
Republican deregulatory vote to make this bill filibuster 
proof. 196   
Ferguson, et al.’s second statistical analysis included 
both Republican and Democrat members in the House.197
That separate analysis found that for House members, 
regardless of party affiliation, “for every $1,000 increase in 
money from finance, the odds of a vote against the banks 
decrease[d] by 0.21 percent.”198 Given that financial interests 
contributed over $90 million in a single election cycle to 
House members, banks could easily pay enough to improve 
substantially the odds of a deregulatory vote in their favor.199
Also, the fact that “naked” CDSs were nothing more 
than “bets” on the viability of the U.S. mortgage market also 
demonstrates the importance of the CFMA having expressly 
preempted state gaming and anti-bucket shop laws.200 Had 
those laws not been preempted, it is almost certain that at 
least some states would have banned these investments as 
unlicensed gambling or illegal bucket shops.201 An action of 
that sort by even a single state would have early on brought 
a timely end to the “naked” CDS market throughout the 
country.202
195 See id. at 26, 35. 
196 See id. at 35. 
197 See Ferguson et al., supra note 190, at 35. 
198 Id.
199 Id. at 26. 
200 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at 975 (referencing 7 U.S.C. § 
16(e)(2)). 
201 See Dinallo Testimony, supra note 170, at 81. 
202 Greenberger Testimony, supra note 88, at 17. 
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B. Counterparty Interconnectedness: The 
Systemic Risk Derived from All Types of 
Swaps 
The entirety of the unregulated swaps market (not just CDS 
and “naked” CDS) was central to the 2008 crisis’s causation. 
That is principally because the swaps markets as a whole are 
so highly interconnected.  Defaults in one segment of that 
market necessarily would lead to defaults in the entire 
market. As shown below, the prevention of a cascading 
collapse of the financial system therefore required the 
American taxpayer to bail out huge U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers not only because of their CDS and 
naked CDS commitments, but because of threatened defaults 
across all their swaps lines.203
1. The Lehman Bankruptcy Evinces the Complete 
Financial Interconnectedness through Swaps of 
The World’s Large Financial Institutions  
For example, the losses at Lehman—the only big U.S. bank 
allowed to fail in the 2008 financial meltdown because 
government intervention was at that time deemed a “moral 
hazard”—were experienced through defaults in all of that 
bank’s swaps trades. As explained in the Lehman bankruptcy 
proceedings, that bank was a counterparty in over 930,000 
swaps.204  “[A]bout 6,000 [of those swaps] claims—totaling 
$60bn in losses—[i]nclude[d] claims from about 40 of the 
203 See Johnson in ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE, supra note 173, at 117–33
(“America cannot end Too Big to Fail without derivatives reform.”). 
204 Charles GuyLaine, OTC Derivative Contracts in Bankruptcy: The 
Lehman Experience, 13 N.Y. BUS. L.J. 14, 16 (2009). 
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largest U.S. banks.”205 Indeed, the swaps liabilities of many 
of Lehman’s more than 3,000 subsidiaries in fifty foreign 
countries were all involved in the bankruptcy of Lehman’s 
parent holding company.206 To the extent that these contracts 
did not involve CDS or naked CDS, they certainly did involve, 
for example, interest rate, currency, foreign exchange, and 
commodity swaps.207
Lehman’s inability to cover the indebtedness of the 
entirety of its swaps portfolio demonstrated the fragility of 
the swaps market as a whole—not just the weakness of the 
CDS or naked CDS market.  If Lehman could not perform due 
to lack of reserves with regard to CDS or naked CDS, it could 
not perform throughout its swaps portfolio. With 6,000 
Lehman counterparties experiencing losses as a result of 
Lehman’s failure, it is clear that large-scale swaps losses by 
any large U.S. bank swaps dealer would cause financial 
instability in all swaps obligations worldwide. 
Moreover, the Lehman liquidators were required to 
engage in a huge legal battle with Lehman’s many swaps 
205 Id.; see also Patrick Fitzgerald, Lehman Brothers to Pay another $3.8 
Billion to Creditors, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www. 
wsj.com/articles/lehman-brothers-to-pay-another-3-8-billion-to-creditors-
1475159586 (reporting on how the most recent distribution the 
investment bank made—its eleventh since filing for bankruptcy—will 
bring the total payout figure to more than $113.6 billion). 
206 See Letter from Michael Greenberger, Prof., Univ. of Md. Carey Sch. 
of L., and George Waddington, Analyst, CHHS, Univ. of Md., to David A. 
Stawick, Sec’y, CFTC, RIN No. 3038-AD57 6 (Aug. 27, 2012) [Hereinafter 
Greenberger & Waddington Letter], http://www.michaelgreenberger. 
com/files/58709I-1.Greenberger.pdf. 
207 See id.; Andrew Ackerman, Court to Decide Fate of Lehman Contracts,
BOND BUYER (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/117_238/-
297451-1.html (“Though . . . [Lehman Brothers Holdings] does not 
provide specific numbers for each category of swap, derivatives market 
participants believe that roughly 20% to 30% of the contracts are 
municipal securities-based interest rate swaps.”). 
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counterparties over those counterparties’ often heavily 
inflated evaluations of their losses from failed swaps 
transactions with Lehman—not just in CDS and naked 
CDS.208 This exaggeration of amounts owed could only have 
been advanced in the non-transparent swaps market where 
swaps were not exchange-traded, and thus the value of swaps 
could not be readily determined by reference to well 
established exchange prices. The liquidators ultimately had 
to file lawsuits against many of these counterparties to cause 
them, once confronted with legal evidence of their puffing, to 
lower their bankruptcy claims to reflect market reality.   
Finally, the Lehman liquidation also demonstrated 
that, even when the identical ISDA-mandated swaps 
contract provisions were being looked at by two different 
countries’ courts (in Lehman’s case, the U.S. courts and the 
U.K. courts), diametrically conflicting rulings from those 
countries could be reached.209 A major single provision within 
the ISDA-inspired standardized swaps language critical to 
resolution of Lehman “bankruptcy [i]ssues [were] decided in 
[directly] conflicting fashion in London and New York . . . .”210
208 Megan Murphy & Anousha Sakoui, Lehman Sues Nomura Over 
Derivatives Claims, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2010), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/258e1208-4ef8-11df-b8f4-00144feab49a. 
209 Harry Wilson, Lehman Brothers Investors Rank Ahead of Creditors, 
Rules Supreme Court, TELEGRAPH (July 27, 2011, 6:26 PM), http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8666446/L
ehman-Brothers-investors-rank-ahead-of-creditors-rules-Supreme-Court 
.html. 
210 Stephen Luben, Lehman Shows Trans-Atlantic Divide on Derivatives,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011, 10:14 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2011/01/07/lehman-shows-trans-atlantic-divide-on-derivatives/?_r=0. 
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2. Bear Stearns Collapse Shows Financial 
Institution Swaps Interconnectedness 
As further evidence of the interconnectedness of swaps 
counterparties within the full range of the worldwide swaps 
market, on April 3, 2008, then New York Federal Reserve 
President Timothy Geithner explained after the Bear 
Stearns’ March 2008 collapse and corresponding Bear 
Stearns’ rescue by JPMorgan Chase:211
The sudden discovery by Bear’s 
derivative counterparties that 
important financial positions they 
had put in place to protect themselves 
from financial risk were no longer 
operative would have triggered 
substantial further dislocation in 
markets. This would have 
precipitated a rush by Bear’s 
counterparties to liquidate the 
collateral they held against those 
positions and to attempt to replicate 
those positions in already very fragile 
markets.212
Citing this quote, Warren Buffet concluded: “This is 
Fedspeak for [‘]We stepped in to avoid a financial chain 
reaction of unpredictable magnitude.[’] In my opinion, the 
Fed was right to do so.”213
211 See, e.g., Greg Farrell, JPMorgan, N.Y. Fed Step into Rescue Bear 
Stearns, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=4454724.  
212 Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc., to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 27, 
2009), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2008ltr.pdf. 
213 Id.
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3. AIG’s Threatened Collapse and Systemic 
Interconnectedness 
Of course, it was the very failure of Lehman on September 
15, 2008, and, inter alia, the foreseeable cascading adverse 
and substantial adverse impacts its bankruptcy would cause 
to thousands of its swaps counterparties worldwide, that led 
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to alter course one day 
after Lehman failed, to prevent AIG’s bankruptcy by U.S. 
government intervention and then to recommend to Congress 
the bank bailouts.214 These actions revealed to the world the 
correlation between and among unregulated swaps 
transactions of every kind and the “too-big-to-fail” 
phenomenon, i.e., there were so many large swaps 
counterparties which would have failed because of swaps 
defaults that traditional bankruptcy solutions would have 
failed as well, thereby likely leading to the Second Great 
Depression.215
Moreover, the U.S. taxpayer bailouts that went into 
the front door of, for example, AIG to “save it” really went out 
the back door as payments to “save,” inter alia, AIG’s big U.S. 
bank holding swaps dealer counterparties.216 As the report of 
214 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE,
ITS IMPACTS ON MARKETS AND THE GOVT’S EXIT STRATEGY 44 (June 10, 
2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-1 
11JPRT56698.pdf. 
215 See Jill E. Sommers, Remarks Before the Capital Markets Consortium: 
Clearinghouses as Mitigators of Systematic Risk, CFTC (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/CommissionerJillES
ommers/opasommers-10.html (“One of the lessons that emerged from the 
recent financial crisis was that institutions were not just ‘too big to fail,’ 
but also too interconnected through non-transparent swaps that the 
institutions did not effectively manage.”). 
216 See Alexander Sellinger, Backdoor Bailout Disclosure: Must the 
Federal Reserve Disclose the Identities of its Borrowers Under the Freedom 
of Information Act?, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 260–61 (2009) 
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the Congressional Oversight Panel (“COP”) on the AIG 
bailout made clear, billions of the taxpayer bailouts went 100 
cents on the dollar to, inter alia, AIG’s big U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers in their capacity as AIG’s 
counterparties.217 In this regard, COP observed as to AIG’s 
derivatives book: 
In the ordinary course of business, 
the costs of AIG’s inability to meet its 
derivative obligations would have 
been borne entirely by AIG’s 
shareholders and creditors . . . . But 
rather than sharing the pain among 
AIG’s creditors[,] . . . the government 
instead shifted those costs in full onto 
taxpayers[.] The result was that the 
government backed up the entire 
derivatives market, as if these trades 
deserved the same taxpayer backstop 
as savings deposits and checking 
accounts. [E]very counterparty 
received exactly the same deal: a 
complete rescue at taxpayer 
expense.218
(explaining the view that the billions used to bail out AIG was really a 
back door bailout to other counterparties who continued to gamble with 
the funds); Gretchen Morgenson, At A.I.G., Good Luck Following the 
Money, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
03/15/business/15gret.html (revealing the counterparties that taxpayers 
bailed out with the funds allocated to A.I.G. “include Goldman Sachs, 
Merrill Lynch and two French banks, Calyon[,] and Société Générale.”). 
217 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 214, at 197, 243–44, 252. 
218 Id. at 3.  
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C. Other Prominent Twenty-First Century 
Financial Calamities Caused by Unregulated 
Swaps 
Because the central thesis of this paper is that U.S. swaps 
dealers have created questionable loopholes to dodge the 
Dodd-Frank regimen to regulate swaps soundly, it is 
important to show that the 2008 financial crisis is not wholly 
a “one-off” event, which Dodd-Frank opponents have 
intimated to support relaxation of Dodd-Frank ten years 
after the meltdown. Other serious financial crises in the early 
21st century demonstrate the way in which devastating 
economic instability and hardship can and will be caused 
when swaps are traded under lax regulatory regimes.  
1. The Greek Financial Crisis 
While the Greek financial crisis has primarily focused on the 
financial instability of Greece itself and the European Union 
as a whole, the central cause of the Greek crisis has received 
scant attention.219 In 2001, Greece found itself potentially in 
conflict with the European Union, because that country had 
a 2.8-billion-euro debt.220 The Maastricht Treaty’s deficit 
rules require all EU member states to show steady 
219 Gregg Levine, Did Wall Street enable the Greek Debt Crisis? 
ALJAZEERA AM. (July 14, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/blogs/ 
scrutineer/2015/7/14/did-wall-street-enable-greek-debt-crisis.html. See 
Robert Reich, How Goldman Sachs Profited from the Greek Debt Crisis, 
HUFFPOST (July 17, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-
reich/how-goldman-sachs-profite_b_7820794.html. 
220 Zhang Danhong, Maastricht Treaty—Not Yet Set in Stone, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (June 2, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/maastricht-treaty-not-yet-
set-in-stone/a-37435390. 
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improvement in their finances after entering the EU.221
However, the 2.8-billion-euro figure would have shown that 
Greece’s national debt was, in fact, worsening.222     
Wanting to mask that shortfall, Goldman Sachs was 
consulted by Greece, and that bank’s “cure” involved it selling 
Greece a “cross currency swap,” the first leg of which 
appeared immediately to erase 2% of Greek debt, bringing 
that country into seeming compliance with the EU’s deficit 
rules.223 Goldman Sachs received in excess of $500 million in 
fees for this swap arrangement.224
However, by 2005 the financial impact of the cross 
currency swap swung against Greece, leaving it with 5.1 
billion-euro deficit, which was double the indebtedness 
221 André Sapir, Europe After the Crisis: Less or More Role for Nation 
States in Money and Finance, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 608, 614 
(2011).   
222 Beat Balzli, How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask its True Debt,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2010, 6:55 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/ 
international/europe/greek-debt-crisis-how-goldman-sachs-helped-
greece-to-mask-its-true-debt-a-676634.html. See Robert Reich, How 
Goldman Sachs Profited from the Greek Debt Crisis, NATION (July 16, 
2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/goldmans-greek-gambit/. 
223 See Jim Armitage & Ben Chu, Greek Debt Crisis: Goldman Sachs 
Could be Sued for Helping Hide Debts When it Joined Euro, INDEPENDENT
(July 10, 2015, 12:15 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ 
europe/greek-debt-crisis-goldman-sachs-could-be-sued-for-helping-
country-hide-debts-when-it-joined-euro-10381926.html; See Beat Balzli, 
How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask its True Debt, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2010, 6:55 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/internation 
al/europe/greek-debt-crisis-how-goldman-sachs-helped-greece-to-mask-
its-true-debt-a-676634.htm; See Robert Reich, How Goldman Sachs 
Profited from the Greek Debt Crisis, NATION (July 16, 2016), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/goldmans-greek-gambit/.  
224 See Armitage & Chu, supra note 223 (“Goldman Sachs is said to have 
made as much as $500m”). 
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Greece experienced before entering into the swap.225 (If 
Goldman’s over $500 million fee is included, Greece’s 
financial shortfall more than doubled.) Therefore, it is not 
surprising that Greece rejected a new Goldman Sachs offer 
to engage in further financial engineering to make the larger 
2005 indebtedness “disappear.” 
In what may have been a high irony, some important 
observers have criticized Mario Draghi, later to become 
President of the European Central Bank (“ECB”), for his 
connection to the Goldman Sachs-Greece deal.226 Draghi, at 
roughly that time, was a Goldman Sachs officer responsible 
for developing business between Goldman Sachs and major 
European governments.227 Draghi and the ECB later became 
highly critical of Greece, citing concerns about the 
sustainability of its debt, and they were proponents of the 
harsh austerity conditions imposed upon Greece as part of 
225 Nancy K. Humphreys, Goldman’s Greek and Malaysian Deals, 
HUFFPOST (Jul. 19, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-k-hum 
phreys/goldmans-greek-and-malays_b_7828700.html; Robert Reich, How 
Goldman Sachs Profited from the Greek Debt Crisis, NATION (July 16, 
2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/goldmans-greek-gambit/. 
226 Cynthia Kroet & Ivo Oliveira, The Draghi Balance Sheet, POLITICO
(Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.politico.eu/article/mario-draghi-ecb-trichet-
bank-financial-crisis-economy/; Stephen Foley, What Price the New 
Democracy? Goldman Sachs Conquers Europe, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 18, 
2011, 01:00 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis 
-and-features/what-price-the-new-democracy-goldman-sachs-conquers-
europe-6264091.html.
227 Professor Mario Draghi Joins Goldman Sachs, GOLDMAN SACHS (Jan. 
28, 2002), http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases 
/archived/2002/2002-01-28.html. 
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the bailouts.228 Draghi, however, has denied any involvement 
in the deal between Greece and Goldman Sachs.229
The 2005 Greek debt imbalance, upon being made 
public by the Greek government, caused respected analysts 
to predict a 91% probability of a Greek default.230 And, thus, 
three bailouts by the EU (the first two of which were joined 
by the IMF) were needed to prevent the financial collapse of 
Greece and possibly the EU itself. The EU bailouts were also 
accompanied by harsh EU austerity dictates for Greece as a 
condition of the bailouts, which has left Greece to this day a 
seriously financially destabilized nation.231
Some analysts have suggested that Greece may have 
turned a corner on its finances and is on the road to recovery. 
While Greece has shown small signs of improvement,232 this 
228 Alessandro Speciale, Draghi Signals Greek Debt Measures Not Enough 
for QE Inclusions, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2017, 11:19 AM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-26/draghi-signals-greek-debt 
-measures-not-enough-for-qe-inclusion. 
229 See Kroet & Oliveira, supra note 226. 
230 Katie Linsell & Sally Blakewell, Credit Risk Gauges in Europe Rise by 
Most Since Lehman on Greece, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2015 8:56 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-29/credit-risk-surges-
by-most-since-lehman-on-greek-euro-exit-risk. 
231 See Katie Allen, Greece Crisis Timeline—The Rocky Road to Another 
Bailout, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2015 4:36 AM), https://www. 
theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/20/greece-crisis-timeline-rocky-
road-another-bailout. See also COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/greeces-debt-crisis-timeline (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2019) (stating that Greece received its first bailout on May 2, 
2010 and others that followed included various cuts and reforms to Greek 
financial policies.). 
232 Griff Witte, Battered for a Decade, Greece Feels an Unexpected Whiff 
of Revival as Europe Gains Strength, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/after-a-prolonged-
economic-crisis-a-greek-revival/2018/03/07/a9007ffe-1bcd-11e8-98f5-
ceecfa8741b6_story.html (the economy is forecasted to grow at a 2.5 
percent rate in 2018, beating the forecast for the EU; and Greece is on the 
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“sentiment” reflects a “false dawn.” Most observers still view 
Greece as a deeply troubled economy. Greece still struggles 
from, amongst other things, a weak private sector job market, 
weak innovation and export activity, and a persistently high 
consumption to GDP ratio.233 In that vein, on March 27, 2018, 
June 14, 2018, and again on August 6, 2018, Greece was 
supplied with yet further bailouts of almost 24 billion euros, 
signaling that the EU, as well as many other creditors and 
experts, do not believe that Greece has fully emerged from its 
financial crisis.234
2. The City of Detroit Bankruptcy 
One of the primary causes of Detroit’s declaration of 
bankruptcy in July 2013 was that city’s massive financing 
costs associated with a series of Wall Street-driven interest 
rate swaps sold to Detroit in 2005 and 2006.235 UBS AG 
(“UBS”) and Bank of America Corporation’s Merrill Lynch 
Capital Services executed those deals with Detroit 
supposedly to reduce Detroit’s pension fund obligations.236
verge of exiting the bailouts); Eshe Nelson, After €300 Billion in Aid, 
Greece Will Exit its Bailout on Shaky Ground, QUARTZ (Jun. 21, 2018) 
https://qz.com/1310447/greeces-economy-will-still-struggle-after-its-
third-bailout-ends/ (explaining that Greece finished 2017 with its highest 
annual growth since the financial crisis). 
233 Theodore Pelagidis & Michael Mitsopoulos, The Inconvenient Truths 
About Greece, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.brookings 
.edu/blog/up-front/2018/03/01/the-inconvenient-truths-about-greece/. 
234 Greece: The Third Economic Adjustment Program, COUNCIL OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/financial-
assistance-eurozone-members/greece-programme (last visited Apr. 28, 
2019).
235 David Sirota, How Wall Street—Not Pensioners—Wrecked Detroit,
SALON (Nov. 20, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/11/20/how 
_wall_street_not_pensioners_wrecked_detroit/. 
236 Id.
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The variable interest rate exposure on those pension fund 
obligations was exchanged under the swaps for fixed interest 
rate loan payments based on a $1.4 billion pension debt 
plan.237 In effect, Detroit was “hedging” against interest rate 
increases.238 Of course, in the post-2006 era, interests 
dropped dramatically, but Detroit was left paying the much 
higher fixed swaps rate to its swaps dealer bank 
counterparties, rather than, in the absence of the swaps, 
paying the historically low variable rate it would have 
otherwise paid on its pension indebtedness.239
Of course, in the pre-Dodd-Frank era, these kinds of 
interest rate swaps were not exchange-traded. Detroit 
therefore could not unilaterally sell its damaging swaps on 
an exchange to minimize its foreseeable financial losses 
resulting from the dramatic drop in interest rates.  Under the 
controlling ISDA Master Agreement, if Detroit terminated 
the swap before its expiration, all payments owed by Detroit 
under the term of the swap were immediately accelerated 
and a huge liquidated damage penalty would be assessed.240
As is true of many ISDA-written swaps of that era for 
municipalities, the contractual length of Detroit’s swaps was 
237 Mary Williams Walsh, ‘Safe Harbor’ in Bankruptcy is Upended in 
Detroit Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2013, 8:38 PM), https:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/23/safe-harbor-in-bankruptcy-is-upended 
-in-detroit-case/. 
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. See also ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT AND SCHEDULE, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 26, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1107694/000119312508091225/dex1032.htm (see, e.g., Section 5(a)(v)); 
Debtor’s Response to Motion Of Syncora Guarantee Inc. and Syncora 
Capital Assurance Inc. for Leave to Conduct “Limited” Discovery 
Regarding Motion of Debtor for Authorization and Approval of 
Forbearance and Optional Termination Agreement at Ex. A. In Re City 
of Detroit, Bankr. No. 13-53846 (E.D. Mich. Feb 24, 2017). 
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30 years.241 As a result, the bank swaps dealers began 
“demanding upwards of $250-300 million in swap 
termination payments” of this major city in economic distress 
in order to let Detroit out of the swaps scheme as it entered 
bankruptcy.242
In a typical bankruptcy proceeding, the bankrupt city’s 
creditors would “have to ‘take a haircut.’”243 However, ISDA 
had successfully lobbied Congress for a supposed “safe 
harbor” in the bankruptcy code that is even today quite 
controversial.244 That bankruptcy provision, if enforced as 
ISDA reads it, requires payment of “100 cents on the dollar“ 
for indebtedness under the swap before the bankruptcy code’s 
traditional creditor “haircuts” are made.245
In the Detroit bankruptcy proceedings, however, the 
bankruptcy judge rejected “termination” settlements made 
between the bank swap dealers and Detroit — first for $230 
million (i.e., 75 percent of the debt) and then for $165 million 
(i.e., 57 cents on the dollar), respectively.  The judge called 
the underlying swaps obligation to the banks “legally 
241 Joseph S. Fichera, Were Detroit’s Swaps Fair?, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 
2014 12:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-01-
27/were-detroit-s-swaps-unfair-. See generally Thomas Gaist, Wave of US 
Municipal Bankruptcies Caused by Wall Street Predatory Interest Rates, 
Not Pensions, GLOBALRESEARCH (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.global 
research.ca/wave-of-us-municipal-bankruptcies-caused-by-wall-street-
predatory-interest-rates-not-pensions/5364268. 
242 David Sirota, How Wall Street—Not Pensioners—Wrecked Detroit,
SALON (Nov. 20, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/11/20/ 
how_wall_street_not_pensioners_wrecked_detroit/. 
243 Id.
244 AM. BANKR. INST., COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CH. 11, 2012–
2014 FINAL REP. & RECOMMENDATIONS 94–110 (2015). 
245 See Walsh, supra note 237; Hedges Against Risk May Complicate 
Bankruptcy, LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://www. 
law360.com/articles/50211/hedges-against-risk-may-complicate-
bankruptcy; see Sirota, supra note 242. 
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dubious.”246 As to the proposed $165 million settlement, the 
bankruptcy judge said: “It’s just too much money.”247 An $85 
million settlement was finally approved.248 This result, 
affirmed on appeal, undercut substantially ISDA’s “safe 
harbor” bankruptcy contentions.249
3. Jefferson County, Alabama (Birmingham) 
Bankruptcy 
Like Detroit, many other cities suffered debilitating losses 
from poorly understood interest rate swaps transactions.  For 
example, Jefferson County, Alabama, in which the city of 
Birmingham is located, went bankrupt because of supposedly 
sound interest rate swaps gone wrong.  The county cited more 
than $4.2 billion in debt when it filed for bankruptcy in 
November 2011.250 Jefferson County’s debt skyrocketed 
throughout the early 2000s when bond deals to upgrade its 
sewer system were compromised by systemic corruption, 
246 Addison Pierce, Why Detroit’s Good-Enough Swap Settlement Should 
Be Good Enough for the Court, AM. U. BUS. L. REV. (Jan. 4, 2014), 
http://www.aublr.org/2014/01/why-detroits-good-enough-swap-
settlement-should-be-good-enough-for-the-court-2/. 
247 Robert Snell, Bankruptcy Judge Denies Detroit’s Swaps Deal, ROLAND 
MARTIN REPORTS, (Jan. 16, 2014), http://rolandmartinreports.com/ 
blog/2014/01/bankruptcy-judge-denies-detroits-swaps-deal/. 
248 See Pierce, supra note 246; Ryan Felton, Judge Signs Off on Detroit's 
$85 Million Swaps Settlement, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Apr. 11, 2014, 
10:55 AM), https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2014/04/11/ 
judge-signs-off-on-detroits-85-million-swaps-settlement. 
249 See generally In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2014), appeal dismissed No. 14-cv-14872, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131174 
(E.D. Mich. Sep. 20, 2015), aff’d, reh’g denied, en banc denied, Ochadleus
v. City of Detroit (In re City of Detroit), 838 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2016). 
250 Associated Press, Jefferson County Emerges from Bankruptcy,
TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Dec. 4, 2013 12:01 AM), http://www.tuscaloosa 
news.com/news/20131204/jefferson-county-emerges-from-bankruptcy. 
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including bribery and fraud charges related to municipal 
bond offerings and swap transactions, which led to twenty-
two criminal convictions.251
Jefferson County began selling these sewer bonds in 
1997 and within five years had raised $2.8 billion.252
JPMorgan Chase advised the county to “refinance” the bonds 
using adjustable interest rate swaps, which hedged the 
adjustable rate obligations by swapping them for fixed rate 
interest payments to the bank swaps dealers.253
Jefferson County records show that 
the bonds provided the banks with 
$120 million in excessive fees with 
JPMorgan selling the county $2.7 
billion of interest-rate swaps, Bank of 
America sold the county $373 million 
in swaps and Lehman Brothers sold 
the county another $190 million of 
swaps.254
In 2008, the Jefferson Country 
interest rate swaps scheme crumbled 
as the fixed interest rate swaps 
251 Melinda Dickinson, Alabama County Files Biggest Municipal 
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-alabama-jeffersoncounty-idUSTRE7A94CP20111110.  
252 Renee Parsons, JP Morgan and the Largest Municipal Bankruptcy,
HUFFPOST (May 15, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/renee-pars 
ons/jp-morgan-and-the-largest_b_1347324.html (note there was no 
competitive bidding on these bonds). 
253 Id. The bank persuaded Jefferson County to refinance despite the fact 
that fixed rate financing offered the lowest municipal bond interest rates 
in more than three decades.  
254 Id. “In exchange for $25 million cash, the county by then held $5.8 
billion of interest-rate swaps, more than other county in the U.S.” Id. In 
2004, JPMorgan convinced the county that it could generate necessary 
capital through additional swaps deals with Bear Stearns ($1.5 billion) 
and Bank of America ($380 million). 
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payments under the swaps increased 
(while variable rates substantially 
decreased).  Jefferson County’s fixed 
monthly debt payment rose from $10 
to $23 million.255  The county was 
unable to meet this obligation when 
[p]ayments the county relied on 
under its swap agreements to cover 
the interest payments on its 
adjustable-rate bonds hit the skids 
when Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s cut the sewer bonds rating to 
just above “junk.”256
The downgrade would have permitted Wall Street 
bank swap dealers to extricate themselves from these swap 
deals, while at the same time the county faced an additional 
billion dollars in swaps termination fees.257 As the county’s 
liabilities climbed ever higher, eventually eclipsing $4 billion, 
bankruptcy became its only viable option.  At the time of its 
filing (before Detroit’s 2013 bankruptcy), Jefferson County’s 
bankruptcy was the largest municipal bankruptcy in United 
States history. 
Months of intense negotiations followed, and finally a 
settlement of the county’s swaps obligations was approved.  
Under the settlement, the county agreed to pay its largest 
swaps creditors $1.84 billion, approximately 60% of what the 
swaps creditors claimed they were owed under, inter alia,
swaps contract termination penalties.258
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Steven Church, Margaret Newkirk & Kathleen Edwards, Jefferson 
County, Creditors Reach Deal to End Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 
2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-04/jefferson-co 
unty-reaches-deal-with-creditors-on-bankruptcy-exit. It is worth nothing 
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Further complicating this financial calamity, prior to 
its settlement with Jefferson County, JPMorgan Chase 
settled with the SEC over that regulator’s charges the bank 
had made illegal payments to friends of public officials in 
Jefferson County to acquire municipal bond business.259
Because of this, JPMorgan Chase was required by the SEC 
to grant significant concessions to the county in the county’s 
bankruptcy settlement.260 That accounted for JPMorgan 
Chase giving Jefferson County a 60% decrease in the amount 
the bank claimed the county owed in swaps termination 
costs.  After finalizing that settlement, the county was able 
to emerge from bankruptcy in December 2013. 
It is worth noting, however, that residents of the 
county later complained of inequitable treatment because 
“several of [the county’s] elected officials went to prison . .  .  
while no one from the banks was convicted of a crime.”261
Furthermore, the county was forced to lay off 1,000 
employees, and many county residents watched their 
water/sewer service bills climb to up to $250 per month, and 
many were otherwise denied access to running water and 
that the county will pay $5 billion in interest over the next 40 years as it 
pays off the $1.8 billion settlement. Jefferson County Emerges from 
Bankruptcy, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.tuscaloosa 
news.com/news/20131204/jefferson-county-emerges-from-bankruptcy. 
259 See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, A County in Alabama Strikes a 
Bankruptcy Deal [hereinafter Walsh, Alabama Deal] N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 
2013, 9:21 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/a-county-in-ala 
bama-strikes-a-bankruptcy-deal/?_r=0; JPMorgan paying $700 Million to 
Settle SEC Charges, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 4, 2009, 2:09 PM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2009/11/jpmorgan_paying_
700_million_to.html. This settlement required JPMorgan Chase & Co.to 
a $25 million civil fine, $50 million payment to the county, and forfeit 
$647 million in termination fees that it claimed the county owed on 
interest-rate swaps.  
260 See Walsh, Alabama Deal, supra note 259.  
261 Id.
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forced to share portable toilets.262 JPMorgan Chase, for its 
part, did not post a single “losing quarter throughout the 
2008 economic crisis.”263
4. Other Problems with Unregulated Interest Rate 
Swaps Faced by Local Governments and 
University Systems 
As one informed observer so aptly put it, these local 
government interest rate swaps engineered by the big U.S. 
bank holding company swaps dealers “[p]redictably, [were] a 
jackpot for Wall Street and their bankrolled politicians, but 
it was the opposite for [municipal] taxpayers.”264 For 
example, many public school systems, such as the University 
of California system, “lost tens of millions of dollars, and [are] 
set to lose far more, after making risky bets on interest rates 
on the advice of Wall Street bankers.”265 The Financial Times
recently reported that “a number of [other universities] are 
caught up in dicey bond deals like the sort that sunk the city 
of Detroit[.]”266
262 Parsons, supra note 252. 
263 Id.
264 David Sirota, How Wall Street—Not Pensioners—Wrecked Detroit,
SALON (Nov. 20, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/11/20/ 
how_wall_street_not_pensioners_wrecked_detroit/.  
265 Melody Petersen, UC Lost Millions on Interest-Rate Bets, ORANGE 
COUNTY REGISTER (Dec. 17, 2014, 10:39 AM), http://www.ocregister.com/ 
articles/university-602769-interest-rate.html; Thomas Gaist, Wave of US 
Municipal Bankruptcies Caused by Wall Street Predatory Interest Rates, 
Not Pensions, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.global 
research.ca/wave-of-us-municipal-bankruptcies-caused-by-wall-street-
predatory-interest-rates-not-pensions/5364268.  
266 Rana Foroohar, The US College Debt Bubble is Becoming Dangerous,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017, 4:08 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/1cdae6d8-
1b90-11e7-bcac-6d03d067f81f.  
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One does not have to look far to see how so many public 
institutions were lulled into the belief by swaps dealers that 
they did not need to understand how these swaps worked.  As 
the National Association for Pension Funds ( “NAPF”) so 
aptly put it in its 2005 guidance (“Swaps Made Simple; What 
a Trustee Needs to Know”):  
[As to] [[l]ack of understanding[,]] 
[pension t]rustees do not necessarily 
need to understand all of the detailed 
mechanics of how swaps work to use 
them effectively – much in the same 
way we do not need to understand the 
internal mechanics of a car to drive it 
. . . .267
If cars crashed as often as interest rate swaps do for 
these municipal and public counterparties, drivers might be 
inclined to learn more about their cars’ “internal mechanics.”  
The NAPF’s “assurance”268 to swaps end users, however, 
represents a key reason that swaps blow up on public entities 
with harsh financial consequences for, inter alia, taxpayers 
and pensioners.  
5. The London Whale 
After Dodd-Frank passed in July 2010, but before that law 
went into effect,269 a JPMorgan Chase derivatives trader, 
267 NAT’L ASS’N OF PENSION FUNDS, SWAPS MADE SIMPLE: WHAT A
TRUSTEE NEEDS TO KNOW 10 (2005), https://www.actuaries.org.uk/ 
documents/swaps-made-simple-what-trustee-needs-know. 
268 Id.
269With Effective Date of Dodd-Frank Derivatives Provisions Looming, 
SEC Gives Guidance on Title VII, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SEC. REG.
(June 18, 2011), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/with-
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Bruno Iksil, who was famously known as the “London 
Whale,” working out of a JPMorgan Chase London branch, 
unsuccessfully engaged in extremely risky unregulated CDS 
swaps trades. Those trades resulted in that bank ultimately 
booking a $6.2 billion loss – a sum that would have sunk 
many other large financial institutions without JP Morgan 
Chase’s capital reserves. 
Investigations into the “London Whale’s” conduct 
demonstrated that internal bank risk limits were exceeded 
by Iksil more than 300 times; two sets of books were kept to 
conceal the misconduct; and internal bank supervision and 
U.K. financial regulatory oversight were nearly non-
existent.270 It is true that JPMorgan Chase was ultimately 
subject to fines and damages under a number of settlements 
arising from the London Whale episode,271 but it was 
effective-date-of-dodd-frank.html. While Dodd-Frank was enacted on 
July 21, 2010, its effective date was 60 days after a final rule was 
published in cases where the statute required a rule. Almost all of Title 
VII’s swaps provisions require a rule.  
270 See generally JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of 
Derivatives Risks and Abuses: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. 
on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs,
113th Cong. (2013), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg85162/ 
pdf/CHRG-113shrg85162.pdf; Patricia Hurtado, The London Whale,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2016, 5:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/quicktake/the-london-whale; Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Bank 
Boards: The Case for Heightened Administrative Enforcement, 68 ALA. L.
REV. 1011, 1012 (2017).  
271 Hurtado, supra note 270; Jonathan Stempel, U.S. to Drop Criminal 
Charges in 'London Whale' Case, REUTERS (July 21, 2017, 4:30 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us- jpmorgan-londonwhale/u-s-to-drop-
criminal-charges-in-london-whale-case-idUSKBN1A62M9; Jane Croft & 
Caroline Binham, Ex- JPMorgan Trader Loses FCA Fight Linked to 
‘London Whale’ Case, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https:// 
www.ft.com/content/766e70d6-067a-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5; Suzi Ring, 
London Whale's ‘Minnow’ Is Last Hurdle in FCA Identity Fights,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
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fortunate that the damage done by this single rogue trader 
was not more extensive or conducted more extensively (with 
resulting even larger losses) by a group of rogue traders 
within the bank.   
IV. WORRISOME FINANCIAL CALAMITIES ON 
THE HORIZON CAUSED BY GROWING MASSIVE 
CONSUMER DEBT DEFAULTS 

A. Growing New Defaults on Trillions of Dollars 
of Consumer Debt 
As of this writing, there is a general popular consensus that 
the American economy is booming because of low 
unemployment272  and the touted stimulus impact of the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.273 In this regard, testifying before 
the House Financial Services Committee, Jerome Powell, the 
2018-01-16/london-whale-s-minnow-is-last-hurdle-in-fca-identity-fights 
(“The regulator returned to court Tuesday to challenge a previous 
decision won by former JPMorgan trader Julien Grout, who said he was 
identifiable in the bank’s London Whale penalty notice, which 
accompanied a 138 million-pound ($189 million) settlement with the bank 
in 2013. JPMorgan was fined more than $1 billion by U.S. and U.K. 
regulators after Grout’s boss Bruno Iksil, nicknamed the London Whale 
for his large bets, incurred $6.2 billion in losses at the lender.”).  
272 But see Podkul et al., supra note 94 (“[While] employment has risen . . 
. about a fifth of the U.S. jobs are in occupations where the median income 
is below the federal poverty line. And median household income is barely 
above its 2008 level adjusting for inflation.”).  
273 See, e.g., Ben Casselman, Up, Up, Up Goes the Economy. Here’s What 
Could Knock It Down., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/20/business/economy/economy-recovery.html 
(“Unemployment is low, job creation is strong[,] and the overall economy 
seems to be gaining momentum, not losing it. Most economists expect the 
expansion to continue well into next year, which would make it the 
longest ever.”).  
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then new Chair of the Federal Reserve, stated: “The next 
couple of years look quite strong. I would expect the next two 
years to be good years for the economy.”274 On March 1, 2018, 
Powell again maintained that the country’s economic outlook 
remained positive in remarks submitted to the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.275
However, despite Chairman Powell’s recent remarks 
and a favorable GDP growth in the first quarter of 2019,276
there are sophisticated assessments by respected observers 
that the present-day economy has many of the characteristics 
of the seemingly thriving economy prior to the 2008 
meltdown, when economic optimism reigned.277 A March 
274 Heather Long, New Fed Chair Jerome Powell Sees Little Risk of a 
Recession, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/27/fed-chairman-in-public-debut-vows-to-
prevent-overheated-u-s-economy/?utm_term=.c3ba7f4c7ce8.  
275 Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: Hearing Before 
S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. (2018) 
(statement of Jerome H. Powell, Chairman of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System). 
276 Fred Imbert, US Economy Grows by 3.2% in the First Quarter, Topping 
Expectations, CNBC (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/26/ 
gdp-q1-2019-first-read.html.  
277 See Steven Pressman & Robert H. Scott, Recent Stock Market Sell-Off 
Foreshadows a New Great Recession, SALON (Mar. 25, 2018, 1:30 PM), 
https://www.salon.com/2018/03/25/recent-stock-market-sell-off-foreshad 
ows-a-new-great-recession_partner/ (discussing parallels between the 
conditions that led to 2008’s recession and characteristics of the present-
day economy). See also Pearlstein, supra note 61; Gillian Tett, The
Corporate Debt Problem Refuses to Recede; Non-financial Leverage is 
Higher Today than it was Before the Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/ceb8d8ee-0b57-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09; 
Heejm Kim, Jim Rogers Says Next Bear Market Will Be Worst in His Life, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-02-09/jim-rogers-says-next-bear-market-will-be-worst-in-his-
lifetime; John Authers, The Market Parallels With 2007, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 
6, 2018, 4:13 AM), http://www.moneywatch.us/authers-note-the-market-
parallels-with-2007/ (“I hate to admit this, but I think I have found a good 
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2018 widely-cited Wall Street Journal analysis 
commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Bear Sterns 
collapse convincingly shows that “the same problems that led 
to the biggest financial market meltdown since the Great 
Depression are alive and well today.”278 Specifically, that 
analysis demonstrates that the Trump-era “rosy-looking 
stats” of lower unemployment and an increase in median 
household income conceal the same serious issues that 
precipitated the 2008 recession, namely: “excessive consumer 
debt (relative to income) and unaffordable housing.”279 As one 
widely respected commentator recently demonstrated, 
“Americans net worth fell at the highest level since the 
financial crisis in the fourth quarter of 2018, [dropping] to 
104.3 trillion as [2018] came to an end, a decrease of $3.73 
trillion from the third quarter [amounting] to a drop of 3.4 
percent.”280 Another well respected economic analyst’s review 
of the readily available data demonstrates that “U.S. private 
historical parallel for what is happening in the markets [today]. And, it 
is with the spring and summer of 2007, on the eve of the [2008] credit 
crisis.”); Nishant Kumar & Suzy White, Greenlight’s Einhorn Says Issues 
That Caused the Crisis Are Not Solved, BLOOMBERG (November 15, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-15/greenlight-s-
einhorn-says-issues-that-caused-crisis-not-solved-ja1cw3ws. Even Carl 
Icahn has said that today derivatives are “risky, often completely 
misunderstood” financial instruments. Cezary Podkul, Ten Years After 
the Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2018), http://graphics.wsj.com/how-the-
world-has-changed-since-2008-financial-crisis/. 
278 Pressman & Scott, supra note 277.  
279 Id.; see also Podkul et al., supra note 94. 
280 Jeff Cox, US Households See Biggest Decline in Net Worth Since the 
Financial Crisis, CNBC (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/ 
07/us-households-see-biggest-decline-in-net-worth-since-the-financial-
crisis.html 
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debt to GDP ratio is now higher than it was at its 2007 peak 
before the Great Financial Crisis.”281
The troubling implications of this research have been 
repeatedly corroborated by the reports of other respected 
economic commentators. Fortune notes that outstanding non-
mortgage consumer credit is currently nearing $4 trillion – a 
45% increase from 2008.282 At over a trillion dollars, credit 
card debt in the U.S. “has reached a seven-year high . . . .” 
Internationally, “nonfinancial corporate debt increased to 
96% of global GDP between 2011 and 2017, with some 37% 
of global companies now deemed to be “highly leveraged,” 
(meaning they have a debt-to-earnings ratio above five-to-
one) up from 32% in 2007 . . . .”283 In the U.K., concern over 
the rapid growth of consumer debt has prompted the leading 
U.K. financial regulator to waive or reduce credit card fees 
and interest for certain consumers caught in persistent 
debt.284 Designed to help consumers, the rule will have the 
corresponding impact of limiting funds to lenders who are 
experiencing these worrisome defaults, including 
281 FRANK VENEROSO, WHERE DOES OUR U.S. INDEBTEDNESS NOW STAND?
RECORD HIGH 1 (2019) (on file with author). 
282 Daniel J. Arbess, The Economy Looks Good Today, But the Next Debt 
Crisis is on the Horizon, FORTUNE (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www. 
fortune.com/2018/02/28/debt-crisis-jerome-powell-federal-reserve-testi 
mony/. 
283 Id.; see, e.g., Pearlstein, supra note 61. Pearlstein says there: “Now, 12 
years [after the 2008 crisis], it’s happening again. This time, however, it’s 
not households using cheap debt to take cash out of overvalued homes. 
Rather, it is giant corporations using cheap debt—corporate debt—to 
record levels. . . . And, once again, they are diverting capital from 
productive long-term investment to further inflate a financial bubble—
this one in corporate stocks and bonds—that, when it bursts, will send the 
economy into another recession.” (emphasis added).
284 Caroline Binham, FCA Overhauls Rules on Credit Card Charges for 
Struggling Debtors, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/f290ac8e-1baa-11e8-aaca-4574d7dabfb6.  
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demonstrated “negative repercussions for sub-prime . . . 
credit card securitizations.”285
Ultimately, the same financial architecture that 
surrounded the housing mortgage crisis (almost certainly 
including “naked” credit default swaps) has been replicated 
in the three key areas where debt is growing at a troubling 
rate: defaults in student loans, auto loans, and credit card 
debt. There are even recent reports that subprime mortgage 
backed securities “have roughly doubled in the first [2018] 
quarter from a year earlier, as investors lapped up assets 
blamed for bringing the global financial system to the brink 
of collapse a decade ago.”286 As was reported in the Wall
Street Journal on the tenth anniversary of Bear Stearns 
crisis: “A decade after risks associated with financial 
engineering nearly brought the economy to its knees, sales of 
similar products are ticking higher.”287
B. Rising Defaults on Student Debt 
As of this writing, there is hardly a day that goes by without 
a chilling warning that defaults on student loans provides 
285 Bob Thornhill, New FCA Rules May Hit Credit Card Profitability,
GLOBAL CAP. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.globalcapital.com/article/ 
b173ptjpclz6v5/new-fca-rules-may-hit-credit-card-profitability; see also 
Adam Samson, US Midwest Factory Sector Gauge Skids to Lowest Level 
in a Year, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018, 2:22 PM), https://www. 
ft.com/content/c1dbb92a-3357-11e8-ac48-10c6fdc22f03 (showing that 
manufacturing in the Midwest grew at the slowest rate in over a year and 
the American economy grew “at a roughly 1.8 percent annualized rate, 
down sharply from an initial forecast of 4.2 percent, and a peak of 5.4 
percent.”).  
286 Ben McLannahan & Joe Rennison, US Subprime Mortgage Bonds 
Back in Fashion, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018, 4:09 AM), https://www. 
ft.com/content/6478a8d6-32c3-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498. 
287 See Podkul et al., supra note 94. 
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“an eerie echo of the housing crisis.”288 As the Wall Street 
Journal observed: “Some worry student debt, rising for years, 
could figure in the next credit crisis.”289 Moreover, “[o]ver the 
past [ten] years the amount of student loan debt in the US 
has grown by 170%, to a whopping $1.4 [trillion]—more than 
car loans, or credit card debt.”290 As one financial regulator 
288 Rana Foroohar, The US College Debt Bubble is Becoming Dangerous,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017, 4:08 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/a272ee4c-
1b83-11e7-bcac-6d03d067f81f; Judith Scott-Clayton, The Looming 
Student Loan Default Crisis is Worse than We Thought, BROOKINGS (Jan. 
11, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-looming-student-loan-
default-crisis-is-worse-than-we-thought/; Matthew Michaels, More People 
than Ever are Defaulting on Student Loans – and it Could Put the US 
Economy at Risk, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2017, 3:39 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/student-loan-default-puts-economy-at-
risk-2017-12; John Authers, Authers’ Note: The Market Parallels with 
2007, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018, 4:13 AM), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/beaa0c4a-0af1-11e8-8eb7-42f857ea9f09. 
289 See Podkul et al., supra note 94. 
290 Foroohar, supra note 288; Nishant Kumar & Suzy Waite, Greenlight’s 
Einhorn Says Issues That Caused the Crisis Are Not Solved, BLOOMBERG 
MKT. (Nov. 15, 2017, 1:04 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2017-11-15/greenlight-s-einhorn-says-issues-that-caused-crisis-not-solve 
d-ja1cw3ws; Bloomberg Daybreak: Americas, How America’s Consumer 
Debt Threatens Credit Markets, (television broadcast Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2017-12-20/how-u-s-cons umer-
debt-threatens-credit-markets-video; Victor Dergunov, America’s 
Impending Debt Crisis, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 3, 2017, 2:54 AM), 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4120000-americas-impending-debt-
crisis; Chris Markowski, America’s $1 Trillion in Credit Card Debt is 
Terrible News for Our Future, THE HILL (Aug. 25, 2017, 1:00 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/347973-americas-1-trillion-
in-credit-card-debt-is-terrible-news; Wolf Richter, America’s Debt is 
Surging, and Some of the Riskiest Borrowers are Struggling to Pay Back,
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:33 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
consumer-debt-surges-and-subprime-auto-delinquencies-rise-2017-11; 
Tyler Durden, US Consumers Tap Out: Credit Card Defaults Surge To 4 
Year High And It’s Getting Worse, ZEROHEDGE (Apr. 26, 2017, 9:31 PM), 
https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-04-26/us-consumers-tap-out-cred 
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has warned that “since 2008 we have basically swapped a 
housing debt bubble for a student loan bubble.”291
William Dudley, “[then-]president of the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank [has] sounded the alarm [about] the 
student debt crisis,” stating that:  
[S]tudents now leave school owing on 
average $34,000[,] up 70 percent from 
a decade ago . . . . [L]oan delinquency 
climbed to 11.2 per cent in the last 
quarter of 2016, the highest rate for 
all types of household debt . . . . More 
than one in ten borrowers are at least 
it-card-defaults-surge-4-year-high-and-its-getting-worse; Jessica Dickler, 
Credit Card Debt Hits a Record High, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2018, 9:54 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/23/credit-card-debt-hits-record-high.html; 
Michelle Singletary, Consumer Debt is at a Record High. Haven’t We 
Learned?, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.washington 
post.com/business/us-consumer-debt-is-at-a-record-high-havent-we-lear
ned/2017/08/11/5c7bee6e-7e13-11e7-a669-b400c5c7e1cc_story.html?utm 
_term=.0242cf78f1db; John A. Byrne, Americas’ Household Debt has 
Surged by $605B this Year, N.Y. POST (Nov. 26, 2017, 12:12 AM), 
https://nypost.com/2017/11/26/new-yorkers-household-debt-has-surged-
by-605b-this-year/; Nick Clements, Consumer Debt Reaches New Peak: 
Will Losses Follow?, FORBES (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/nickclements/2017/08/18/consumer-debt-reaches-new-peak-will-
losses-follow/#6f4cd4a41849; Alistair Gray, U.S. Banks Suffer 20% Jump 
in Credit Card Losses, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018, 2:54 PM), 
https://www.ft.com/content/bafdd504-fd2c-11e7-a492-2c9be7f3120a; Ben 
McLannahan, Debt Pile-Up in US Car Market Sparks Subprime Fear,
FIN. TIMES (May 30, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
bab49198-3f98-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2; Ben McLannahan, US Bank 
Derivatives Books Larger Since Rescue of Bear Sterns, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 
16, 2018, 9:42 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/201bce0c-289b-11e8-
b27e-cc62a39d57a0. 
291 Froohar, supra note 266 (citing an expert at the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau). 
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90 days behind in repaying their 
student debt[.]292
Many commentators have concluded that the weight of 
student loan debt on millennials alone is “a drag on the 
economy as a whole.”293
Again, inhering in the student loan debt crisis are the 
same financial engineering instruments present during the 
2008 crisis, e.g., student loan asset-backed securities, 
collateralized debt obligations, and naked credit default 
swaps.294 Many of these instruments were executed before 
292 Eric Pianin, America’s Student-Loan Debt Reaches $1.3 Trillion (and 
It’s Still Climbing), FISCAL TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.inc.com/the-
fiscal-times/student-loan-debt-1-trillion.html. 
293 Dante Chinni & Sally Bronston, The Real College Crisis: Student Debt 
Drags Down Economy, NBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www. 
nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/real-college-crisis-student-debt-
drags-down-economy-n984131 (Stating “the biggest source of debt for 
millennials? Personal education loans at 21 percent” and “the net impact 
is . . . a drag on the economy as a whole”).  
294 Attended A Public College? Don’t Pay Your Federal Loans, DAILY KOS
(June 3, 2015, 8:38 AM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2015/6/3/ 
1390122/-Attended-A-Public-College-Don-t-Pay-Your-Federal-Loans; 
Raúl Carrillo, How Wall Street Profits Form Student Debt, ROLLING 
STONE (Apr. 14, 2016, 2:37 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/ 
news/how-wall-street-profits-from-student-debt-20160414; Rachel L. 
Ensing, SecondMarket to Launch Student-Loan Securities Platform,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241 
27887323978104578334342724776724; Larry Doyle, Are Student Loans 
an Impending Bubble? Is Higher Education a Scam?, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 
26, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/are-student-loans-
an-impending-bubble-is-higher-education-a-scam-2011-5; Joe Rennison, 
Investors Pour Back into Crisis-Era Credit Product, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23, 
2017, 4:44 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/c4d815b2-86bc-11e7-bf50-
e1c239b45787; Brad Rosen, A New Direction Forward at the CFTC in 
2017, WOLTERS KLUWER (“[E]stimated notional value of the U.S. swaps 
markets was $243 trillion in 2017, a 211 percent increase over the prior 
year”), http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/securities/news/a_new_direc 
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the effective date of Dodd-Frank so that that statute’s swaps 
requirements did not apply.295 However, even if executed 
after the effective date of Dodd-Frank, the U.S. bank swap 
dealers have created the new loopholes identified in this 
paper that now can remove these instruments from Dodd-
Frank’s swaps protections at those swaps dealers 
discretion.296
C. Rising Defaults on Auto Loans 
What is true of the student loan market is also now true with 
auto loans, especially subprime auto loans. As was reported 
in Forbes:
Research from Experian, a credit 
firm, shows that the average 
duration of new car loans is at an all-
time high of 5.5 years—with 25% of 
loans extending for 6-7 years, and 
some lasting 8 years or longer. The 
number of auto loans outstanding 
with subprime borrowers was 23% of 
the total in 3Q 2014. Increasingly 
those subprime borrowers are falling 
behind on their payments. More than 
2.6% of borrowers who took out loans 
in the first quarter of 2014 had 
missed at least one monthly payment 
by November—the highest level of 
tion_forward_at_the_cftc_in_2017 (citing COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 
COMM’N, FY 2017 Agency Financial Report, available at http:// 
business.cch.com/srd/2017afr.pdf).  
295 See infra note 297 and accompanying text. 
296 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, TABLE C: EFFECTIVE DATES OF 
PRINCIPAL DODD-FRANK PROVISIONS, https://www.sullcrom.com/files/up 
load/Effective-Dates-of-the-Principal-Provisions-of-Dodd-Frank.pdf. 
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early trouble since 2008, when 
delinquencies rose above 3.0%. For 
borrowers with weak credit scores the 
delinquency rate was 8.4%.297
Similarly, a report on auto loans broadcast on CNBC showed: 
[A]n increasing portion of those loans 
is of the subprime—or, based on the 
borrower’s credit history, more likely 
to default—variety. Through the 
middle of 2014, about 29 percent of all 
the securities based on auto loans to 
individuals were classified subprime, 
a level 15 percent higher than during 
the same period last year, according 
to figures from Standard & Poor’s.298
Forbes therefore reported:  
297 Michael Lingenheld, The Next Subprime Crisis, Auto Loans, Won’t End 
Well, Forbes (Jan. 28, 2015, 3:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/michaellingenheld/2015/01/28/the-next-subprime-crisis-auto-loans/; 
Cooper Levey-Baker, Do Rising Car Loan Defaults Signal a Precarious 
Economy?, SARASOTA (Feb. 2, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.sarasota 
magazine.com/articles/2018/2/2/precarious-economy (“Is the rise in 
delinquencies a sign of the debt bubble about to pop, like the housing 
market 10 years ago? Halliburton notes that delinquency rates are 
‘creeping up,’ not ‘exploding,’ and warns against doomsday predictions, 
and the Federal Reserve suggests that the expansion of the subprime 
auto loan market may have a ‘muted’ effect on the overall financial sector. 
But auto loans do make up a significant chunk of American debt. Total 
household debt rose to almost $13 trillion last year; $1.2 trillion of that 
was in auto loans, trailing only mortgage debt and student loan debt.”). 
298 Kate Kelly, New Debt Crisis Fear: Subprime Auto Loans, CNBC (Oct. 
1, 2014, 12:18 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/10/01/new-debt-crisis-
fear-subprime-auto-loans.html. 
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[S]ales of US subprime auto ABS 
[Asset-Backed Securities] totaled 
more than $17.4 billion in 2014, after 
a record $22 billion were sold in 2013. 
Auto lenders have even started 
offering [auto loan asset backed 
securities] with a “prefunding” 
feature that effectively packages 
securitized bundles of auto loans 
before they’ve even been made. While 
that might sound crazy and 
reminiscent of 2008, easier lending 
standards have been a big driver of 
vehicle sales that continue to beat 
expectations. The head of Honda’s US 
sales recently warned that 
competitors are doing “stupid things” 
to gain an advantage.299
Taking all these factors of the auto loan debt infrastructure 
into account, a recent Bloomberg report concluded:  
[Recently], it appeared the chickens 
had come home to roost for some 
subprime auto lenders and investors, 
with Fitch Ratings warning that 
delinquencies in subprime car loans 
had reached a high not seen since 
October 1996. The number of 
borrowers who were more than 60 
days late on their car bills in 
February rose 11.6 percent from the 
same period a year ago, bringing the 
299 Michael Lingenheld, The Next Subprime Crisis, Auto Loans, Won’t End 
Well, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2015, 3:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/michaellingenheld/2015/01/28/the-next-subprime-crisis-auto-loans/. 
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delinquency rate to a total 5.16 
percent, according to the credit rating 
company.300
By the fourth quarter of 2018, the car loan delinquency rate 
exceeded 8 percent.301
Again, as the above quotes demonstrate and as is true of 
student loan and credit card indebtedness, the auto loans 
financial infrastructure mimics the failed financial 
engineering created in the mortgage markets leading up to 
the 2008 financial crash.  
D. Rising Defaults on Credit Card Debt 
On August 7, 2017, Bloomberg reported that “U.S. consumer 
credit-card debt just passed an ominous milestone, beating a 
record set just before the global financial system almost 
collapsed in 2008.”302 Credit card debt reached an all-time 
high in June 2017 as the Federal Reserve valued outstanding 
credit card loans at $1.02 trillion.303 Accompanying this 
record high of outstanding debt has been substantial losses 
sustained by banks. In 2017, “[t]he big four US retail banks 
[Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells 
300 Tracy Alloway, This is What’s Going on Beneath the Subprime Auto-
Loan Turmoil, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2016, 10:23 AM), https://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-21/this-is-what-s-going-on-
beneath-the-subprime-auto-loan-turmoil. 
301 Gillian Tett, Driven to Default: What’s Causing the Rise in Subprime 
Auto Loans?, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
1ce6d32e-4520-11e9-b168-96a37d002cd3 (showing updated numbers of 
delinquency rates). 
302 Jennifer Surane, U.S. Credit-Card Debt Surpasses Record Set at Brink 
of Crisis, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2017, 6:09 PM), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2017-08-07/u-s-credit-card-debt-surpasses-record-set-
at-brink-of-crisis. 
303 Id.
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Fargo] sustained a near 20 per cent jump in losses from credit 
cards . . . , raising doubts about the ability of consumers to 
fuel economic expansion.”304 Together, Citigroup, JPMorgan 
Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo lost $12.5 billion 
from credit card loans in 2017.305 Relaxing approval 
standards, credit card issuers have aggressively attempted to 
attract customers and promote spending through monetary 
incentives such as bonuses and cashback.306 Data indicates 
that card issuers have been largely successful as, 
“[c]ustomers opened about 110 million new credit card 
accounts in 2016. That’s roughly 50 percent higher than 2010 
and higher than any single year since 2007.”307 Together, the 
rapid increase of new credit card lines and the record high of 
defaults on credit card loans indicate a troubling trend that 
consumers are vastly spending beyond their means. 
E. Future Economic Chaos 
It bears repeating that defaults now occurring across the 
consumer spending economy mirror the defaults on debt 
preceding the mortgage meltdown. However, it is not just the 
defaults that are worrisome. It is the fact that the financial 
infrastructure that magnified the 2008 financial meltdown 
has been built up around these three forms of debt as well. 
304 Alistair Gray, US Banks Suffer 20% Jump in Credit Card Losses, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018, 2:54 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/bafdd504-
fd2c-11e7-a492-2c9be7f3120a.  
305 Id.
306 Robert Harrow, What Consumers Can Expect From Credit Card 
Issuers in 2018, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www. 
forbes.com/sites/robertharrow/2018/01/29/what-consumers-can-expect-
from-credit-card-issuers-in-2018/#39bc16f4672d. 
307 Herb Weisbaum, Americans Have More Credit Cards – and More Debt, 
Says CFPB, NBC NEWS (Dec. 28, 2017, 7:35 AM), https://www. 
nbcnews.com/business/consumer/americans-have-more-credit-cards-
more-debt-says-cfpb-n833086. 
Too Big to Fail 
296 Journal of Business & Technology Law 

Through the new loopholes to Dodd-Frank swaps regulation 
identified in this paper, the major U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers have engineered a way to evade 
Dodd-Frank’s regulations at will. Consequently, if a systemic 
break were to occur because of cascading and increasing 
student, auto, and/or credit card loan defaults and in swaps 
associated thereto, the economic chaos and harm of the 2008 
financial meltdown may very well be repeated, as will the fact 
that the largest U.S. bank holding companies will then once 
again seek a multi-trillion dollar taxpayer bailout to avoid a 
Second Great Depression. 
V.  DODD-FRANK’S SOLUTIONS FOR STABILIZ-
ING THE SWAPS MARKET
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed Dodd-
Frank into law.308 Dodd-Frank transformed the regulation of 
swaps by requiring generally that swaps be subject to 
clearing and, if cleared, by transparency through exchange-
like trading, including capital, collateral or margin 
requirements, and checks on swaps dealers anti-competitive 
and ethical behavior. 309
The Act first requires that all “swap dealers” (“SD” or 
“SDs”) and “major swap participants” (“MSP” or “MSPs”) 
register with the appropriate banking prudential regulators, 
308 The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Brady Dennis, Obama Ushers 
in New Financial Era; Landmark Law is Signed President Says Work 
Still Lies Ahead for Regulators, WASH. POST, July 22, 2010, at A13. 
309 BAIRD WEBEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40975, FIN.
REGULATORY REFORM AND THE 111TH CONG. at 8 (2010), 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40975_20100601.pdf (“H.R. 4173 . . . 
mandate[s] reporting, centralized clearing, and exchange-trading of OTC 
derivatives . . . . The bill[] require[s] regulators to impose capital 
requirements on swap dealers and “major swap participants.”). 
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the CFTC, and/or, if equity swaps are involved, the SEC.310
A swap dealer is an entity that (1) holds itself out as such; (2) 
makes a market in swaps; (3) regularly enters into swaps for 
its own account in the ordinary course of business; or (4) 
engages in activity generally recognized in the trade as 
dealing in swaps.311 Major swap participants are entities that 
are not swap dealers and (1) maintain a substantial position 
in swaps, excluding transactions used to hedge commercial 
risk; (2) create substantial counterparty exposure that could 
undermine the banking system or financial markets; or (3) 
are highly leveraged, but not subject to federal prudential 
bank regulators’ capital requirements; and (4) maintain a 
substantial position in swaps.312 For purposes of this paper, 
all relevant U.S. financial entities focused on herein are 
swaps dealers.
At present, the threshold for SD registration with the 
CFTC is the conducting of many billions of dollars in swaps 
310 Id.; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 731(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1703 (2010). In the case of 
U.S. bank holding companies, Dodd-Frank gives the appropriate 
prudential regulators jurisdiction for capital and margin requirements if 
the bank is a swaps dealer or a major swap participant. Douglas Landy, 
Melissa Ferraro & James King, United States: “Are You My Mother?”: 
Which Agency Governs What Swap Entity Under the Margin Rules for 
Non-Cleared Swaps?, MONDAQ (May 9, 2016), http://www.mondaq.com/ 
unitedstates/x/489242/Commodities+Derivatives+Stock+Exchanges/Are
+You+My+Mother+Which+Agency+Governs+What+Swap+Entity+Unde
r+The+Margin+Rules+For+NonCleared+Swaps.  Non-bank subsidiaries 
of U.S. bank holding companies are governed entirely by the CFTC or 
SEC, depending on the nature of the swap for all swaps regulation, 
including capital and margin.   
311 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 721(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1658 (2010).   
312 Id.
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trades per year.313 Registered SDs must disclose any material 
risks of swaps and any material incentives or conflicts of 
interests.314 In addition, they must meet capital and margin 
(or collateral) requirements and conform to business conduct 
rules, including those related to fraud and market 
manipulation, that are set by the regulators (while clearing 
organizations and exchanges can supplement these federal 
regulator requirements).315 Dodd-Frank also requires that 
swaps transactions be reported to federal regulators.316
 The CFTC conceptually separates its regulation of 
SDs into “Entity-Level” Requirements and “Transaction-
Level” Requirements, totaling thirteen applicable types of 
swaps requirements.317 Entity-Level Requirements are 
swaps rules that “apply to a swap dealer . . . as a whole,” and 
Transaction-Level Requirements are regulations that “apply 
on a transaction-by-transaction basis.”318
313 Swap Dealer (SD) Registration, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, https://www. 
nfa.futures.org/registration-membership/who-has-to-register/sd-msp. 
html (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).  
314 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 731(h)(3)(B), 764(g)(3)(B)(i)-(ii). 
315 Id. §§ 731(e), 764(e)–(h). 
316 Id. § 727(C). Business conduct standards were the subject of a January 
11, 2012 final CFTC rule and applied to SDs and MSDs. Business 
Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with 
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734 (Feb. 17, 2012). These standards 
enhance protections to swaps counterparties of SDs and MSPs through, 
inter alia, due diligence, disclosure, fair dealing and anti-fraud 
protections. Id. As is shown below, it appears that the CFTC never made 
clear that these business conduct standards were to apply 
extraterritorially where Dodd-Frank was to apply abroad until it issued 
a proposed rule on October 11, 2016. That rule was never finalized. See 
infra notes 461–46 and accompanying text. 
317 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS,
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE & POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING COMPLIANCE 
WITH CERTAIN SWAPS REGULATIONS (2013).  
318 Id.
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The CFTC identifies six main categories of Entity-
Level Requirements: capital adequacy, chief compliance 
officer, risk management, swap data recordkeeping, swap 
data repository reporting, business conduct standards, and 
physical commodity large swaps trader reporting.319  The 
seven Transaction-Level Requirements are categorized as: 
required clearing and swap processing, margining (and 
segregation) for uncleared swaps, mandatory trade 
execution, swap trade relationship documentation, real-time 
public reporting, trade confirmation, and daily trading 
records.320
It is important to note here, however, that U.S. bank 
holding company swap dealers—as opposed to their non-
bank subsidiaries—are “prudentially” regulated by the 
appropriate federal banking agencies,321 and those banking 
institutions must comply with the swaps capital and margin 
requirements imposed by those bank regulators and not 
those established by the CFTC.322
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 See Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 
Fed. Reg. 74,840, 74,841 n.4 (Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 45) (“The [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] is the 
prudential regulator for any swap entity that is (i) a State-chartered bank 
that is a member of the Federal Reserve System[;] (ii) a State-chartered 
branch or agency of a foreign bank[;] . . . and (v) a bank holding company 
. . . .”).  
322 The U.S. prudential regulators are the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Farm Credit Administration, 
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Margin and Capital 
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,840, 74,840 
(Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified 12 C.F.R. pt. 45) (“For swap entities that 
are prudentially regulated by one of the Agencies, sections 731 and 764 
of the Dodd-Frank Act require the Agencies to adopt rules jointly for swap 
entities under their respective jurisdictions imposing (i) capital 
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However, while the rules set by prudential bank 
regulators exist as a separate body of margin and capital 
mandates from the CFTC’s capital and margin rules, the 
differences between the two sets of regulations are 
considered minimal.323
Pertinent for the purposes of this paper, which focuses 
on whether the CFTC should apply its Dodd-Frank swaps 
rules to all swaps trades of foreign non-bank subsidiaries of 
U.S. bank holding companies, those non-bank subsidiaries of 
SDs are fully subject to CFTC capital and margin rules (and 
not those of the banking regulators) to the extent that Dodd-
Frank reaches those foreign subsidiaries through sensible 
extraterritorial rules.324
requirements and (ii) initial and variation margin requirements on all 
swaps not cleared by a registered derivatives clearing organization or a 
registered clearing agency.”); see also 12 C.F.R. § 45 (2017); 12 C.F.R. §
237 (2016); 12 C.F.R. § 349 (2016); 12 C.F.R. § 624 (1989); 12 C.F.R. § 
1221 (2016). 
323 U.S. Uncleared swap Margin, Capital and Segregation Rules, DAVIS 
POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.davispolk.com/ 
publications/us-uncleared-swap-margin-capital-and-segregation-rules/; 
Prudential Regulators and CFTC Adopt Margin Rules for Non-Cleared 
Swaps, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.sidley.com/ 
en/insights/newsupdates/2016/01/prudential-regulators-and-cftc-adopt-
margin-rules (noting that substantive differences between the Prudential 
Regulators Final Rule and CFTC Final Rule are not particularly 
significant). 
324 Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and 
Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,253, (Dec. 16, 2016) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 23, 140) (“SDs and MSPs that are not banking 
entities, including nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies 
regulated by the Federal Reserve Board, are subject to the Commission’s 
capital requirements.”); see also Prudential Regulators and CFTC Adopt 
Margin Rules for Non-Cleared Swaps, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Jan. 20, 
2016), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2016/01/prudent 
ial-regulators-and-cftc-adopt-margin-rules (“[A] nonbank subsidiary of a 
bank holding company — such as a non-bank swap dealer registered with 
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Dodd-Frank often imposes the clearing and exchange 
trading swaps requirements on standardized swap 
transactions.325 Under clearing, a clearing facility stands 
between the buyer and seller of a contract to guarantee each 
against default by a counterparty.326 To avoid their own 
liability, clearing facilities must therefore establish and 
strictly enforce the capital adequacy of swaps counterparties, 
and collect margins from swaps counterparties, i.e., deposits 
on the amount at risk in a swaps trade.327 Under Dodd-
Frank, the regulatory agencies decide whether specific types 
of swaps must be cleared, and designated clearing 
organizations (“DCOs”) must inform regulators about which 
types of swaps they plan to clear.328 DCOs must allow “non-
discriminatory” access by counterparties to clearing.329
Swaps that are required to be cleared must also be traded on 
a designated contract market or a swaps execution facility 
(“SEF”).330
the CFTC — would be . . . subject to the CFTC Final Rule rather than to 
the PR Final Rule.”). 
325 See Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for 
Security-Based Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution 
Facilities, and National Security Exchanges with Respect to Security-
Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65882 (Oct. 26, 2010) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (explaining some of the regulations 
the Dodd-Frank Act imposes on swap transactions). 
326 See generally Jorge A. Cruz et al., Clearing House, Margin 
Requirements, and Systemic Risk, 19 REV. OF FUTURES MARKETS 39 (Aug. 
31, 2010), https://www.theifm.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Clearing 
house%20-%20Margin%20Requirements%20-Risk-pub2011_0.pdf.  
327 Id.
328 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 723(h)(2)(A), 763(a)(1) (2010). 
329 Id. § 763(a)(2)(B). 
330 Id. §§ 723(e), 763(a)(2)(B). Dodd-Frank contains a narrow “end-user” 
exception designed to ease the burden on businesses using swaps to 
mitigate risk associated with their commercial activities. The exception 
applies to parties that are not financial entities that are using swaps to 
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Dodd-Frank requires the reporting to federal 
regulators of all swaps, whether or not they are exempt from 
clearing and/or exchange trading.331 All swaps must be 
reported to a registered swap data repository (SDR), the 
CFTC, or the SEC (where appropriate), and this reporting 
must occur as soon as technologically possible after swap 
execution.332
VI. DODD-FRANK WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO 
APPLY TO SWAPS EXECUTED OUTSIDE THE U.S. 
IF THEY POSE A “DIRECT AND SIGNIFICANT” 
IMPACT ON U.S. COMMERCE OR IF THEY ARE 
DESIGNED TO EVADE DODD-FRANK 

A. Dodd-Frank’s Extraterritorial Language 
As explained below,333 it was widely recognized by the time 
of Dodd-Frank’s passage that swaps traded abroad by, inter 
alia, U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers, or their 
affiliates, contributed greatly to U.S. and worldwide 
economic destabilization in 2008, which in turn, required the 
massive multi-trillion-dollar U.S. taxpayer bank bailouts.  
Just prior to Senate passage of Dodd-Frank on July 16, 
2010, Senate Banking Committee Chairman, Chris Dodd, 
and Senator Jeff Merkley (a staunch supporter of Dodd-
hedge or mitigate commercial risk and have notified the CFTC and/or 
SEC (where appropriate) how they meet financial obligations of non-
cleared swaps. An example of an eligible end user exemption would be 
airlines buying fuel using uncleared swaps to hedge against price 
increases. This end-user exemption does not include swaps in which both 
parties are major swap participants, swap dealers, or other large 
financial entities. 
331 Id. §§ 727, 731, 764. 
332 Id. §§ 727, 729, 763, 764. 
333 See infra notes 334–39 and accompanying text. 
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Frank and a member of the Senate Banking Committee) both 
commented about the risks associated with the U.S. financial 
institutions’ domination of the global swap market334 and 
how a U.S. bank’s foreign subsidiaries could easily imperil 
that subsidiary itself, other affiliated subsidiaries, and the 
U.S. parent bank holding company as well.335
In those July 16, 2010 floor statements, it was made 
clear that Dodd-Frank would contain the tools to ensure that 
U.S. financial regulatory agencies would have the authority 
to identify swaps trading problems that emerge both 
domestically and around the world.336 Indeed, it was then 
widely recognized that a London-based foreign subsidiary of 
AIG—AIG Financial Products—sold huge numbers of CDSs 
and naked CDSs guaranteeing the viability of trillions of 
dollars of U.S. residential mortgages. The threatened AIG 
default on those swaps caused AIG to face economic ruin in 
the absence of an immediate $85 billion U.S. taxpayer bailout 
(and ultimately an approximately $180 billion bailout).337
That bailout was to benefit, inter alia, many big U.S. bank 
334 156 CONG. REC. S5828-53 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (statement of 
Senator Dodd), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-07-14/html/ 
CREC-2010-07-14-pt1-PgS5828.htm (explaining that Dodd-Frank 
contains “the tools to see to it that our regulatory agencies and others will 
have the capacity and the ability to identify and to spot early on problems 
that emerge both in the [U.S.] and around the world.”). 
335 156 CONG. REC. S5870-902 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of 
Senator Merkley), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-07-15/html/ 
CREC-2010-07-15-pt1-PgS5870-2.htm. 
336 156 CONG. REC. S5828-53 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (statement of 
Senator Dodd), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-07-14/html/ 
CREC-2010-07-14-pt1-PgS5828.htm. 
337 Edmund L. Andres & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After 
$170 Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009), https:// 
mobile.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15AIG.html.  
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holding company swaps dealers in their capacity as AIG 
counterparties on these CDS-based swaps.338
The clear concern by legislators was that reckless and 
poorly regulated swaps activity of foreign affiliates of U.S. 
financial institutions had already led (and could lead again) 
to cascading swaps defaults that quickly washed back to 
systemically risky U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers 
and would therefore require bailouts by U.S. taxpayers of 
those parent U.S. institutions.   
Therefore Dodd-Frank expressly applied its swaps 
rules to swaps transactions executed outside of the U.S. in 
two important cases: (1) when those activities, “have a direct 
and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, 
commerce of the United States”; or (2) when activities, 
“contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe or promulgate as are necessary or appropriate 
to prevent the evasion of any provision [of Dodd-Frank].”339
With respect to the former, the CFTC has interpreted 
the language of the extraterritorial provision to mean that 
swaps rules apply, “to activities outside the United States 
that have either: (1) [a] direct and significant effect on U.S. 
commerce; or, in the alternative[; or] (2) a direct and 
significant connection with activities in U.S. commerce, and 
through such connection present the type of risks to the U.S. 
financial system and markets that [the swaps provisions] 
directed the Commission to address.”340
338  Shahien Nasiripour, Goldman Sachs got Billions from AIG for Its Own 
Account, Crisis Panel Finds, HUFFPOST (Jan. 26, 2011, 9:32 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/26/goldman-sachs-aig-backdoor-
bailout_n_814589.html.  
339 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (2012). 
340 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,300 (July 26, 
2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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Just days before Dodd-Frank’s Senate passage, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank LTD341 that a U.S. SEC financial regulatory 
statute would apply extraterritorially, only if that statute 
contained explicit language to that effect. The Court noted 
that, “it is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that 
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is 
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States,’”342 reaching the conclusion that, “[u]nless 
there is ‘the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly 
expressed,’ we must presume it ‘is primarily concerned with 
domestic conditions.’”343
Congress, therefore, specifically and directly 
responded to Morrison, when three days later, on June 24, 
2010, it added the extraterritorial language quoted above to 
Dodd-Frank in Section 722 (i).344 The intent of Congress was 
341 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
342 Id. at 255 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 
(1991)) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
343 Id. at 255 (citing EEOC, 499 U.S. at 248).  
344 156 CONG. REC. H5205, H5237 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of 
Rep. Bachus) (“In the case of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the 
Supreme Court last week held that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
applies only to transactions in securities listed on United States 
exchanges and transactions in other securities that occur in the United 
States. In this case, the Court also said that it was applying a 
presumption against extraterritoriality. This bill’s provisions concerning 
extraterritoriality, however, are intended to rebut that presumption by 
clearly indicating that Congress intends extraterritorial application in 
cases brought by the SEC or the Justice Department.”). It should be noted 
that these statements address claims brought by the SEC and DOJ, 
because they are responsive to the facts of Morrison (a case of an 
Australian bank, being sued for securities fraud, by Australians, for 
activities in Australia, on Australian exchanges), however the actual 
amendment language makes it clear that the amendment language 
extends jurisdiction to all swaps regulators. Congress’s intent has been 
accepted as a reversal of Morrison in notable cases already. See, 
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clear: it wanted to ensure that, inter alia, the CFTC had the 
power to regulate extraterritorial activities with “direct and 
significant” effects on U.S. commerce and activities 
transacted outside the U.S. with the intent to “evad[e] Dodd-
Frank.”345
B. The CFTC’s July 2013 Extraterritorial 
Guidance: Swaps Executed by Guaranteed 
U.S. Bank Holding Company Foreign 
Subsidiaries Are Covered by Dodd-Franks 
Swaps Regulation 
In the roughly three years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, 
the CFTC mostly completed what has been recognized as the 
arduous, unprecedented, “Herculean feat”346 of finalizing 
over sixty substantive rules, exemptive orders, and guidance 
actions.347 When the CFTC met on July 12, 2013 to 
e.g., S.E.C. v. Tourre, No. 10 Civ. 3229 (KBF), 2013 WL 2407172, at *1 
n.4 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2013) (“Because the Dodd–Frank Act effectively 
reversed Morrison”); In re Optimal U.S. Litig., 865 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456 
n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); S.E.C. v. Compania Int’l Financiera S.A., No. 11 
Civ. 4904(DLC), 2011 WL 3251813, at *6 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011). 
345 Richard Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They 
Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN.
J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3, 7 (2011). 
346 Annette L. Nazareth & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, Eight US Regulatory 
Predictions for 2017, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/79955066-d81f-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e.  
347 For a complete list of rules, exemptive orders and guidance actions see
Final Rules, Guidance, Exemptive Orders, and Other Actions, U.S. CFTC, 
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Dodd-FrankFinal 
Rules/index.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2019). As of January 2017, seventy-
four total rules have been created to implement Dodd-Frank. Fourteen of 
those rules were created and implemented after the July 2013 Guidance 
was released. During the period that the CFTC was busy establishing the 
framework of regulations pertaining to Dodd-Frank, many market 
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implement the statute’s extraterritoriality provision, the 
then-CFTC Chairman, Gary Gensler, made it clear that it 
had been impossible to determine the extraterritorial reach 
of the swaps rules until the substance of those rules were in 
place. He said:  
We're well over 90 percent through 
the various rule and guidance 
writing.  And the markets are 
probably well towards half way 
implementing these reforms . . .  so 
now . . . it is time for reforms to 
properly apply to and cover those 
activities that, as identified by 
Congress in section 722 . . .  of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, have “a direct and 
significant connection with activities 
in, or effect on, commerce of the 
United States.”348
participants, including U.S. and non-U.S. persons that would be subject 
to eventual registration and other swaps rules under the July 2013 
Guidance were exempted from compliance under a tapestry of CFTC no-
action letters and exemptive orders. A list of expired no-action letters can 
be found at Expired Staff No-Action Letters, U.S. CFTC, http://www. 
cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/ExpiredNoAction/index.htm (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2017). See Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with 
Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed Reg. 43,785 (July 22, 2013) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1). Despite the huge amount of work that went 
into implementing Dodd-Frank, those sixty regulations, orders, and 
guidance statements did not address their application extraterritorially. 
See also Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 
384 (D.D.C. 2014). 
348 Opening Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler at the Open Meeting 
to Consider Cross-Border Guidance and Exemptive Order, U.S.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (July 12, 2013), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/genslerstatement07
1213; see also Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
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It was at that meeting that the CFTC issued its “final 
guidance” on the extraterritorial effect of its swap rules, 
determining when the Dodd-Frank swaps rules would be 
applied to swaps transactions executed outside the United 
States (the “July 2013 guidance”).349
It is at this point that a common-sense analysis of the 
extraterritorial application of Dodd-Frank must be 
addressed. The worldwide swaps market is valued at 
hundreds of trillions of dollars in notional value. Among the 
biggest players in that market are four U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers which: (1) comprise 90% of the U.S. 
swaps market trading volume; (2) are headquartered and 
have their principal place of business in the U.S.; (3) have 
been deemed under Dodd-Frank by the U.S. Financial 
Stability Oversight Council to be systemically important 
(and thus likely to call upon U.S. taxpayer bailouts upon 
their threatened failure); and (4) were aided by the U.S. 
taxpayer in the 2008 meltdown to the tune of trillions of 
dollars.350 Those banks are:  Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, 
Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America.  
Moreover, as one expert analyst of the world’s 
financial stability explained only two years ago: 
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292 (July 26, 
2013). 
349 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292 (July 26, 2013). 
350 The Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) lists these big four 
institutions as the top of the 2016 list of globally systemically important 
banks (“G-SIBs”). The FSOC adopts the list of G-SIBs from the Financial 
Stability Board (“FSB”), and makes recommendations based on that 
maintained list. See 2016 List of Global Systemically Important Banks
(G-SIBs), FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (Nov. 21, 2016), 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-list-of-global-systemically-
important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf.   
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[as recently as]  April 2016, the US 
[financial] regulators issued a failing 
grade to five big [U.S.] banks 
(including Bank of America . . . and 
JPMorgan Chase [the two largest 
U.S. swaps dealers]) on their 
emergency wind down plans in a 
crisis-like situation.351 Put simply, if 
another financial crisis [had] hit [the] 
US [in April 2016 or soon thereafter], 
these banks would [have] certainly 
need[ed] a bailout from the US 
government to prevent a major 
financial crisis from happening 
again.352
351 Although both Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase passed the 
Federal Reserve’s annual stress test for the first time in 2017, the 2016 
failures still demonstrate solvency volatility in this regard. See Liz 
Hoffman & Ryan Tracy, Fed ‘Stress Tests’ Clear All Banks to Issue 
Payouts to Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2017, 7:45 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-stress-tests-all-banks-cleared-on-
payouts-to-shareholders-1498681800.  
352 WORLD ECONOMY, ECOLOGY & DEVELOPMENT (“WEED”), INT’L FIN. &
G20 VOICES FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 12 (Feb. 2017) (Markus Henn, Lisa 
Metzinger, & Todd Dennie, eds.), https://www2.weed-online.org/uploads/ 
international_finance_g20_voices_from_the_global_south.pdf; See 2017 
List of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BOARD (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/P211117-1.pdf; see also Office of the COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES 
ACTIVITIES, 37 (Dec. 2017), https:// www.occ.treas.gov/topics/capital-
markets/financial-markets/derivatives/ dq317.pdf; Ryan Tracy, Big U.S. 
Banks Get Satisfactory Grades on ‘Living Wills’, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-u-s-banks-get-satisfactory-grade 
s-on-living-wills-1513719024; see also John Heltman. Regulators Approve 
Big Banks’ Living Wills —With a Warning, AM. BANKER (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/ regulators-approve-big-banks-
living-wills-with-a-warning. 
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When one looks at the substantial swaps trading of 
these four banks and then examines Dodd-Frank’s clear 
mandate that extraterritorial U.S. bank activities that “have 
a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect 
on, commerce of the United States,” are subject to all Dodd-
Frank swaps regulations wherever those trades are executed 
world-wide, it is self-evident that that statute applies to all 
of those four banks’ swaps transactions wherever and by 
whomever executed. And, if that straightforward analysis 
were, in fact, the way in which Dodd-Frank was applied 
extraterritorially, the question of whether U.S. swaps law or 
foreign swaps law (or lack of foreign law) applied to all other
swaps trades would be a matter of much smaller 
consequence. Defaults on foreign swaps trades by all other 
U.S. institutions would be relatively small, and they very 
likely could be handled effectively either by traditional 
bankruptcy law or by the “wind down” provisions required by 
Dodd-Frank itself.353
However, rather than apply that simple and 
straightforward approach of the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial 
plain language test quickly and directly to these four huge 
U.S. bank holding companies, the CFTC, beginning with its 
July 2013 guidance, embarked upon a Rube Goldberg-like354
“one size fits all,” overly complex extraterritorial set of rules 
without any specific reference to these four huge U.S. bank 
holding companies that dominate U.S. swaps trading. The 
needless complexity of the CFTC cross-border guidance has 
353 David Skeele, Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative,
PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1949&cont
ext=faculty_scholarship.  
354 A comic exemplar “of [someone] doing something simple in a very 
complicated way that is not necessary.” Rube Goldberg, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY (last visited Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Rube%20Goldberg.  
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drawn harsh criticism from all sides of the regulatory 
spectrum (e.g., from pro-regulatory market reformers to the 
swaps industry itself) as having: “created a regulatory maze”; 
“textual twists and turns [leading to] dead ends”; “overly fine 
. . . distinctions”; and “mak[ing] practical applications [of the 
July 2013 guidance] difficult”; “created significant 
uncertainty”; “inconsistencies and ambiguities”; and 
“analytic inconsistencies.”355 This uncertainty and confusion 
was further enabled by the CFTC’s observation that its July 
2013 extraterritorial guidance was “a statement of general 
policy” intended to “allow for flexibility in application to 
various situation, including consideration of all relevant facts 
and circumstances.”356
As heroic was the CFTC’s valiant three-year effort to 
meet tough statutory deadlines to implement, for example, 
over 50 final substantive Dodd-Frank swaps rules mandated 
355 William Shirley, Guarantees, Conduits, and Confusion Under the 
CFTC’s Cross-Border Guidance, 34 J. L. INV. & RISK MGMT. PRODS. 1
(2014) (“In adopting its cross-border guidance for Dodd-Frank swap 
regulation, the CFTC created a regulatory maze . . . . The CFTC’s 
guidance on this subject not only created distinctions that arguably are 
overly-fine, but introduced textual twists and turns and analytic 
inconsistencies and dead ends that make practical application difficult.”); 
JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 73, at 288; Max Stendahl, Murky 
Guidance Undermines CFTC’s Derivatives Plans, LAW360, July 12, 2013, 
https://www.law360.com/articles/456853/murky-guidance-undermines-
cftc-s-derivatives-plans (“Wall Street attorneys warned of a backlash and 
even potential litigation as clients struggle to untangle the guidance to 
determine which deals fall under which jurisdictions.”); Micah Green et 
al., Five Key Facts About the SEC’s and CFTC’s Cross-Border Regulatory 
Approaches, 6 ALTERNATIVE INV. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 50 (Dec. 25, 2013) 
(“The CFTC Final Guidance also fails to fully reflect years of global 
regulatory coordination and risks becoming the outlier . . . .”). 
356 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Regarding Compliance with Swap 
Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45292, 45297 (Jul. 26, 2013).  
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by that statute,357 its effort to deal with extraterritoriality 
has fostered virtual regulatory chaos. It is difficult (if not 
impossible) to state with complete certainty or clarity the 
manner in which the entirety of the CFTC’s Dodd-Frank 
extraterritorial rules apply.  
However, as discussed immediately below, there are 
two sets of circumstances that make crystal clear that the 
CFTC’s extraterritorial rulings have opened gaping loopholes 
in Dodd-Frank swaps regulation by enabling, for example, 
the four big systemically-risky U.S. bank holding companies 
to shift, at their own discretion, U.S. swaps trading within 
their corporate family abroad and, as the regulatory law now 
stands, out from under Dodd-Frank. 
VII. SWAPS ARE MOVED BY U.S. SWAPS 
DEALERS FROM THE U.S. TO THEIR OWN 
“DEGUARANTEED” SUBSIDIARIES ABROAD 
The first circumstance showing that the July 2013 guidance 
created a massive loophole from Dodd-Frank swaps 
regulation is that there is every indication that swaps trading 
has had a substantial movement from the U.S. to abroad. For 
example, in a widely cited study, Reuters found that “by 
December of 2014, certain U.S. important swaps markets had 
seen 95 percent of their trading volume disappear in less 
than two years.”358 The term “disappear” is not quite 
357 DAVIS POLK, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT 4 (2016) (As of July 19, 
2016, the CFTC has issued a total of 51 rules to implement Title VII 
regulation of Dodd-Frank). 
358 Id. (describing the time period between creation of the deguarantee 
loophole, and the writing of the article); Banks and end-users told GAO 
that moving the swaps can increase their risks and, in turn, costs. Such 
risks and costs likely would have been greater under the original version 
because of its broader scope, GAO said.; Andrew Ackerman, Fed 
Considers Easing Capital Rule Seen as Hampering Swaps Market Critics 
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Including Treasury and CFTC Urge Relaxing Regulation, Saying it has 
Undermined Key Part of Dodd-Frank, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-considers-easing-capital-rule-seen-as-
hampering-swaps-market-1497432602; The Treasury Report’s Recomm-
endations for Derivatives Regulation, MORRISON FOERSTER at 4 (Oct. 26, 
2017), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/171026-treasury-report-deriv 
atives.pdf (“With respect to so-called ‘ANE’ transactions, trades between 
non-U.S. entities but ‘arranged, negotiated or executed’ by personnel 
located in the United States, Treasury recommends that the CFTC and 
SEC reconsider any U.S. personnel test as a basis to apply transaction-
based requirements and, in particular: . . . the CFTC and the SEC should 
reconsider the implications of applying their Title VII rules to 
transactions between non-U.S. firms or between a non-U.S. firm and a 
foreign branch or affiliate of a U.S. firm merely on the basis that U.S.-
located personnel arrange, negotiate or execute the swap, especially for 
entities in comparably regulated jurisdictions.”); Iñaki Aldasoro and 
Torsten Ehlers, Risk Transfers in International Banking, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS (Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt 
1712b.htm; FIA & sifma, Promoting U.S. Access to Non-U.S. Swaps 
Markets: A Roadmap to Reverse Fragmentation, 3–7 (Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Non-US-Trading-
Platform-and-CCP-White-Paper-12-14-2017.pdf (“The increase in 
multilateral trading and central clearing of swaps markets since 
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act increases the need for U.S. firms 
to have effective access to non-U.S. swaps trading venues and central 
counterparties (‘CCPs’) . . . U.S. firms were forced off swaps trading 
venues in numerous jurisdictions stretching across the European Union 
(‘EU’) and Asia. U.S. banks were forced to subsidize their operations in 
order to access certain local CCPs . . . . The implementation of the Dodd-
Frank Act’s SEF registration requirement in October 2013 and its 
mandatory trading requirement in February 2014 drove fragmentation of 
the global swaps markets by forcing non-U.S. swaps trading venues to 
deny participation by U.S. firms”); Andrew Ackerman, CFTC Aims to 
Close Swaps Loophole for Large U.S. Banks, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-aims-to-close-swaps-loophole-for-large-
u-s-banks-1433856763; Dennis M. Kelleher, Must-Read Investigative 
Report Highlights Wall Street’s Latest Lobbying to Avoid Key Financial 
Reforms, HUFFPOST (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ 
mustread-investigative-re_b_8050920; Douwe Miedema, U.S. Regulator 
Plans to Close Swaps Trading Loophole, REUTERS (June 9, 2015), 
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accurate, because it is not that U.S. bank holding company 
swaps dealers, for example, no longer engage in these trades; 
rather, those institutions have moved many of their trades359
“off shore” to their newly deguaranteed “foreign” affiliates 
which are otherwise wholly consolidated on the U.S. bank 
holding companies’ balance sheets, but deemed by those 
parent U.S. banks to be outside of Dodd-Frank for the sale of 
swaps to non-U.S. persons.360
https://www.reuters.com/article/banking-rules-derivatives/u-s-regulator-
plans-to-close-swaps-trading-loophole-idUSL1N0YV1H520150609; 
Kimberly Amadeo, Credit Default Swap: Pros, Cons, Crises, Examples,
THE BALANCE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/credit-default 
-swaps-pros-cons-crises-examples-3305920; Christopher Kirkpatrick, 
Comment on the Proposed Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for 
Swaps Dealers and Major Swaps Participants, INST. FOR AGRICULTURE 
TRADE AND POL’Y (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.iatp.org/documents/ 
comment-on-the-proposed-margin-requirements-for-uncleared-swaps-
for-swaps-dealers-and-majo; Silla Brush, CFTC Proposes Narrowing 
Wall Street’s Foreign Swaps Loophole, BLOOMBERG (June 29, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/cftc-proposes-narrowing-
wall-streets-foreign-swaps-loophole/. 
359 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, EXEMPTIVE ORDER 
REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN SWAP REGULATIONS, https:// 
www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents
/file/exemptiveorder_factsheet_final.pdf (noting that trades are executed 
through de-guaranteed affiliates of the large parent U.S. bank swap 
dealer)  
360 Charles Levinson, U.S. Banks Moved Billions of Dollars in Trades 
Beyond Washington’s Reach, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www. 
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-swaps/. Levinson provides 
the example that: 
The global inter-dealer market for interest rate swaps in 
Euros is one of the largest derivatives markets in the 
world. U.S. banks’ monthly share of the market had 
plunged nearly 90 percent since January 2013, from over 
$1 trillion to $125 billion, according to ISDA.  The data 
were misleading.  U.S. banks were still trading as 
vigorously as ever.  But their trades, booked through 
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Also, an examination of interest rate swaps trading 
alone shows that beginning in 2014 the volume of trades 
between European and U.S. swaps dealers declined 77%.361
CFTC Chairman (then Commissioner) Giancarlo attributes 
London affiliates, without any credit guarantees linking 
them back to the U.S., were now showing up in the data 
as the work of European banks. 
While some have questioned Levinson’s figures, as his study indicates, 
there are many expert swaps market observers and participants, who by 
their own calculations have seen a major swaps movement out of the U.S. 
to foreign deguaranteed subsidiaries. Id. Whatever the exact percent of 
that foreign movement (which is obscured by a lack of transparency) there 
is a widespread consensus that it is substantial, i.e., large enough that 
cascading defaults of those swaps trades could cause a systemic break in 
the world economy. Precise analysis also becomes more complicated by 
the fact, as footnote 563 of the CFTC guidance makes clear, the 
deguaranteed subsidiary registered with the CFTC as a swaps dealer can 
only evade Dodd-Frank under the loophole if its counterparty is not a 
“U.S. person.” CFTC Issues Cross-Border Substituted Compliance 
Determinations, Provides Limited Phase in for Some Swap Requirements,
DAVIS POLK (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.davispolk.com/files/01.07.14. 
CFTC_.Issues.CrossBorder.Substituted.pdf. If the counterparty is a “U.S. 
person,” those trades are covered by Dodd-Frank. Again, informed 
market observers suspect that just as U.S. banks shed their “U.S. person” 
status when deguaranteeing their foreign subsidiaries, a similar 
approach could be adopted by what would otherwise be a “U.S. person” 
bank counterparty, becoming itself a deguaranteed foreign subsidiary 
(and thus becoming a “non-U.S. person”). There is a doubtless near 
universal sense that the deguarantee loophole is taking a substantial 
portion of swaps out from under Dodd-Frank. Indeed, it is also likely, as 
Levinson suggests, that some of these market observers tipped off the 
CFTC staff about the ISDA loophole, because the CFTC was otherwise 
never informed by swaps traders or anyone else of the “creation” of that 
loophole in August 2013. See Levinson, supra. Levinson reports that the 
CFTC did not learn of the loophole until many months into 2014. Id.
361 Audrey Costabile Blater, Revisiting Cross-Border Fragmentation of 
Global OTC Derivatives: Midyear 2014 Update, ISDA RESEARCH NOTE
(Jul. 24, 2014) at 1–5, http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/ 
research-notes. 
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this decline directly to: “[n]on-U.S. persons avoiding financial 
firms bearing the scarlet letters of ‘U.S. person’ in certain 
swaps products to steer clear of the CFTC’s problematic 
regulations.”362 Chairman Giancarlo is right in thinking that 
business is being channeled to “non-U.S.” persons to avoid 
the Dodd-Frank swaps regulations. Where his 
characterization falters is that truly foreign bank competitors 
are not winning the bulk of this swaps business; instead that 
business is largely being shifted within the U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers to their own newly “deguaranteed” 
foreign affiliates that are nevertheless fully consolidated on 
the parent U.S. banks’ balance sheets, but deemed by the 
CFTC to be “non-U.S. persons.”  
Even before the CFTC issued its final guidance on 
extraterritorially in July 2013, Goldman Sachs successfully 
anticipated the future on the foreign subsidiary 
extraterritorial loophole in 2012 by demanding that its 
clients wishing to use Goldman Sachs as its preferred swaps 
counterparty give the bank standing permission to move 
swaps trades to different Goldman Sachs foreign subsidiaries 
around the world, whenever and wherever Goldman Sachs 
saw fit.363 In this regard:  
[I]t meant that a client might strike a 
derivatives deal with Goldman in 
New York in the morning, and that 
afternoon, with no disclosure, a 
Goldman office in London or 
Singapore or Hong Kong could take 
over the deal.  With each shift, the 
trade could fall under different 
362 Keynote Address of CFTC Commissioner J. Christopher Giancarlo 
before the ISDA’s Trade Execution Legal Forum, CFTC (Dec. 9, 2016), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo-18. 
363 Levinson, supra note 360.  
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[foreign] regulators - but not under 
the CFTC’s purview and the Dodd-
Frank rules.364
The purpose of this tactic was clearly designed to 
evade, at the U.S. banks’ will the U.S. Dodd-Frank swaps 
jurisdiction.365
As will be described in detail below, two further tactics 
were unilaterally adopted by, inter alia, the big U.S. bank 
holding swaps dealers and their representatives beginning in 
August 2013 to “escape” Dodd-Frank swaps rule application 
to their purported “foreign” trades. Suffice it to say for 
present purposes, these swaps dealers, inter alia:
x “Deguaranteed” their previously 
“guaranteed” foreign subsidiaries 
through a box-checking exercise in 
the standardized industry swaps 
contract documentation, thereby 
claiming the ability to evade the 
CFTC’s July 2013 guidance that only 
foreign “guaranteed” subsidiaries 
would fully be subject to Dodd-
Frank.366
364 Id.
365 See id. (“An industry executive familiar with Goldman’s thinking said 
the agreement was meant to help clients by giving them flexibility to 
move trades outside U.S. jurisdiction if they wished. ‘It was an option for 
those who wanted that flexibility,’ this person said.”). 
366 See infra Part IX.B. It may be that the deguaranteed bank subsidiary 
can only trade swaps outside of Dodd-Frank swaps regulation if its 
counterparty is a “non-U.S. person.” See supra note 349. However, the 
ease with which the U.S. swaps dealers have converted themselves from 
“U.S. persons” to “non-U.S. persons” makes clear that it would be 
similarly easy to convert by corporate engineering a “U.S. person” foreign 
subsidiaries’ counterparty into a “non-U.S. person,” thereby clearly 
Too Big to Fail 
318 Journal of Business & Technology Law 

x Followed a practice of having swaps 
arranged, negotiated and executed 
(“ANE”) in the United States by U.S. 
personal and then “assigning” the 
already executed swap to a recently 
deguaranteed foreign affiliate, 
claiming that Dodd-Frank does not 
apply.367

VIII. THE CFTC BELATEDLY AND 
INEFFECTIVELY TRIES TO END THE 
DEGUARANTEE AND ANE LOOPHOLES 
The second factor that clarifies any possible confusion over 
the U.S. swaps dealers’ readings of the July 2013 guidance as 
described immediately above is that the CFTC, in an October 
18, 2016 proposed rule and accompanying interpretations, 
expressly recognized and then proposed to close fully both the 
“deguarantee” and “ANE” loopholes.368 In that October 2016 
proposal, the CFTC made clear that if U.S. personnel in the 
U.S. arranged, negotiated and executed a swap, Dodd-Frank 
would apply even if the swaps were later “assigned” to a 
recently deguaranteed foreign subsidiary.369 Additionally, 
any foreign affiliates included within a U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealer’s consolidated balance sheet would be 
required to comply with Dodd-Frank, thereby eliminating the 
significance of the recent deguarantees. 
However, the CFTC’s October 2016 proposed rule and 
interpretations were not finalized before the inauguration of 
President Donald Trump, and there is virtually a unanimous 
exempting the transaction from Dodd-Frank swaps regulation in that 
event as well. 
367 See infra notes 459–60 and accompanying text. 
368 See infra Part IX.G. 
369 Id.
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consensus that a Trump-controlled CFTC (or a Republican 
Congress) will never finalize those rulings.370  Accordingly, 
U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers’ “foreign” 
assignment of swaps to newly deguaranteed subsidiaries, 
even if the swaps are arranged, negotiated and executed in 
the U.S. by U.S. personnel, can at the U.S. bank swaps 
dealer’s discretion evade Dodd-Frank. (Even if the 
Republicans lost control of one or both Houses in the 2018 
mid-term, legislation eliminating these loopholes would 
almost certainly be vetoed). As a result, certain failing and 
systemically risky swaps trades threatening another 
meltdown will almost certainly lead to a call for U.S. 
taxpayers to once again bail out these big U.S. banks to avoid 
the calamity of a Second Great Depression.371
 At this juncture, it may be fair to ask that if President 
Trump, his CFTC, and the Republican-controlled Congress 
are “speak[ing] of dismantling the Dodd-Frank Act,”372 why 
should one worry about the administrative loopholes to that 
statute’s application to “foreign” swaps if the statute itself 
will disappear?373
Indeed, all supporters of the diverse regulatory 
approaches to swaps regulation (from supporters of the Dodd-
Frank swaps regime to the large U.S. bank holding company 
swaps dealers) are forecasting that there will be little 
statutory change to that part of Dodd-Frank that specifically 
addresses the regulation of the swaps market; for example, 
“[b]anking executives . . . now are moving too quickly head off 
370 See infra Part IX.I.  
371 Glenn Thrush, Trump Vows to Dismantle Dodd-Frank ‘Disaster’, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/ 
trump-dodd-frank-regulations.html?_r=0. 
372 Annette L. Nazareth & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, Eight US Regulatory 
Predictions for 2017, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/79955066-d81f-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e.  
373 Id.
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President . . . Trump and other [Dodd-Frank] critics who are 
talking about dismantling [the] statute entirely according to 
the Wall Street Journal. . . .‘We’re not for wholesale throwing 
out Dodd-Frank, said JP Morgan Chase . . . CEO Jamie 
Dimon.’”374
  Big bank reticence about the need for statutory change 
to Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulatory regime is almost certainly 
the result of three factors. First, legislation proposed by the 
Nation’s biggest banks seeking relief from Dodd Frank’s 
critically important swaps regulation would surely be viewed 
as highly unpopular. While the mainstream economy has still 
not fully recovered from the Great Recession,375 Americans 
well know that these big banks have all been bailed out to the 
tune of trillions of dollars by the U.S. taxpayer, and those 
banks have remained financially strong (if not stronger) since 
374 Mark Kolakowski, Dodd-Frank How Bank CEOs Want It Changed, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.investopedia.com/news/dodd 
frank-how-bank-ceos-want-it-changed-jpm-pnc/; see also Ben White & 
Victoria Guida, Trump Expected to Pick Treasury Veteran as Top Bank 
Cop, POLITICO (Apr. 16, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/ 
04/banking-regulations-trump-treasury-237271 (“The selection [of 
former Treasury undersecretary, Randy Quarles, as the Federal 
Reserve’s top regulator sends] a clear signal that the [Trump] 
administration is looking to take a pragmatic approach to paring back 
bank regulation, rather than choosing an ideologue who would seek to 
eviscerate the rules enacted since the financial crisis.”); Gabriel T. Rubin, 
Swaps Rules Due for Overhaul in Bid to Boost Liquidity, WALL ST. J. 
(April 26, 2018, 12:01 a.m. ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/swaps-
rules-due-for-overhaul-in-bid-to-boost-liquidity-1524715260 (explaining 
that “[CFTC Chairman Giancarlo] promised near term action only on 
swap-execution rules,” i.e., how a swaps trade is made, as opposed to 
revising the full panoply of rules reporting, transparency, collateral and 
capital rules governing the regulation of swaps) (emphasis added). 
375 See Podkul et al., supra note 94. (“[M]any people across the political 
spectrum complain that the recovery is uneven and the . . . grains are not 
fairly distributed.”). 
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the Great Recession ended, if not before that.376 These banks 
are now considered by key U.S. financial regulators to be 
“systemically important,” i.e., if they collapse in future 
economic disasters, there will likely be a corresponding call 
upon U.S. taxpayers for further trillion-dollar bailouts. The 
passage of a bill to undo Dodd-Frank’s swaps regulation for 
these big banks, even in the Republican controlled House and 
Senate, would almost certainly be politically unfeasible.   
This lack of feasibility can be seen in the recent 
Congressional effort to provide “modest”377 relief from Dodd-
Frank’s capital requirements imposed by prudential banking 
regulators to community and mid-size banks, the former with 
assets no greater than $10 billion and the latter with assets 
no greater than $250 billion.378
376 See Ben McLannahan, Wall Street Bonuses Rise 17% to Pre-Crisis 
Levels, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/3b18dc52-
3112-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498 (noting that the amount of Wall Street 
bonuses have risen 17%, nearly reaching the “the peak levels of $33bn-
$34bn recorded in 2006 and 2007 . . . .”); see also Ben McLannahan, Dimon 
Pay Day Means a Year’s Wages for Typical JPMorgan Staff, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/aac3a27a-2de4-11e8-9b4b-
bc4b9f08f381 (“JPMorgan Chase chief executive Jamie Dimon earned as 
much in a day as the typical employee at his bank took home in the whole 
of last year . . . .”); see also Podkul et al., supra note 94 (explaining that 
“[a]verage bonuses and salaries on Wall Street have climbed back from 
the post crisis lows…[b]ut 10 years [after the financial crisis] the trend of 
large [financial] firms is still intact,” while “[t]he financial sector is again 
becoming a bigger piece of the economy. That could translate to future 
risks for borrowers and consumers in another crisis.”). 
377 Andrew Ackerman, Senate to House: Don’t Risk Upending Deal on 
Dodd-Frank Rollback, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2018, 5:16 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-to-house-dont-risk-upending-deal-
on-dodd-frank-rollback-1521568094. 
378 See Burgess Everett et al, Schumer Struggles to Contain Warren-Led 
Rebellion, POLITICO (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2018/03/14/schumer-warren-democrats-dodd-frank-460563; Bob Bryan & 
Joe Perticone, The Biggest Wall Street Bill in Years is Tearing Democrats 
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On March 14, 2018, the Senate, by a vote of 67-31, 
passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and 
Consumer Protection Act (S. 2155).379  The bill was originally 
intended to provide capital requirement relief only for 
community banks, i.e., those banks with less than $10 billion 
in assets.380 Yet, in the process of crafting this legislation, 
provisions were added that could benefit banks that are 
larger than community banks. Section 401 of S. 2155 raises 
the threshold for possibly avoiding certain enhanced 
prudential regulations, i.e., liquidity standards, capital 
requirements, risk management standards, and other forms 
of supervision, to banks with up to $250 billion in assets, 
which was raised for those banks from Dodd-Frank’s current 
$50 billion threshold.381 However, under Section 401, 
prudential banking regulators are not required to afford 
relief to mid-size banks (as they are required to do for 
community banks). They are only given the discretion to do 
so.382 If prudential banking regulators exercise the discretion 
Apart, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2018), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
democrats-divide-elizabeth-warren-on-wall-street-bank-deregulation-
2018-3. 
379 Alan Rappeport, Senate Passes Bill Loosening Banking Rules, but 
Hurdles Remain in the House, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/03/14/business/senate-banking-rules.html. 
380 Tracy Ryan, The Fine Print: What’s in the Financial-Regulation Bill,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fine-print-
whats-in-the-senate-financial-regulation-bill-1520354942. 
381 S. 2155, 115th Cong. § 401 (2018). 
382 Id. (striking the word “shall” from how regulators are to impose 
requirements on large banks and replacing it with “may”); See Jeff Stein, 
Senate Banking Bill Likely to Boost Chance of Bank Bailout, CBO Says,
WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/ 
wp/2018/03/05/senate-banking-bill-would-boost-the-chances-of-more-
bank-bailouts-cbo-report-says/?utm_term=.ec0cca24a2d6 (noting that 
the change in Section 401 grants regulators far more discretion in how to 
impose regulations on large banks).
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afforded),383 relief could only be provided only to BB&T Corp. 
($221 billion in assets), SunTrust Banks Inc. ($205 billion in 
assets), Charles Schwab Corp. ($243 billion in assets), and 
American Express ($181 billion in assets),384 but 
expressly not to the 13 largest U.S. financial institutions, 
many of which have assets in amounts that are multiples of 
these mid-size bank assets.385
While affording even discretionary relief to these mid-
size banks was itself very controversial,386 the purposeful 
limitation of this deregulatory effort only to mid-size banks, 
and the fact that Section 401 expressly did not provide relief 
to the Nation’s very largest banks, was constantly 
emphasized by even the very deregulatory-oriented 
383 See, e.g., Jesse Hamilton, Wall Street Faces Higher Capital Demands 
Under Fed Proposal, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2018, 5:01 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-10/fed-seeks-significa 
nt-overhaul-of-post-crisis-bank-capital-rules (“Wall Street banks could 
face higher capital hurdles under a Federal Reserve proposal that would 
mark the most significant rewrite of requirements put in place after the 
2002 financial crisis”); See also Rachel Witkowski, A Parting Warning 
from FDIC’s Hoenig on Big-Bank Rules, AM. BANKER (Mar. 28, 2018, 
12:16 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/a-parting-warning-
from-fdics-hoenig-on-big-bank-rules (“In his last policy speech as the 
FDIC’s vice chairman, Thomas Hoenig said it would be ‘a serious policy 
mistake’ to ease capital standards such as the ‘supplementary leverage 
ratio’ for megabanks.”).
384 The Largest Banks in the United States, RELBANKS.COM, https://www. 
relbanks.com/top-us-banks/assets (last visited Mar. 29, 2019). 
385 See Jim Puzzanghera, Despite Stumbling Before the Financial Crisis, 
Federal Reserve Would Get New Discretion in Senate Banking Bill, L.A. 
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fed-
banking-deregulation-20180313-story.html. 
386 See Stein, supra note 382; see also Ackerman, supra note 377 (“Centrist 
Democrats have already weathered attacks from their more liberal 
colleagues for supporting [S.2155] and are loath to vote on it a second 
time.”).
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Republican drafters and chief proponents of S. 2155.387
Therefore, even the staunchest advocates for Dodd-Frank 
regulatory relief in this regard did not extend S. 2155 relief 
to the thirteen largest U.S. financial institutions; and 
therefore not to the biggest swaps dealer banks: Citibank
(with $1.843 trillion in assets), JPMorgan ($2.534 trillion in 
assets), Bank of America ($2.281 trillion in assets), and 
Goldman Sachs ($916 billion in assets).388
Additionally, Section 402 of S. 2155 reduces the 
supplementary leverage ratio established by the prudential 
banking regulators, i.e., the amount of capital that a bank 
must keep on hand as a buffer for financial collapse, for 
“custodial banks.”389  Custodial banks are defined in the bill 
as “any depository institution holding company 
predominantly engaged in custody, safekeeping, and asset 
servicing companies, including any insured depository 
institution subsidiary of such a holding company.”390
Currently, only three mid-size banks would be eligible for 
relief under Section 402—Bank of New York Mellon, State 
Street, and the Northern Trust Corporation.391
However, two of the four largest U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers that are the subject of this paper 
387 See Stein, supra note 382.  
388 The Largest Banks in the United States, RELBANKS.COM, https:// 
www.relbanks.com/top-us-banks/assets (last visited Mar. 29, 2019). 
389 S. 2155, 115th Cong. § 402 (2018). 
390 Id. (emphasis added). 
391 See Aaron Back, The Surprisingly Large Winners in a Bill to Help 
Small Banks, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www. 
wsj.com/articles/the-surprisingly-large-winners-in-a-bill-to-help-small-
banks-1521019801. On December 21, 2018, the Federal Register 
published a proposed rule by the Federal Reserve that would exercise 
discretion afforded under, inter alia, S. 2155 for mid-sized banks 
mentioned above, but did not afford relief to any of the four big U.S. bank 
holding companies that are at the heart of the discussion herein. 83 Fed. 
Reg. 66,024 (Dec. 21, 2018).  
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were at first reported as desiring this type of regulatory 
relief: Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase. However, clearly to 
quell increasing public anger that the very biggest 
systemically important banks might receive deregulatory 
relief under S. 2155, both Federal Reserve regulatory chief 
Randal Quarles and JPMorgan Chase CEO, Jamie Dimon, 
said separately at different public fora after S. 2155’s passage 
in the Senate that JPM “will not benefit” from the bill 
because that bill “only really affects[s] smaller banks, so it 
doesn’t really have anything to do with us [.]”392 Indeed, even 
according to S. 2155’s Republican deregulatory supporters, 
megabanks are not and will not be afforded relief under the 
terms of S. 2155.393
That S. 2155, which was initially only intended to 
bring relief to community banks (those under $10 billion in 
assets), then benefitted some of America’s mid-size banks (up 
to $250 billion in assets), has, in and of itself, been very 
controversial. That Section 402 might ultimately have 
benefitted Citigroup ($1.834 trillion in assets) and JP 
Morgan Chase ($2.534 trillion in assets) was emphatically 
opposed by S. 2155’s principal drafters, who have 
continuously stressed that the act does not afford and was 
not intended to afford, deregulatory relief to any of the 
Nation’s thirteen largest banks, including Citibank and JP 
Morgan Chase, the latter of which, through its CEO, has now 
392 See David Dayen, JPMorgan CEO: Banking Bill “Doesn’t Really Have 
Anything to do With Us”, INTERCEPT (Mar. 28, 2018, 1:43 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/03/28/jpmorgan-crapo-banking-bill/. 
393 Id. A CBO estimate that Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase currently 
have a 50 percent chance of being included under Section 402 of S. 2155, 
has been rebutted by JPM’s CEO, the Federal Reserve regulatory chief, 
and the Republican Senate sponsors of the bill. For the CBO estimate, see
CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE S. 2155 ECONOMIC GROWTH,
REGULATORY RELIEF, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2018).
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denied any claim that the act’s deregulatory impact would 
apply to it.394
While S. 2155 enjoyed enough bipartisan support in 
the Senate to overcome a filibuster there, that bill, after 
Senate passage, required the passage of complementary 
legislation in the House to become a law. But, in the House, 
leading Republicans were not happy with S. 2155 as passed 
by the Senate. For example, Jeb Hensarling, Chairman of the 
House Financial Services Committee originally did not 
support S. 2155 as passed by the Senate, because it did not 
afford enough deregulation.395 He therefore sought negotia-
tions with those seventeen Senate Democrats (including one 
independent who votes with Democrats) who voted for S. 
2155 to see if an agreement could be reached on Hensarling’s 
further regulatory relief proposals.396 However, those Senate 
Democrats, already facing a severe backlash for supporting a 
bill that many have criticized as already providing too much 
regulatory relief, were unwilling to negotiate further.397
394 Erica Werner & Renae Merle, Senate Passes Rollback of Banking Rules 
Enacted After Financial Crisis, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/senate-passes-
rollback-of-post-financial-crisis-banking-rules/2018/03/14/43837aae-
27bd-11e8-b79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html?utm_term=.a496822e9f5f; see 
also Ackerman, supra note 377 (“The relatively modest Senate bill, 
[Republican Senator Tillis] added, reflects the political reality of what can 
be accomplished in the Senate, where Republicans hold 51 seats and 
generally need support from nine Democrats to pass legislation.”).  
395 See Zachary Warmbrodt, Hensarling’s Last Stand; Blocking Banking
Bill, POLITICO (Mar. 15, 2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2018/03/15/jeb-hensarling-bank-deregulation-bill-418536. 
396 See id.
397 See Victoria Finkle & Rob Blackwell, Is This Jeb Hensarling’s Last 
Stand? AM. BANKER (Mar. 19, 2018, 5:13 PM), https://www.amer 
icanbanker.com/news/is-this-jeb-hensarlings-last-stand (noting that 
Democrats “insist there’s no more room for negotiation” on the bill). 
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Indeed, after Senate passage of S. 2155, the big U.S. 
bank holding companies themselves faced increasing 
criticism from their own shareholders for trying to weaken 
Dodd-Frank.398 And, leading Senate Republicans therefore 
advised House Republicans, including Hensarling, that 
“there is little political appetite in the Senate to vote on a 
revised version of [S.2155],” and, as a result, Hensarling 
“accept[ed] [the] deregulatory package that passed the 
Senate . . . without changes,” hereby allowing the Senate bill 
pass the House and thus be enacted into law on May 24, 
2018.399
398 See Ben McLannahan, Citigroup and Goldman Face Shareholder 
Pressure on Lobbying, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/33285f2e-3471-11e8-ae84-494103e73f7f. 
399 As the Washington Post Editorial Board observed: “The big story about 
[S. 2155], in fact, is not how much damage the Wall Street lobby has 
managed to do to Dodd-Frank, but, how little.” Editorial Board, The Story 
Isn’t How Much Dodd-Frank Has Been Changed. It’s How Little, WASH.
POST (May 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
story-isnt-how-much-dodd-frank-has-been-changed-its-how-little/2018/ 
05/26/19018406-5eb8-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html?utm_term=.84 
e51bba28c8a4a4c070ef53f315_story.html?utm_term=.97a16679d014; 
See, e.g., Trump, at Bill Signing Scaling Back Dodd-Frank, Says U.S. 
Prepared for Anything on N.K., CBS NEWS (May 24, 2018, 12:53 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-signs-bill-dodd-frank-banking-
regulation-roll-back-dodd-frank-act-today-live-stream-updates/ (signing 
ceremony of S. 2155); See also Tory Newmyer, The Finance 202: 
Hensarling Compromise Clears a Path for Bank Deregulation, WASH.
POST (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/power 
post/paloma/the-finance-202/2018/04/27/the-finance-202-hensarling-
compromise-clears-a-path-for-bank-deregulation/5ae24cad30fb0437119 
268d2/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.739560140b25; Ackerman, supra note 
377; Sylvan Lane, Frustration Mounts as Dodd-Frank Rollback Stalls,
THE HILL (Mar. 25, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/ 
380027-frustration-mounts-as-dodd-frank-rollback-stalls (“The financial 
industry is trying to break the jam. They now fear the bill could die with 
little time for Congress to act before attention shifts to the midterm 
elections.”).
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In short, any proposed legislation for the principal 
benefit of four huge systemically problematic U.S. bank 
holding company swap dealers that would go much further 
than S. 2155 to not only afford capital reserves relief, but also 
diminish the entirety of the thirteen types of swaps regulation 
now required by Dodd-Frank is far from likely to pass even 
in a Republican controlled Senate. These huge banks know 
this, and it almost certainly explains their reticence in 
affirmatively seeking to undermine directly Dodd-Frank’s 
statutory provisions.400    
400 The recent proposal by the U.S. Federal Reserve to change 
administratively the Volcker Rule regulations – as opposed to seeking a 
statutory change to that Rule – is not to the contrary. See, e.g., Benjamin 
Bain & Robert Schmidt, Wall Street Gets Win as Fed Set to Ease Volcker 
Trade Limits, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2018, 4:17 PM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-30/fed-releases-proposal-for-
easing-volcker-rule-trading-limits. The statutory requirement for that 
Rule is found in section 619 of Dodd-Frank. 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). 
Generally speaking, “[t]he Volcker rule . . . restricts U.S. banks from 
making certain kinds of speculative transactions on their own account 
and from investing in hedge funds.” Michelle Price, House Passes Bill to 
Streamline ‘Volcker Rule’, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2018, 4:07 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-volcker/house-passes-
bill-to-streamline-volcker-rule-idUSKBN1HK2QY. It was enacted to 
prevent the kinds of huge bank losses in 2008 arising directly from banks’ 
proprietary and reckless speculative trades for their own accounts, 
thereby threatening the federally insured deposits within those banks. 
Id. The Fed’s recent proposal does not try to alter Dodd-Frank’s § 619. 
While the Fed’s recent proposal has been criticized by market reformers 
as being too friendly to big U.S. banks, Mr. “Volcker himself weighed in, 
saying he welcomed efforts to simplify compliance with the rule he’s 
credited with championing.” Bain & Schmidt, supra. In this regard, Mr. 
Volcker has repeatedly emphasized that his original 2010 proposal was 
quite simple and was originally proposed in a 2010 three-page letter to 
President Obama. James B. Stewart, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now 
Boggles, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
10/22/business/volcker-rule-grows-from-simple-to-complex.html. He has 
elsewhere said: “I’d write a much simpler [rule.] I’d love to see a four-page 
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Second, powerful influences within the Trump 
Administration and prominent Congressional Republicans 
and Democrats have touted the reinstatement of a so-called 
“modern day” Glass-Steagall as a major policy initiative, 
including President Trump himself; former National 
Economic Council Director (and former Goldman Sachs 
COO), Gary Cohn; Secretary of the Treasury, Steve Mnuchin; 
outgoing Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Vice 
Chairman, Thomas Hoenig; and Steve Bannon, President 
Trump’s former chief strategist.401 Glass-Steagall, which was 
[rule] that bans proprietary trading and makes the board and the chief 
executive responsible for compliance.” Id. However, the final Volcker 
Rule, as written separately by 5 different banking and market regulators, 
was about 1000 pages in length. Michelle Price, Fed Unveils Rewrite of 
‘Volcker Rule’ Limits on Bank Trading, REUTERS (May 31, 2018, 12:07 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-volcker/fed-unveils-rew 
rite-of-volcker-rule-limits-on-bank-trading-idUSKCN1IV09Y?feedType= 
RSS&feedName=topNews. As one Member of Congress noted: “I support 
the concept of the Volcker Rule, but these rules [as drafted by the 5 
different regulatory agencies are not] going to be effective. We have taken 
something simple and made it complex. The fact that it’s [1000] pages 
shows the banks pushing back and having it both ways.” Stewart, supra
(comments of Rep. Welch (D-VT)). Finally, while it is true that legislation 
to amend the Volcker Rule passed the House of Representatives in April 
2018, it was that very legislation that a bi-partisan group of Senators 
refused to consider as part of the legislative effort to enact S.2155. See 
Price, supra; See also notes 383–87 and accompanying text. 
401 Sylvan Lane, Cohn Backs Modern Version of Glass–Steagall: Report,
THE HILL (Apr. 6, 2017, 2:42 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/ 
overnights/327698-overnight-finance-cohn-backs-modern-glass-steagall-
pelosi-no-deal; Elizabeth Dexheimer, Cohn Backs Wall Street Split of 
Lending, Investment Banks, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2017, 11:09 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-06/cohn-said-to-back-
wall-street-split-of-lending-investment-banks; Bess Levin, Gary Cohn, 
Trump’s Top Goldman Hire, Wants to Bring Back Glass-Steagall, VANITY 
FAIR (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/gary-cohn-
glass-stegall; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Trump and 
Warren Agree? Maybe, on Plan to Shrink Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 
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fully repealed in 1999,402 was a New Deal response to the 
Great Depression that ring-fenced commercial banking with 
insured customer deposits from investment banks dealing in 
speculative investments.403  Under a new Glass-Steagall-like 
scenario, U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers almost 
certainly would not be fully able to engage in swaps trading 
as they do today. Much of that trading, even under the most 
lenient pending Glass-Steagall proposals, would mostly be 
removed from a commercial bank with federally insured 
deposits, and the bulk of that trading would be left, inter alia,
to investment banks and hedge funds ring-fenced from 
commercial banking. 404 The size of the latter banks would 
not be systemically important and their failure would likely 
be handled by, inter alia, the wind-down provisions within 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/business/dealbook/donald-tr 
ump-elizabeth-warren-big-banks.html?_r=0; Patrick Jenkins, The 
Tangled Web of Gary Cohn, Goldman Sachs and Glass-Steagall, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1cdae6d8-1b90-11e7-
bcac-6d03d067f81f. 
402 See Jenkins, supra note 401 (The result of the complete repeal of Glass-
Steagall in 1999 sanctioned the rise “of so-called universal banking, 
which allows mainstream deposit-taking activities and riskier 
investment banking to take place under one roof.”). 
403 Jordan Weissmann, Trump’s Top Adviser, the Former President of 
Goldman Sachs, Supports Bringing Back Glass–Steagall, SLATE (Apr. 6, 
2017, 10:57 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2017/04/06/don 
ald_trump_s_top_economic_advisor_supports_bringing_back_glass_stea
gall.html.  
404 See Jenkins, supra note 401. Of course, it has been pointed out that 
because Goldman Sachs is not a “universal banker,” the reinstatement of 
Glass-Steagall “would be a relative non-event for Goldman Sachs itself. 
In competitive terms, it would be a huge boost.” Id. As Dennis Kelleher of 
Better Markets, a pro-regulation group put it: “Most troubling about Mr. 
Cohn’s possible embrace of Glass-Steagall are the potential benefits that 
would be uniquely enjoyed by his former firm, Goldman Sachs.” “Goldman 
Sachs, he says, “would be kings of the financial work where [universal 
bank holding companies] couldn’t compete.” Id. (brackets in original). 
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Dodd-Frank or by traditional bankruptcy proceedings.405 The 
failure of these ring-fenced banks self-evidently would also 
not threaten customer deposits, because they would have so 
little or even none.  
To be sure, there are varying perspectives on what 
such a “modern day” Glass-Steagall measure would look like. 
On April 6, 2017, Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of 
Massachusetts, and then-Senator John McCain, Republican 
of Arizona, introduced the “21st Century Glass-Steagall Act 
of 2017,” which would, among other things, separate
commercial and investment banks.406 In May 2017, Treasury 
Secretary Mnuchin, in testimony to a Senate committee 
regarding the Warren and McCain bill, said he and the 
President are in favor of a “21st Century Glass-Steagall” (not 
referring to any Congressional bills) that contains “aspects of 
[the original Glass-Steagall] that may make sense,” but they 
405 See also Barney Jopson, US ‘Too Big to Fail’ Regime Set for Trump 
Overhaul, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
d08bc3ca-1705-11e8-9e9c-25c814761640 (describing Treasury Secretary 
Mnuchin’s recent proposal to create, inter alia, a new category of Chapter 
14 bankruptcy designed to make it easier to wind down collapsing 
megabanks outside of more traditional bankruptcy provisions as a 
recognition that existing Dodd-Frank wind down provisions will not work 
and will lead to calls for U.S. taxpayer bailouts of megabanks). 
406 See S. 881, 115th Cong. (2017). There is also a bipartisan “21st Century 
Glass-Steagall Act of 2017” effort in the House, led notably by Rep. 
Capuano (D-MA) and Rep. Jones (R-NC), H.R. 2585, 115th Cong. (2017), 
as well as a related “Return to Prudent Banking Act of 2017” sponsored 
by fifty-eight representatives, including Reps. Kaptur (D-OH), Jones (R-
NC), and Coffman (R-CO). H.R. 790, 115th Cong. (2017). Additionally, 
Sen. Kennedy (R-LA) has also stated the need for policymakers to discuss 
the return of Glass-Steagall. Ian McKendry, GOP Lawmaker Wants to 
Hear More About Glass-Steagall Return, AM. BANKER (Jun. 7, 2017), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/gop-lawmaker-wants-to-hear-
more-about-glass-steagall-return.
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would not support a complete separation of commercial and 
investment banks.407   
One prominent “third way compromise” gaining 
currency (and which sounds as if it may fall within Secretary 
Mnuchin’s stated preference), is a law modelled on [the 
U.K.’s] “ring-fencing rules [that] will erect a barrier between 
retail and investment banking activities[.]”408 One leading 
suggestion of this kind from Thomas Hoenig, former Vice 
Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
“would be a 20 percent limit on the funding that an 
investment bank could source from the holding company.”409
However, Wall Street certainly would not cheer even a 
modest “third-way” compromise of this sort; nor would the 
risk of any kind of Glass-Steagall legislative rider be borne 
by these big swaps dealers to try to obtain complete Dodd-
Frank swaps regulation relief.    
Thus, for this reason as well, there is understandably 
considerable hesitancy on the part of the four huge, 
“systemically” risky U.S. bank holding company swaps 
dealers in advancing proposals to substantially unravel 
Dodd-Frank swaps regulations. Debate over that kind of 
legislation would almost certainly invite vigorous debate 
both in and out of Congress about the extent to which these 
large commercial banks should otherwise be separated from 
their investment arms, i.e., reinstatement of a “modern day” 
Glass-Steagall to prevent future U.S. taxpayer bailouts.  
407 Treasury Secretary Clarifies Position on Glass-Steagall, C–SPAN (May 
18, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4670278/treasury-secret ary-
clarifies-postion-glass-steagall. 
408 See Patrick Jenkins & Barney Jopson, Support Builds for Watered-
Down Version of Glass-Steagall Law, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/4ca1c210-227f-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16. 
409 Id.
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Third, and probably most important, the big banks are 
reticent about seeking legislative relief from Dodd-Frank 
swaps regulation is because of the ease with which the four 
big U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers can now evade 
at their will Dodd-Frank swaps regulation through the 
deguarantee and ANE loopholes.410 The de facto (and largely 
unrecognized) discretionary repeal of U.S. swaps regulation 
by these bank-created extraterritorial loopholes has the 
complete effect of a substantial de jure statutory repeal 
without the accompanying dangers of, for example, a Glass-
Steagall-like debate.  
IX. THE ISDA “DEGUARANTEE” LOOPHOLE 
As will be shown in detail below, a single footnote (footnote 
563) within the 662 footnotes included in the CFTC’s July 
2013 guidance was unilaterally seized upon in August 2013 
by ISDA and its swaps dealer members to carve a pathway 
to evade Dodd-Frank swaps regulation at their will. To 
understand how substantial this loophole is, one must first 
untangle the basic elements of the July 2013 Guidance, 
starting with the creation of an important distinction 
between swaps activities involving a “U.S. person”411 and 
those involving only non-U.S. persons.  
410 See infra Part IX.  
411 See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Comp-
liance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,291, 45,301–
45,302 (July. 26, 2013) (“. . . [t]he Commission's interpretation of the term 
‘‘U.S. person’’ would generally encompass: (1) persons (or classes of 
persons) located within the United States; and (2) persons that may be 
domiciled or operate outside the United States but whose swap activities 
nonetheless have a ‘‘direct and significant connection with activities in, 
or effect on, commerce of the United States’’ within the meaning of CEA 
section 2(i)”).  
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The 83-page, triple-columned, single-spaced July 2013 
Guidance makes “U.S. persons” in swaps trades subject to all 
of Dodd-Frank’s swaps rules, regardless of the physical 
location of the swap execution.412 The term “U.S. persons” 
includes the usual defining traits of such a term: the presence 
of natural U.S citizenship; corporate and other entities 
organized or with principal places of business in the U.S.; 
foreign entities owned by U.S. persons; and branch offices of 
412 See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,317 
(July 26, 2013). Further, a securities industry group, unhappy with the 
July 2013 Guidance sued the CTFC to prevent the new rules from 
applying extraterritorially in the absence of a properly promulgated 
regulation addressing the rules' extraterritorial applications. The judge 
was unconvinced, holding that:  
The majority of plaintiffs' claims fail because Congress 
has clearly indicated that the swaps provisions within 
Title VII of the Dodd–Frank Act—including any rules or 
regulations prescribed by the CFTC—apply 
extraterritorially whenever the jurisdictional nexus in 7 
U.S.C. § 2(i) is satisfied. In this regard, plaintiffs' 
challenges to the extraterritorial application of the Title 
VII Rules merely seek to delay the inevitable. The Court 
will not question the CFTC's decision to proceed in 
interpreting and applying Section 2(i) on a case-by-case 
basis through adjudication; nor will it set aside the 
CFTC's decision to promulgate the Cross–Border Action 
to announce its non-binding policies regarding the Title 
VII Rules' extraterritorial applications. Instead, the 
Court will only remand to the CFTC those Title VII Rules 
that are supported by inadequate cost-benefit analyses.  
Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass’n v. U.S. C.F.T.C., 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 436 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). In August 2016, the CFTC published the cost-benefit 
analysis for the proposed rules in the Federal Register, allowing the eight 
rules to take effect. See Final Response to District Court Remand Order 
in Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass’n v. U.S. C.F.T.C., 81 Fed. Reg. 54,478 
(Aug. 16, 2016). 
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U.S. persons.413  There can be no doubt that the four largest 
U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers are themselves 
U.S. persons.   
The single most important concept within the 
guidance relates to whether Dodd-Frank applies to swaps 
executed outside the U.S. by a “foreign affiliate” of a U.S. 
Person. Under the guidance, if a foreign affiliate is 
“guaranteed” by a U.S. person parent, as had been the case 
in standard ISDA swaps contract language for about two 
decades, the foreign affiliate is subject to Dodd-Frank’s 
swaps rules even if the trade is executed abroad.  
A. The Deguarantee Footnote within the July 
2013 Guidance 
However, at first unbeknownst to the CFTC, that agency’s 
decision to focus exclusively on a foreign affiliate guarantee 
unexpectedly let ISDA open the door for, inter alia, the four 
largest U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers to 
“deguarantee “ their foreign “affiliates.”414  The July 2013 
guidance was interpreted by ISDA to enable this loophole 
with a single and otherwise seemingly immaterial footnote 
(footnote 563 of the 662 footnotes within the guidance), which 
provides that U.S. swaps dealers can avoid Dodd-Frank’s 
swaps rules, “if a non-U.S. swap dealer . . . relies on a written 
declaration from the [foreign] subsidiaries’ parent that, 
413 Stephen Hall & Victoria Daka, Better Markets Comment Letter on 
Cross-Border Application of Registration Thresholds and External 
Business Conduct Standards Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major 
Swap Participants, BETTER MARKETS (Dec. 19, 2016), https:// 
bettermarkets.com/rulemaking/better-markets-comment-letter-cftc-
cross-border-application-registration-thresholds-and. 
414 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,324–25 (July 26, 
2013). 
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under the swap, the subsidiary is not guaranteed with 
recourse by a U.S. person.”415 Footnote 563 is the only source 
cited for the “deguarantee loophole.”416
B. ISDA Provides the “Deguarantee User’s 
Guide” to Evade Dodd-Frank 
On August 19, 2013, footnote 563 of the July 2013 Guidance 
was relied upon by ISDA to become a clear instruction to its 
members on how to deguarantee presently guaranteed 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding company swap 
dealers to avoid Dodd-Frank’s swaps rules.417  In fact, after 
ISDA’s August 2013 instruction, according to one leading 
expert, “the [four] biggest U.S. banks [had] changed 
‘hundreds of thousands’ of such swaps contracts” to provide 
for this deguarantee.418
The centerpiece of implementing this “loophole” can be 
found by referencing the original copyrighted, boilerplate of 
ISDA swaps contract documentation produced for its member 
swaps dealers. That boilerplate is referred to in detail 
above.419 Since 1992, when a ISDA swaps customer 
415 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,355 n.563 (July 
26, 2013). See supra note 352, explaining that for the deguarantee 
loophole to be perfected, the deguaranteed foreign bank subsidiary must 
be trading with a non-U.S. person counterparty. It is explained therein 
the ease with which a “U.S. person” counterparty can itself through its 
own intra-corporate maneuvering, deguarantee (or create a 
deguaranteed) foreign subsidiary to convert itself to a “non-U.S. person,” 
thereby taking the swaps trade out of Dodd-Frank as the deguarantee 
loophole law is now conceived by the CFTC. 
416 See Levinson, supra note 360. 
417 Id.
418 Id.
419 See supra notes 107–113 and accompanying text; Master Agreement,
INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N (1996) (Original publication and 
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contemplated executing a swap with a subsidiary of a parent 
U.S. bank holding company, it was commonplace for the 
parent to guarantee that subsidiary within the ISDA 
standardized and copyrighted “credit support annex.”420
A key change to the ISDA documentation came on 
August 19, 2013, about a month after the CFTC July 2013 
Guidance was finalized.  At that time, unbeknownst to the 
CFTC, ISDA published, and made available to its swaps 
dealer membership, a standardized “Cross-border Swaps 
Representation Letter” (the “ISDA Cross-Border Letter”).421
The ISDA Cross-Border Letter relies on ISDA’s 
interpretation of footnote 563 as having sanctioned the 
deguaranteeing of foreign subsidiaries by a simple pre-
written standardized declaration.422 In the prior twenty-one 
years that ISDA provided these copyrighted boilerplate 
documents to its members, it had never before contemplated 
form language deguaranteeing a U.S. swaps dealer’s foreign 
subsidiary.   
Lest there be any confusion regarding the intent of the 
ISDA Cross-Border Letter, the preamble language on its first 
page reads: 
copyright 1992), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1332815/00011 
9312509105708/dex1024.htm. 
420 INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX (1994). 
See, e.g., INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2011 BEST PRACTICES FOR
THE OTC DERIVATIVES COLLATERAL PROCESS 6 (2011); Christian Johnson, 
Rehypothecation Risk, GLOBAL CAPITAL (Apr. 16, 2001); Christian 
Johnson, Seven Deadly Sins of ISDA Negotiations, GLOBAL CAPITAL (Mar. 
25, 2002); Denis M. Forster, Standard Swaps Agreements Don’t Insulate 
Users from Risk, AM. BANKER (June 13, 1994), https://www.american 
banker.com/news/standard-swaps-agreements-dont-insulate-users-from-
risk. 
421 Cross-Border Swaps Representation Letter, INT’L SWAPS AND 
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www2.isda.org/attachment/ 
NTgyNA==/Cross_Border_Rep_Letter_Final.doc. 
422 Id.
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On July 26, 2013, the CFTC 
published an “Interpretive Guidance 
and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance with Certain Swap 
Regulations” providing guidance as 
to when the CFTC will assert 
jurisdiction over swap transactions 
that have a non-U.S. element.  This 
representation letter allows market 
participants to provide counter-
parties with status representations 
needed to determine whether 
compliance with various CFTC swap 
regulations is required by the 
Interpretive Guidance.  The repres-
entations in this letter are solely for 
the purposes of making such 
determinations.423
ISDA then reduced the process of deguaranteeing 
foreign subsidiaries to a box-checking exercise, i.e., where a 
party would literally put a checkmark in a box next to the 
question titled “II (B) Guarantee Representations”:  
No U.S. Person Guarantees[:] 
We hereby represent to you as of each 
time we enter into a Swap 
Transaction with you that, unless we 
have notified you to the contrary in a 
timely manner in writing prior to 
entering into such Swap Transaction, 
our obligations to you in connection 
with the relevant Swap are not, 
supported by any Guarantee (of 
which we are aware) other than any 
Guarantee provided by a person who 
423 Id.
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we reasonably believe does not fall 
within any of the U.S. Person 
Categories and who we believe in 
good faith would not otherwise be 
deemed a “U.S. person” under the 
Interpretive Guidance.424
The ease with which the four big U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers could now reverse over two decades 
of past practice of guaranteeing subsidiaries to a new 
deguarantee contextualizes the flight of swaps trading from 
U.S. markets.  It has been reported, for example, that the 
movement of the U.S. swaps market abroad is as high as 95% 
within certain kinds of swaps trading volume.425 The 
problem, however, is that, in escaping Dodd-Frank’s swaps 
rules by trading through newly deguaranteed foreign 
subsidiaries, the systemic risk to the U.S. economy slingshots 
back to the U.S. bank holding company lender of last resort: 
the U.S. taxpayer.  
C. Deguaranteeing Does Not Eliminate Systemic 
Risk: U.S. Parent Banks and the U.S. 
Taxpayers Remain on the Hook 
It is long-standing practice of corporate governance that 
when a parent entity has created a subsidiary engaged in 
high-risk activities, the parent entity offers assurances to 
third party partners/customers in the form of a downstream 
guarantee of the subsidiary.426 The deguarantee loophole 
424 Id.
425 Levinson, supra note 360. 
426 See Cassandra Jones Havard, Back to the Parent: Holding Company 
Liability for Subsidiary Banks—A Discussion of the Net Worth 
Maintenance Agreement, the Source of Strength Doctrine, and the Prompt 
Corrective Action Provision, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2353, 2355–56 (1995). 
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changes decades of common practice. For example, in 1992, 
the then-budding swaps market relied heavily on the 
assurances of guarantees as evidenced by the standardized 
Credit Support Annex to the ISDA Master Agreement.427
Now, in what is a several hundred trillion-dollar 
notional value swaps market, guarantees of swaps trading 
subsidiaries are suddenly no longer deemed a business 
necessity. This is certainly so because 90% of the U.S. swaps 
market is handled by the four huge U.S. bank holding 
company swap dealers who, as the aftermath of the Great 
Recession shows, are generally understood to be backed by 
the U.S. government through U.S. taxpayer-funded 
bailouts.428 Swaps counterparties to these huge U.S. bank 
holding company swaps dealers and their foreign affiliates 
know that these institutions are “too-big-to-fail,” and thus an 
explicit guarantee from the parent is really no longer needed.  
As mentioned earlier, there is such certainty that these big 
banks will be rescued in a financial crisis that that 
understanding is embedded in the stock price of these 
banks.429
The ISDA deguarantee language is nothing more than 
a legal fiction. It does not in fact shield any parent U.S. bank 
holding company swaps dealer from the practical, real-world 
risk of a foreign subsidiary default. Were a U.S. bank to allow 
the failure of their de-guaranteed foreign subsidiary, the 
creditworthiness of its many other deguaranteed or 
guaranteed affiliates and subsidiaries,430 and even the 
427 See CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX, supra note 420.  
428 See Collins, supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
429 Id.
430 Former CFTC Chairman Gensler has pointed out that, “[t]he nature 
of modern finance is that financial institutions commonly set up 
hundreds, if not thousands, of ‘legal entities’ around the globe with a 
multitude of affiliate relationships.” Gary Gensler, Keynote Address on 
the Cross-border Application of Swaps Market Reform at Sandler O'Neill 
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parent U.S. bank itself, would immediately suffer severe 
reputational damage, and that damage would manifest itself 
with that bank quickly being deemed a credit risk.431 Thus, 
even without a guarantee, it is widely understood in financial 
circles that the foreign subsidiary has a de facto guarantee 
backed by the lender of last resort to the bank holding 
company: the U.S. taxpayer. 
The CFTC acknowledged this fact when it said in the 
July 2013 guidance: “[e]ven in the absence of an explicit 
business arrangement or guarantee, U.S. companies may for 
reputational or other reasons choose, or feel compelled, to 
assume the cost of risks incurred by deguaranteed foreign 
affiliates.”432 As one market expert so aptly put it: “The 
market knows and relies on the unstated fact that the U.S. 
parent bank can and ultimately must bail out any 
purportedly unguaranteed subsidiaries to avoid the 
Conference, CFTC (June 6, 2013) [hereinafter Gensler Address], 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-141. 
431 Jonathan Fiechter et al., Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit 
All?, 4, 9, 20 (Int’l Monetary Fund Staff Notes, Mar. 7, 2011), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1104.pdf; see Daryl
Montgomery, Coming Soon from Europe: The Next Global Financial 
Crisis, SEEKING ALPHA (July 7, 2016), http://seekingalpha.com/article/ 
3987017-coming-soon-europe-next-global-financial-crisis (“Banks and 
Wall Street firms are somewhat unique among all companies in that they 
must maintain credibility among their peers. The loss of ability to 
perform financial transfers means instant death for them. Bear Stearns 
folded overnight in March 2008 because of this, even though it was 
hurrying to release its excellent first quarter earnings. Earnings, book 
value, PE, and other fundamental measures of a company's strength 
become instantly meaningless under such circumstances.”); see also 
Greenberger & Waddington Letter, supra note 206.  
432 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,294 (July 26, 
2013) (emphasis added). 
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reputational and run risk associated with their failure.”433
The real effect is that using the “deguarantee” to evade Dodd-
Frank means that “banks are again moving their risky 
derivatives trading . . . outside U.S. regulation, while 
increasing the risk that future losses will still come back 
home to the U.S. for the U.S. taxpayer bailouts – just as they 
did in 2008.”434 As then-CFTC Chairman Gensler also made 
clear: “[W]hen a run starts on any overseas affiliate or branch 
of a modern financial institution, risk comes crashing back to 
our shores.”435
433 Cross-Border Factsheet: U.S. Banks are Again Trying to Evade 
Financial Reform Law by Changing a Few Words in a Contract: this Time, 
it’s Called “De-guaranteeing” Overseas Affiliates, BETTER MARKETS (June 
19, 2014) [hereinafter Cross-Border Factsheet], https://bettermar- 
kets.com/sites/default/files/Cross-Border%20Guarantee%20Fact%20She 
et%206-19-14%20(2).pdf. This position is fully adopted by the CFTC as 
noted in the July 2013 Guidance stating, “[e]ven in the absence of an 
explicit business arrangement or guarantee, U.S. companies may for 
reputational or other reasons choose, or feel compelled, to assume the cost 
of risks incurred by foreign affiliates.”). Interpretive Guidance and Policy 
Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 
Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,294 (July 26, 2013); see also Greenberger & 
Waddington Letter, supra note 206; Letter from Michael Greenberger, 
Prof., Univ. of Md., Carey Sch. of L., and Brandy Bruyere, Analyst, 
CHHS, Univ. of Md., to Melissa Jurgens, Sec’y, CFTC, RIN No. 3038-
AD85 (Feb. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Greenberger & Bruyere Letter], 
https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=5914
9&SearchText; Letter from Am. for Fin. Reform, to Tim Massad, 
Chairman, CFTC, RIN 3038-AE54 (Dec. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Letter]. 
434 Cross-Border Fact Sheet, supra note 433; see also Greenberger & 
Waddington Letter, supra note 206. 
435 Gensler Address, supra note 430.  
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D. Incentives for U.S. Bank Swaps Dealers to 
“Deguarantee” 
Financial markets, especially the markets for swaps, are 
global, as the worldwide financial crisis of 2008 made clear. 
Accordingly, at the September 2009 G20 Summit in 
Pittsburgh, it was agreed that all G20 countries would 
develop regulations for swaps according to a set of agreed 
upon regulatory principles that are now reflected within 
Dodd-Frank.436   
The U.S. responded to the G20 call to action by 
enacting Dodd-Frank less than a year later.437
Unfortunately, almost all the remaining member nations 
failed to act on a timely basis.  With the meltdown in the rear-
view mirror, an international race-to-the-bottom of swaps 
regulation was therefore created under the seeming 
assumption that non-U.S. counterparties would choose to 
enter swaps transactions with foreign dealers under lax 
regulation to avoid, inter alia, the regulatory “bother” of 
Dodd-Frank.  This attitude was claimed to pose a threat to 
436 See Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS.
2 (2009), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-cen-ter/international/g7-g2 
0/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf (“We 
committed to act together to raise capital standards, to implement strong 
international compensation standards aimed at ending practices that 
lead to excessive risk-taking, to improve the over-the-counter derivatives 
market and to create more powerful tools to hold large global firms to 
account for the risks they take.”). 
437 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Prot. Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (signed into law July 21, 2010). See also 
Robert Reich, Wall Street’s Global Race to the Bottom, HUFFPOST (Oct. 4, 
2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/wall-streets-global-ra 
ce-_b_750239.html (“Squadrons of lawyers and lobbyists are now pressing 
the Treasury, Comptroller of the Currency, SEC, and the Fed to go even 
easier on the Street. Their main argument is if regulations are too tight, 
the big banks will be less competitive internationally.”).  
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the big U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers who, 
within that race-to-the-bottom, feared that they would be 
displaced as leaders of the worldwide swaps markets if they 
and their foreign subsidiaries were governed by Dodd-
Frank.438
The claim of the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (“SIFMA”), the international banking 
industry’s main lobbying group in, inter alia, Washington, 
D.C., was that for a U.S. bank holding company swap dealer 
to remain “competitive” in the global swaps market, it had to 
free its foreign subsidiaries from Dodd-Frank. “In private 
talking points drafted by the [SIFMA] . . . the industry 
[claimed] the de-guaranteeing practice is lawful and allows 
U.S. banks to compete on a level playing field with their 
foreign-based counterparts.”439
However, the argument that U.S. banks would have 
suffered by losing competitive swaps battles to true foreign 
swap dealers because those U.S. banks would be subject to 
the Dodd-Frank framework is flawed. Many U.S. bank 
holding company swaps dealers left the swaps market since 
the 2008 meltdown, recognizing that swaps were deemed so 
financially insecure that the prudential banking regulators 
were substantially hiking capital requirements in direct 
proportion to a U.S. bank holding companies’ swaps trading 
exposure.440 Leaving the swaps market, therefore, is not 
438 FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Rainer Kattel et al. 
eds., 2015) (commenting on the “light touch” approach adopted by the 
British financial system). 
439 Silla Brush, Wall Street Faces Scrutiny of Tactic to Evade Swaps Rules,
BLOOMBERG (July 31, 2014, 11:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2014-07-31/wall-street-faces-new-u-s-scrutiny-of-deriv 
atives-tactic. 
440 Olivia Oran, Morgan Stanley’s Commodities Head Swaps Swagger for 
Small and Smart, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2016, 9:11 AM), http://www.reu- 
ters.com/article/us-morgan-stanley-commodities-idUSKBN13U1FX; 
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necessarily as financially suicidal as described by, inter alia,
SIFMA.
Moreover, one of the major reasons U.S. bank holding 
company swap dealers have been found by regulators, 
legislative bodies, and reputable academics to be 
systemically “important” (or risky) is because of the very 
volatility of the swaps market in which they trade.  Warren 
Buffet famously called swaps, “weapons of mass financial 
destruction.”441 Buffet has also said that to the extent that 
Gregory Meyer, Goldman Warns Federal Reserve over Commodity 
Trading Rules Fallout, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www. 
ft.com/content/8f345610-f91c-11e6-bd4e-68d53499ed71. 
441 See Warren Buffet, Warren Buffet on Derivatives, BERKSHIRE 
HATHAWAY (2002), http://www.fintools.com/docs/Warren%20Buffet%20 
on%20Derivatives.pdf; Michael Snyder, Warren Buffett: Derivatives Are 
Still Weapons of Mass Destruction and “Are Likely to Cause Big Trouble”,
ETF DAILY NEWS (June 22, 2015, 9:43 PM), https://etfdailynews. 
com/2015/06/22/warren-buffett-derivatives-are-still-weapons-of-mass-
destruction-and-are-likely-to-cause-big-trouble/ (offering Buffet’s re-
affirmed sentiment, thirteen years later, that “at some point [derivatives 
are] likely to cause big trouble”) (quoting Tony Boyd, Warren Buffett Still 
Says Derivatives are “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” FIN. REV. (Jun. 17, 
2015, 3:11 PM), https://www.afr.com/markets/derivatives/warren-buffett-
still-says-derivatives-are-weapons-of-mass-destruction-20150617-
ghpw0a); Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, The G20 Leaders’ Summit 
and the Regulation of Global Finance: What Was Accomplished?, CTR. FOR 
INT’L GOV. INNOVATION (2008), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 
267240030_The_G20_Leaders'_Summit_and_the_Regulation_of_Global_
Finance_What_Was_Accomplished_The_G20_Leaders'_Summit_and_th
e_Regulation_of_Global_Finance_What_Was_Accomplished; Id. at 4–5:  
The G20 Leaders’ Summit has also made commitments 
to bring order in the market for credit default swaps 
(CDS), a derivatives market involving contracts for 
insurance against bond defaults. These contracts have 
mainly been traded “over-the-counter” (OTC); that is, 
they have been negotiated privately between the buyer 
and the seller of the insurance without a formal clearing 
house or exchange that could minimize counter-party 
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swaps are thought to hedge the risk of underlying risky 
investments, e.g., risky loans, the answer is not to make risky 
loans in the first place.442
To that end, the U.S. taxpayers should not become the 
de facto guarantor of risk for these megalithic U.S. banks 
risk and force margin requirements for all contracts. This 
market grew at an astonishing speed over the last decade 
and regulators left it unchecked. In 2000, for example, 
the US Congress voted to exempt the OTC markets from 
oversight by the US futures regulator.  
While these contracts were seen as beneficial 
instruments to spread default risk, they now stand 
accused of having exacerbated the current crisis. Warren 
Buffett’s famous description of derivative as “weapons of 
mass destruction” is now often repeated. The insurance 
giant American International Group (AIG) had to be 
rescued by the US Treasury after it had issued US$440 
billion in swaps to cover defaults on debt. The opacity of 
the market has also contributed to uncertainty. In the 
aftermath of the default of the US investment bank 
Lehman Brothers, both the total amount of credit default 
swaps on its debt and the hands in which these contracts 
ended were unknown, and these knowledge gaps 
heightened the panic in the financial markets.  
Most regulatory institutions around the world, including 
the FSF, have begun calling for OTC derivatives 
transactions to be recorded and cleared through a 
clearing house standing between the parties of the trade. 
Even the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), the most important private industry 
organization in the sector, has shifted its position. After 
long resisting tighter public controls over OTC 
derivatives, the ISDA recently welcomed the creation of 
a centralized clearing house, while developing a series of 
protocols to facilitate net settlement of credit default 
swaps on the debt of Lehman Brothers, Washington 
Mutual, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. 
442 See e.g., Bansi R. Shah, Risk Management Techniques: Do They Pay 
Off?, 5 INDIAN J. APPLIED RES. 257, 261 (2015). 
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embroiled in trillions of dollars of historically risky and 
poorly regulated swap transactions. Furthermore, the 
“competitive positioning” advanced by these U.S. banks and 
their lobbyists that so consumes this banking rhetoric is 
entirely at the expense of U.S. taxpayers. As such, 
recognizing that swaps are inherently dangerous 
instruments, especially in the volumes transacted by these 
huge U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers, the 
supposed “loss” of swaps business would be, if fulfilled, 
arguably to the betterment of the U.S. and world economies, 
and certainly better for U.S. taxpayers. 
The deguarantee loophole footnote provided the 
perfect foil for ISDA and, inter alia, these large U.S. bank 
holding company swap dealers to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage. Sources “with knowledge of the situation” 
maintain that U.S. banks removed foreign affiliate 
guarantees for the express purpose of not “get[ting] caught 
by U.S. regulations.”443
E. CFTC’s Belated, and Now Likely Permanently 
Unsuccessful, Attempt to End the 
Deguarantee Loophole 
In early 2014, press reports began to surface that CFTC staff 
at that time first learned of, and reported to unsuspecting 
CFTC Commissioners that, the large U.S. swaps dealers 
were using a “deguarantee loophole” to move trades from 
domestic U.S. parents or affiliates to newly “deguaranteed” 
foreign subsidiaries to evade application of Dodd-Frank.444
443 Katy Burne, Big U.S. Banks Make Swaps a Foreign Affair, WALL. ST.
J. (Apr. 27, 2014, 4:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-u-s-banks-
make-swaps-a-foreign-affair-1398627739. 
444 David Aron & Ken McCracken, CFTC’s Anti-Evasion Rule Under 
Dodd-Frank Brought to Forefront by “De-guaranteeing” Activity, 36 No. 6 
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As the year progressed, then CFTC Chairman Massad, who 
had shortly before assumed the CFTC chair, began to decry 
the practice of deguaranteeing as a pathway to escape Dodd-
Frank.445
F. The CFTC’s First Formal Response to the 
Deguarantee Loophole: Extraterritorial 
Application of the Rules for Margin for 
Uncleared Swaps 
The first formal CFTC response to the loophole was a new 
rule for cross-border application of its Margin Requirements 
for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants (“Cross-Border Margin Rule”) proposed on July 
14, 2015, and made final in May 2016.446  The CFTC stated 
in the proposed rule that it “is aware that some [U.S. Swaps 
FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. NL 2, n.1 (June 2016) (quoting Peter 
Madigan, 100% Not Guaranteed: US Banks Quizzed Over Affiliates,
RISK.NET (July 28, 2014), http://www.risk.net/regulation/2356481/100-
not-guaranteed-us-banks-quizzed-over-affiliates) (“quoting a ‘senior’ 
CFTC source, who noted ‘[t]here is no formal investigation into the de-
guaranteeing of these affiliates’ and that then-Acting Chairman Wetjen 
‘instructed staff to gather some facts . . . [, which] isn’t the same as asking 
the enforcement division to initiate an investigation.’”); see also Levinson, 
supra note 360. 
445 Aron & McCracken, supra note 444, at n.5 (citing Andrew Ackerman 
& Scott Patterson, CFTC to Scrutinize Swaps Loophole, WALL ST. J.,
(Sept. 5, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-to-scrutinize-
banks-shifting-trading-operations-overseas-1409916820) (reporting on 
Massad’s concerns that “activity that takes place abroad can result in the 
importation of risk into the U.S. . . . infecting the parent company in 
possibly destabilizing ways” and additionally that the CFTC “plans to 
scrutinize U.S. Banks that are shifting some trading operations overseas 
to avoid tough CFTC rules.”). 
446 Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and 
Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin 
Requirements, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,376 (July 14, 2015). 
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Dealers] removed guarantees in order to fall outside the 
scope of certain Dodd-Frank requirements” and that “[t]he 
[newly] proposed coverage [in the new proposed rule] of 
foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. person as a ‘Foreign 
Consolidated Subsidiary’ [“(FCS”)] . . . would address the 
concern that even without a guarantee . . .  foreign 
subsidiaries of a U.S. person with a substantial nexus to the 
U.S. financial system [would henceforth be] adequately 
covered by the [new] margin requirements.”447
The final Cross-Border Margin Rule adopted the FCS 
concept and definition from its proposed version. An FCS is: 
a non-U.S. covered swap entity 
(“CSE”) in which an ultimate parent 
entity that is a U.S. person has a 
controlling financial interest, in 
accordance with U.S. GAAP, such 
that the U.S. ultimate parent entity 
includes the non-U.S. CSE’s 
operating results, financial position 
and statement of cash flows in the 
U.S. ultimate parent entity’s 
consolidated financial statements, in 
accordance with U.S. GAAP.448
Said more simply, an affiliated entity—U.S. or 
otherwise—whose performance is consolidated within its 
U.S. parent company’s books is subject to the new CFTC 
margin rules for uncleared swaps, regardless whether the 
affiliate is deguaranteed by the parent. As such, the effect of 
the final Cross-Border Margin Rule is that it addresses the 
deguaranteeing problem by subjecting to U.S. margin rules 
for uncleared swaps both (1) uncleared swaps of non-U.S. 
447 Id. at 41,385. 
448 Id.
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CSEs (covered swap entity) guaranteed by a U.S. person and 
(2) uncleared swaps of FCSs (foreign consolidated 
subsidiaries).449
Although this shift is important, the Cross-Border 
Margin Rule only applies to certain—not all—margin
requirements and it does not apply to the twelve other types 
of Dodd-Frank swaps regulatory tools discussed above.450   
Of course, those swaps that moved, under the 
deguarantee contract clause provided in the August 2013 
ISDA Cross-Border letter, from the U.S. swaps dealer parent 
or that parent’s U.S. affiliate to their newly deguaranteed 
foreign subsidiaries in trades with “non-U.S. persons would 
generally not be cleared pursuant to Dodd-Frank (since the 
motivation for moving swaps to a deguaranteed foreign 
subsidiarity was to evade Dodd-Frank). As such, the CFTC 
January 2016 final rule on margin for uncleared swaps would 
have brought foreign subsidiary swaps completely back 
under Dodd-Frank margin requirements. If subject to Dodd-
Franks’ margin requirements, the amounts posted for 
margin would therefore also be included, inter alia, in the 
U.S. prudential regulators’ calculations for that capital that 
must be held in reserve under Dodd-Frank for U.S. bank 
holding company swaps dealers.451 As a result, the May 16 
final rule “recaptured” those “foreign” uncleared swaps, 
placing them back under Dodd-Frank margin and capital 
reserves requirements.   
449 Id. (emphasis added).  
450 See supra Part V. See also Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps 
for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 636 (Jan. 6, 
2016) (stating the final rule on margin for uncleared swaps.). 
451 See Capital Requirements of Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,252 (Dec. 16, 2016). 
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As shown in detail below,452 in a CFTC concession 
designed to head off  a threatened “trade war” over swaps by, 
inter alia, the EU (supported by, inter alia, big U.S. swaps 
dealers), shortly after the CFTC’s January 2016 margin for 
uncleared swaps rule was adopted, the CFTC uncleared 
margin rule was completely and permanently preempted by 
the CFTC’s later adoption of yet another self-created CFTC 
exemption from Dodd-Frank swaps rules: i.e., the wholly 
made up doctrine of “substituted compliance,” under which, 
inter alia, these foreign subsidiaries’ uncleared swaps outside 
of Dodd-Frank that were thought to be brought back into 
Dodd-Frank’s collateralization and capital regime, were 
instead governed by the “substituted” and much weaker EU 
and Japanese margin rules for uncleared swaps.453
G. The Proposed CFTC Rules and Inter-
pretations to End the Deguarantee and ANE 
Loopholes  
The CFTC finally (more than three years after ISDA’s 
deguarantee instruction to its members) recognized that it 
must address completely deguaranteeing of subsidiaries as it 
applies to all thirteen of the Dodd-Frank swaps regulatory 
tools. A proposed October 18, 2016 CFTC rule and 
interpretations fully recognized the nature of modern finance 
452 See infra Part XI (discussing the substituted compliance doctrine and 
its use by the CFTC). See also infra notes 528–32 and accompanying text 
(discussing the EU’s threatened swaps “trade war” with the United 
States). 
453 See Comparability Determination for the European Union: Margin 
Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap 
Participants, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,394 (Oct. 18, 2017); Comparability 
Determination for Japan: Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for 
Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 63,376 (Sept. 
15, 2016). 
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where “large financial institutions typically conduct their 
business operations through a highly integrated network of 
business lines and services conducted through multinational 
branches or subsidiaries that are under the control of the 
ultimate parent entity.”454
The CFTC detailed the swaps operations of, inter alia,
Goldman and Citigroup, noting “the current swap market is 
global in scale and characterized by a high level of 
interconnectedness among market participants, with 
transactions negotiated, executed, and arranged between 
counterparties in different jurisdictions, (and booked and 
managed in still other jurisdictions).”455 The CFTC concluded 
“market realities suggest that a cross-border framework 
focusing only on the domicile of the market participant or 
location of counterparty risk would fail to effectively advance 
the policy objectives of the Dodd-Frank swap reforms, which 
were aimed at increasing market transparency and 
counterparty protections and mitigating the risk of financial 
contagion in the swap market.”456
The CFTC clearly provided that “[a] failure to treat 
these [foreign] entities the same in this context could provide 
a U.S. financial group with an opportunity to avoid SD . . . 
registration by conducting relevant swap activities through 
unregistered [foreign affiliated] entities.”457 Accordingly, the 
CFTC, in its proposed rule and interpretations,458 adopted 
454 Id. See also Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds 
and External Business Conduct Standards Applicable to Swap Dealers 
and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 71,946, 71,950 (Oct. 18, 2016) 
(making clear that where Dodd-Frank applied extraterritorially, the 
CFTC’s business conduct standards, dealing with protections to non-SDs 
and MSPs were to be applied, including protections of due diligence, 
disclosure, fair dealing and anti-fraud requirements). 
455 81 Fed. Reg. at 71,948. 
456 Id.
457 Id. at 71,951. 
458 Id. at 71,973. 
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the definition and use of FCS that it previously used in its 
final May 2018 Cross-Border Margin Rules as being 
applicable to all extraterritorial applications of Dodd-Frank’s 
swaps rules. These consolidated foreign affiliates, it 
concluded, must therefore be subject to Dodd-Frank swaps 
rules whether guaranteed or not.
H. Yet Another Extraterritorial Loophole 
Discovered: ANE 
Through the October 18, 2016 CFTC proposed rule-making, 
the CFTC highlighted yet another loophole adopted 
unilaterally, inter alia, by U.S. bank holding company swaps 
dealers in the application of the deguarantee doctrine. The 
CFTC squarely addressed the fact that swaps ultimately 
assigned to deguaranteed foreign subsidiaries had often been 
“arrange[d] negotiate[d], or execute[d]” (“ANE”) by the U.S. 
bank holding company swap dealer’s personnel (or the 
personnel of the foreign deguaranteed subsidiary) in the 
United States by U.S. bank personnel within the bank) and 
only then “assigning” the fully executed trade to a newly 
deguaranteed foreign subsidiary.459 Specifically, the CFTC 
stated:
In the Commission's view, and as 
further explained below, arranging, 
negotiating, or executing swaps are 
functions that fall within the scope of 
the ‘swap dealer’ definition.  That the 
counterparty risks may reside 
primarily outside the United States 
is not determinative.  To the extent 
that a person uses personnel located 
in the United States (whether its own 
459 Id. at 71,975. 
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personnel or personnel of an agent) to 
arrange, negotiate, or execute its 
swap dealing transactions, the 
Commission believes that such 
person is conducting a substantial 
aspect of its swap dealing activity 
within the United States and 
therefore, falls within the scope of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.460
This ANE practice further shows that U.S. bank 
holding company swaps dealers were treating newly 
deguaranteed foreign affiliates as mere shells; i.e.,
channeling swaps business through the foreign subsidiary 
entity without any real need for the swaps being “executed” 
in the claimed foreign jurisdiction. 
I. The CFTC’s Proposed Rejection of the 
Deguarantee and ANE Loopholes Will Almost 
Certainly Never Be Finalized 
President Trump has made clear that he wants to “roll back” 
Dodd-Frank.461 President Trump has also nominated, and 
the Senate has confirmed, CFTC Commissioner Giancarlo as 
the new chairman of the CFTC.462 Mr. Giancarlo worked at a 
460 Id. at 71,952. 
461 Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back 
Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/trump-congress-financ 
ial-regulations.html?_r=1. 
462 Barney Jopson & Ben McLannahan, Trump Appointee Gary Cohn to 
Stay Clear of Goldman Matters, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), http:// 
www.ft.com/content/f83b253e-f9a4-11e6-9516-2d969e0d3b65; Benjamin 
Bain & Robert Schmidt, Trump May Tap Republican Commissioner to 
Lead Swaps Regulator, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2016, 1:18 PM), 
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brokerage active in derivatives before joining the CFTC in 
2014. As a CFTC commissioner, Chairman Giancarlo had a 
record of being an “outspoken critic”463 of many CFTC Dodd-
Frank rules.464 While as shown above,465 wholesale statutory 
reform of Dodd-Frank swaps statutory provisions to the 
benefit of the biggest U.S. banks is not in the offing, it is also 
expected that “[c]ontroversial pending [swaps] rules [like 
closing the deguarantee loophole] are unlikely to be finalized 
anytime soon.”466   
It therefore seems a certainty that the October 2016 
CFTC proposal to overturn the deguarantee and ANE 
loopholes will not be finalized by the CFTC during a Trump 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-11/trump-may-tap-rep 
ublican-commissioner-to-lead-swaps-regulator. 
463 Jopson & McLannahan, supra note 462. 
464 Ben Protess, Trump Picks a Regulator Who Could Help Reshape Dodd-
Frank Act, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/03/14/business/dealbook/cftc-christopher-giancarlo-futures-regulat 
ion.html. Mr. Giancarlo has since published a white paper which—at the 
least—acknowledges the need to “limit regulatory evasion” and the risks 
to the U.S. financial system attendant with exploitation of the de-
guarantee loophole, he maintains “there are better means” to address 
those risks than the proposed 2016 rules. J. CHRISTOPHER GIANCARLO,
CROSS-BORDER SWAPS REGULATION V. 2.0: A RISK-BASED APPROACH 
[hereinafter GIANCARLO WHITE PAPER] 66 (U.S. Commodities & Futures 
Trading Comm’n Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
2018-10/Whitepaper_CBSR100118_0.pdf. What he recommends instead 
is an “outcomes-based” framework of determining substituted compliance 
in a “comparable jurisdiction,” similar to the recommendations of the 
Department of the Treasury, discussed later in this paper. Infra notes 
536—37 and accompanying text. What the white paper does not explain 
is how its recommendations will address the specific risks created by the 
big four banks’ heavy reliance on the deguarantee and ANE loopholes for 
their swaps trades.    
465 See supra Part VIII.  
466 Annette L. Nazareth & Gabriel D. Rosenberg, Eight US Regulatory 
Predictions for 2017, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/79955066-d81f-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e. 
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Administration. Therefore, the deguarantee and ANE 
loopholes will remain available, inter alia, to the four 
dominant U.S. bank holding company swap dealers, each of 
which has been deemed systemically risky; each of which has 
already been bailed out by U.S. taxpayers during the Great 
Recession; and each of which in combination now controls 
90% of the U.S. swaps market.  Moreover, these U.S. bank 
holding company swaps dealers will be able to arrange, 
negotiate and execute these swaps in the U.S. with U.S. 
personnel before assigning the swaps to the newly de-
guaranteed foreign subsidiary.   
X. THE DEGUARANTEEING OF FOREIGN 
SUBSIDIARIES EVEN WHEN SWAPS ARE 
EXECUTED IN THE U.S. IS A SELF-EVIDENT 
“EVASION” OF DODD-FRANK 
As shown above,467 Dodd-Frank’s extraterritoriality 
provision, by its plain language, applies that statute’s swaps 
regulatory regime to “foreign” swaps transactions that are 
designed to “evade” Dodd-Frank. It is self-evident that the 
four parent U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers have 
no other apparent or rational reason to have swaps assigned 
to a newly deguaranteed foreign subsidiary other than to 
afford opportunities to evade Dodd-Frank. This is seen even 
more clearly by the CFTC’s recognition that these “foreign” 
swaps transactions are often fully arranged, negotiated and 
executed by U.S. bank personnel in the U.S. within the 
parent or affiliate domestic banks before they are “assigned” 
to a newly deguaranteed “foreign subsidiary”; and a recent 
precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
strongly suggests that the “execution” of these swaps in the 
467 See supra Part V. 
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U.S. constitutes a “domestic” (and not an extraterritorial) 
transaction even if the swap is later assigned to a foreign 
entity and thus Dodd-Frank would fully apply.468
To implement the anti-evasion component of the 
extraterritorial provision, the CFTC, on August 13, 2012, 
promulgated Regulation 1.6 within its “Swap Adopting 
Release.”469 Regulation 1.6 defines “evasion” in the cross-
border context as: (1) conducting activities outside of the U.S. 
to “willfully evade or attempt to evade” any portion of the 
Dodd-Frank swaps rules; and (2) the form of those activities 
(agreements, documents, contracts) shall not be dispositive 
to the question of evasion.470
The CFTC provided interpretive guidance471 as a part 
of Regulation 1.6, in which that agency adopted a “principles-
based approach” to determine evasion,472 Among these 
principles, the CFTC embraced this concept:  
[T]he structuring of instruments, 
transactions, or entities to evade the 
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act 
may be “limited only by the ingenuity 
of man.” Therefore, the CFTC will 
look beyond the manner in which an 
instrument, transaction, or entity is 
documented to examine its actual 
substance and purpose to prevent 
any evasion through clever 
draftsmanship — an approach 
468 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (2012); see also Painter, supra note 345, at 2–3; Choi v. 
Tower Research Capital LLC, 890 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2018). 
469 17 C.F.R. § 1.6 (2012). 
470 Id.
471 Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-
Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement 
Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,299 (2012). 
472 Id. at 48,298. 
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consistent with the CFTC’s case law 
in the context of determining 
whether a contract is a futures 
contract and the CFTC’s inter-
pretations in this release regarding 
swaps.473
By focusing the inquiry on the “substance and 
purpose” of the underlying swaps transactions or swaps 
entities, the CFTC expressly avoided being trapped by the 
words within swaps documentation and allowed itself to 
focus on the real underlying motive for the form of execution, 
as well as its economic impact.474 In this regard, the CFTC 
has said: “[W]here a consideration of all relevant facts and 
circumstances reveals the presence of a purpose that is not a 
legitimate business purpose, evasion may exist.”475
In applying this “substance and purpose” test to the 
practice of deguaranteeing foreign subsidiaries, there is an 
unanswerable case that deguaranteeing is willful evasion.476
473 Id. at 48,300. 
474 Id.; see also Aron & McCracken, supra note 444, at 1. 
475 Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 
48,302 (Aug. 13, 2012) (emphasis added). Legitimate business purposes 
are evaluated on a case-by-case basis where the CFTC considers common 
industry practices and accepted business routines. Further related to the 
concept of legitimate business purpose, the CFTC has advised that 
regulatory cost avoidance is not de facto evasion; the CFTC even went so 
far as to say that legitimate business purposes include weighing all 
manner of costs; regulatory being among them. See Aron & McCracken, 
supra note 444, at 1. 
476 Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 
48,301 (Aug. 13, 2012) (stating “to the extent a purpose in structuring an 
entity or instrument or entering into a transaction is to evade 
requirements of Title VII with respect to swaps, the structuring of such 
instrument, entity, or transaction may be found to constitute willful 
evasion”). 
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As the data cited above demonstrates,477 many of the 
transactions moved abroad by U.S. bank holding company 
swaps dealers had previously been executed within the 
United States, thereby self-evidently showing that the real 
purpose of these transactions is to afford the chance to evade 
Dodd-Frank.  Indeed, neither ISDA nor the deguaranteeing 
swaps dealers themselves have offered any explanation for 
the transfer abroad of what were, and what could be, U.S. 
swaps trades except for “[candidly and openly] reason[ing] 
that if they stripped out the word ‘guarantee’ and equivalent 
terms [from the ISDA swaps contract language], they could 
avoid the CFTC [swaps] rules.”478
They acknowledge that the “deguaranteeing” strategy 
is premised upon the unsupported general allegation that 
“[i]nternational clients . . .  threatened to take their business 
to non-U.S. banks in order to avoid the new American 
rules . . . .”479 However, “evading” Dodd-Frank as a 
competitive business strategy cannot justify evading the very 
provisions of that statute that are central to preventing a 
repeat of worldwide economic chaos and a U.S. taxpayer 
multi-trillion-dollar intervention on those banks behalf. 
Indeed, the “legitimate business purpose” test itself is 
nowhere mentioned in Dodd-Frank, much less authorized as 
a cure for otherwise banned behavior. Moreover, the CFTC 
interpretations of “evasion” expressly recognize that masking 
evasion as a legitimate business concern is flatly in conflict 
with one of the fundamental purposes of Dodd-Frank.480
Moreover, the CFTC “evasion” guidance itself 
identifies economically irrational behavior as presumptively 
477 See Blater, supra note 364, and Levinson, supra note 414 and 
accompanying text. 
478 Levinson, supra note 360. 
479 Id. (clarification provided). 
480 See generally Aron & McCracken, supra note 444. 
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an “[il]legitimate business purpose.”481 The irrationality of 
the ISDA-driven deguaranteeing box-checking process482 is 
reinforced by the fact that neither the “foreign” subsidiary 
nor the subsidiary’s counterparty, both of which lose the 
benefit of the guarantee, are compensated for accepting the 
economic risk assumed by deguaranteeing. The only “benefit” 
derived from the deguarantee transaction is that given to the 
U.S. parent, which escapes application of Dodd-Frank.   
In sum, because “deguaranteeing” is clear-cut evasive 
behavior, these swaps transactions, even if executed abroad 
are, for this reason as well, subject to Dodd-Frank by the 
clear “evasion” terms of the extraterritorial provision in that 
statute.
XI. DODD-FRANK SWAPS RULES CAN STILL BE 
AVOIDED BY EVEN CFTC-REGISTERED 
GUARANTEED FOREIGN AFFILIATES USING 
THE CFTC CREATED DOCTRINE OF 
“SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE”  
Even where a non-U.S. person is required by Dodd-Frank’s 
extraterritorial provision to comply with Dodd-Frank, the 
CFTC’s July 2013 guidance creates out of whole cloth a 
further exemption from the application of Dodd-Frank: the 
so-called “substituted compliance” doctrine. “Substituted 
compliance” are words found neither in Dodd-Frank nor in 
its legislative history.483  The doctrine is wholly based on the 
CFTC’s adoption of an unrelated and otherwise legally 
481 Id.
482 See supra note 424 and accompanying text. 
483 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,340-42 (July 26, 
2013). 
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irrelevant “international comity” test, which, as used by the 
CFTC in this context, has no basis in U.S. law. 
“Substituted compliance,” as created by the CFTC, is 
designed to avoid purported conflicts between Dodd-Frank 
and a conflicting swaps regulatory scheme of the foreign 
country in which the swaps transaction was executed.484 In 
other words, if a foreign swaps transaction is otherwise 
required by Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial provision to be 
subject to Dodd-Frank, the CFTC has created a “legal fiction” 
to make that agency free to ignore Dodd-Frank and accept, 
under “substituted compliance,” a foreign government’s—
rather than U.S.—swaps regulations.   
Under the “substituted compliance” doctrine, the 
CFTC, upon application by any one of a broad group of 
stakeholders, determines whether foreign swaps rules at 
issue are, “comparable to and as comprehensive as the 
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act,” even if the rules are 
not “identical” to U.S. law.485 Entities entitled to request such 
a comparability determination from the CFTC include: 
foreign regulators; a non-U.S. entity or group of non-U.S. 
entities; a U.S. bank that is, inter alia,  an SD with respect 
484 Id.
485 Id. at 45,342–43. See also id. (“After receiving a submission from an 
applicant, the resulting comparability determination would be made by 
the Commission with regard to each of the 13 categories of regulatory 
obligations, as appropriate.”). The categories are: (i) capital adequacy; (ii) 
chief compliance officer; (iii) risk management; (iv) swap data 
recordkeeping; (v) swap data repository reporting and large trader 
reporting; (vi) clearing and swap processing; (vii) margining and 
segregation for uncleared swaps; (viii) trade execution; (ix) swap trading 
relationship documentation; (x) portfolio reconciliation and compression; 
(xi) real-time public reporting; (xii) trade confirmation; and (xiii) daily 
trading records.  
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to its own foreign entities, a trade association, or other group 
on behalf of similarly-situated entities.486   
Determinations when compliance with a foreign rule 
may be “substituted” for Dodd-Frank are made on a 
requirement-by-requirement basis, across the thirteen 
categories of Dodd-Frank‘s swaps regulatory rules.487  In 
other words, the CFTC may, for example, allow substituted 
compliance for one of the thirteen Dodd-Frank swaps 
regulatory requirements, but apply Dodd-Frank for all other 
requirements.488 Finally, and of great import here, once a 
comparability decision has been made by the CFTC to rely on 
a foreign country’s swaps rule (rather than a Dodd-Frank 
rule), that decision is binding precedent in that it will 
automatically apply to all subsequent swaps transactions, of 
any swaps trade or by any swaps traders within the foreign 
jurisdiction.489
486 Id. at 45,344. 
487 See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text (listing the thirteen 
regulatory topics). 
488 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,343 (Jul. 26, 
2013). In cases where the CFTC permits substituted compliance, the 
Commission retains its examination and enforcement authorities. Id. at 
45,342. It is important to note however, that if a substituted compliance 
regimen is in play, the CFTC’s examination and enforcement authorities 
are largely a mirage. The normal hooks that the CFTC would use to assert 
its authority may not be present, e.g., the SD may not even be registered. 
489 Id. at 45,344 (“Once a comparability determination is made for a 
jurisdiction, it will apply for all entities or transactions in that 
jurisdiction to the extent provided in the determination, as approved by 
the Commission.”). 
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A. “International Comity” is the CFTC’s Only 
Rationale for “Substituted Compliance” 
Again, the doctrine of “substituted compliance” is found 
nowhere in Dodd-Frank or its legislative history. The CFTC’s 
entire legal underpinning for its invented “substituted 
compliance” rule is the doctrine of “international comity,”490
a term also not found within Dodd-Frank. The reason given 
by the CFTC for following the international comity doctrine 
is because, inter alia, the European Union (“EU”), the United 
Kingdom (“U.K.”), and Japan vigorously protested when the 
CFTC contended that “too-big-to-fail” U.S. swaps dealers 
were, under the plain language of the Dodd-Frank 
extraterritorial swaps provision, subject to that U.S. statute 
even where swaps trades were conducted abroad.491
Foreign countries, actively supported by ISDA and 
U.S. swaps dealers, were offended that their own laws would 
not apply to swaps executed in their countries, even if by U.S. 
490 See generally William S. Dodge, International Comity in American 
Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2072 (2015). 
491 See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,292 (Jul. 
26, 2013); see also id. at 45,300 (Jul. 26, 2013) (setting forth the CFTC’s 
guidance regarding Title VII’s extraterritorial application); Id. at 45,371–
72 (Jul. 26, 2013) (describing the cross-border rules as “overbroad” and 
without adequate grounding in the “direct and significant” standard as 
articulated by CFTC Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia in his dissenting 
statement). 
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persons.492 Allegations of sharp elbows493 by U.S. regulators 
were almost certainly against the then-CFTC Chairman 
Gensler, who steadfastly maintained that the extraterritorial 
provision within Dodd-Frank applying Dodd-Frank to swaps 
executed abroad by, e.g., the four big U.S. bank holding 
company swaps dealers, prevents U.S. taxpayers from having 
to once again make multi-trillion dollar bailouts of those U.S. 
systemically risky institutions, and this otherwise saves the 
U.S. and worldwide economy from another calamitous 
meltdown.494
492 See Eileen Bannon, The Extraterritorial Reach of Derivative 
Regulation under Dodd-Frank, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Apr. 8, 2013) 
Westlaw 20130506A NYCBAR 1. 
In 2009, the members of the G-20 agreed that: (i) the OTC 
derivatives contracts should be reported to trade 
repositories; (ii) standardized OTC derivatives contracts 
should be cleared through central counterparties by the 
end of 2012; and (iii) non-centrally cleared contracts 
should be subject to higher capital requirements.  In light 
of such reform initiatives, there has been substantial 
concern that regulation be coordinated on an 
international basis . . . .  Regulatory requirements for 
derivatives have advanced to different levels in various 
jurisdictions, and the Commodities Future Trading 
Commission (CFTC) is the first regulator to have 
attempted to define its jurisdictional reach. . . . The 
CFTC states that it will use an outcomes-based approach 
to determine whether the foreign requirements are 
designed to meet the same regulatory objectives, and 
anticipates a robust and ongoing coordination and 
cooperation between the CFTC and its foreign 
counterparts. 
493 Id.
494 Gary Gensler, Keynote Address on OTC Derivatives Reform, MARKIT’S
OUTLOOK FOR OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS CONFERENCE (Mar. 9, 2010), 
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-32 (stating that 
“[t]hough credit default swaps have existed for only a relatively short 
period of time, the debate they evoke has parallels to debates as far back 
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Once Mr. Gensler left the Commission at the end of 
2013, however, little deference was thereafter given to the 
U.S. taxpayer’s plight as the lender of last resort to those very 
large, systemically risky U.S. bank holding company swaps 
dealers. Rather, an emphasis was placed completely on 
calming international distress over the CFTC’s assertion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction on its own CFTC registered U.S. 
systemically risky institutions, as contemplated by Dodd-
Frank.495 The therapy adopted to lay this international 
“distress” to rest was the invention by the CFTC out of whole 
cloth of the ‘substituted compliance” doctrine and its easy 
application to foreign swaps trades that otherwise would 
lawfully be governed by Dodd-Frank.
The CFTC’s entire support for its novel “substituted 
compliance” doctrine was the use of the legal common law 
rule of “international comity.” Reliance on “international 
comity” in this context is completely misplaced. The United 
States Supreme Court has made clear that the use of 
“international comity” is merely the use of a rule of statutory 
construction that “reflects principles of customary 
international law—law that (we must assume) Congress 
as 18th Century England over insurance and the role of speculators. 
English insurance underwriters in the 1700s often sold insurance on 
ships to individuals who did not own the vessels or their cargo. The 
practice was said to create an incentive to buy protection and then seek 
to destroy the insured property. It should come as no surprise that 
seaworthy ships began sinking. In 1746, the English Parliament enacted 
the Statute of George II, which recognized that ‘a mischievous kind of 
gaming or wagering’ had caused ‘great numbers of ships, with their 
cargoes, [to] have . . . been fraudulently lost and destroyed.’ The statute 
established that protection for shipping risks not supported by an interest 
in the underlying vessel would be ‘null and void to all intents and 
purposes.’”). 
495 Bannon, supra note 492.  
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ordinarily seeks to follow.”496 In this context, it is “the respect 
sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of 
their laws . . . exercised when they come to interpreting the 
scope of laws their legislatures have enacted.”497
Therefore, under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, 
“international comity” is merely an interpretive tool used by 
U.S. judges to discern whether ambiguous legislative 
language about which country’s law will be applied among 
countries competing to have their law applied.498 For 
example, when it is unclear whether a U.S. statute applies 
extraterritorially, U.S. courts apply the doctrine of 
international comity to interpret the statute in question to 
limit its scope only to application within the U.S. unless there 
is a clear contrary intention through the language of the 
statute itself or the statute’s legislative history. As shown in 
detail above,499 the Dodd-Frank extraterritorial provision 
was written in the wake of a then-recent Supreme Court 
decision holding that if a statute is to have extraterritorial 
effect, Congress must say so clearly. And, within three days 
of that Supreme Court precedent, the extraterritorial 
provision of Dodd-Frank was inserted, which, by its plain 
language and contemporaneous legislative history, makes 
expressly clear that Congress wanted Dodd-Frank to be 
applied extraterritorially when swaps trading abroad could 
seriously hurt the U.S. economy or where the foreign trade is 
conducted as a ruse to evade application of Dodd-Frank.500   
496 F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 
(2004). 
497 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
498 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (explaining that the courts 
“are not to read general words . . . without regard to the limitations 
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers . . .”). 
499 See supra notes 17, 341–45 and accompanying text. 
500 Id.
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There is no legal precedent extant that defines 
“international comity” as giving authority to a U.S. 
administrative agency to weaken unilaterally the otherwise 
clear Congressional statutory language or intent that the 
statute must be applied extraterritorially.   
However, the CFTC decided in the July 13 guidance 
that “international comity,” as it improperly conceived of that 
doctrine, would completely trump the statute’s express 
extraterritorial mandate with respect to how the statute 
would apply abroad.501
B. The CFTC’s “Substituted Compliance” 
Rulings are Self-Evidently Flawed 
The CFTC’s wholly novel doctrine of substituted 
compliance—completely unmoored from the language or 
intent of Dodd-Frank—has been fraught with difficulties 
since its inception.  On November 15, 2008, the G20 heads of 
state met in Washington, D.C. to address the then-current 
worldwide economic turmoil.502 The G20 “is an informal 
forum for advancing international economic cooperation 
501 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,297 (Jul. 26, 2013). 
For a full discussion of this issue, including the inapplicability of the cases 
the CFTC improperly relied on to conceive of “international comity” see
generally Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 
UMKC L. REV. 965 (2012); Greenberger & Bruyere Letters supra note 
433.
502 Colin Bradford, Johannes Linn & Paul Martin, Global Governance 
Breakthrough: The G20 Summit and the Future Agenda, BROOKINGS 
(Dec. 17, 2008), https://www.brookings.edu/research/global-governance-
breakthrough-the-g20-summit-and-the-future-agenda/. 
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among 20 major advanced and emerging-market countries . . 
. .”503
“[A]t the November 2008 Washington DC [G20] 
summit, the leaders [of G20 countries] supported actions by 
[their] regulators to speed up efforts to reduce the systemic 
risks associated with credit default swaps and [other] over-
the-counter [swaps] transactions.”504 At the follow-up 
Pittsburgh G20 Summit in September 2009, G20 leaders 
further agreed that all standardized swaps should be traded 
on exchanges, or electronic trading platforms; and that they 
should be cleared. The leaders also agreed that all swaps 
should be reported to regulators through trade 
repositories.505 Reforms were to be completed by each of the 
member countries by the end of 2012.506
At that 2009 G20 summit, a commitment was also 
made to bring regulators from Australia, Brazil, the 
European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, Ontario, Quebec, 
Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States together in 
November of 2012 to finalize the cross-border regulation of 
the swaps market.507
After that November 2012 G20 meeting, however, 
regulators from these countries concluded that, “complete 
harmonization—perfect alignment of rules across 
jurisdictions—[would be impossible] as it would need to 
503 JAMES JACKSON & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42961, 
COMPARING G-20 REFORM OF THE OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS 2 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42961.pdf (including a 
list of the twenty participating nations). 
504 Id. at 8. 
505 Id. at 9. 
506 Id.
507 Press Release, U.S. CFTC, Joint Press Statement of Leaders on 
Operating Principles and Areas of Exploration in the Regulation of the 
Cross-border OTC Derivatives Market (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/ 
PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6439-12. 
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overcome jurisdictions’ differences in law, policy, markets 
and implementation timing, as well as to take into account 
the unique nature of jurisdictions’ legislative and regulatory 
processes,” and that, “regulatory gaps may present risks to 
financial markets and provide the potential for regulatory 
arbitrage.”508 In and of itself, this conclusion of a lack of 
compatibility makes clear that there can be little 
“comparability” among the swaps regimes of the different 
member countries that would justify “substituted 
compliance.”  
Moreover, by the end of 2012, only the United States, 
through the July 21, 2010 passage of Dodd-Frank, and Japan 
had enacted legislation meeting the G20 swaps reform 
recommendations.509 Most other G20 countries, including the 
EU, were “markedly behind.”510
Also, after the November G20 2012 meeting, the CFTC 
Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight 
(“DSIO”) issued an advisory that certain important Dodd-
Frank swaps rules would apply to non-U.S. CFTC-registered 
persons, i.e., foreign institutions registered with the CFTC as 
SDs, if there were no corresponding foreign swaps rules 
within their home country.511
At that time, roughly four years after the meltdown, 
none of the G20 nations, except the United States through 
Dodd-Frank and Japan, had adopted their own complete 
swaps regulatory regime despite the prior 2008-2009 
commitments made by the G20 in the immediate wake of the 
crisis. There was vociferous outrage about the CFTC’s initial 
DSIO advisory among those G20 nations without completed 
508 Id.
509 See Jackson & Miller, supra note 503, at Summary and 10. 
510 Id. at 11. 
511 Press Release, U.S. CFTC, Applicability of Transaction-Level 
Requirements to Activity in the United States (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6771-13. 
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swaps regimes. That outrage was repeatedly expressed 
through, inter alia, direct contacts with top U.S. financial 
regulators. The complaints stated that the CFTC’s proposal 
that applied Dodd-Frank to foreign swaps dealers in 
countries without complete swaps regulation, and who were 
registered with the CFTC to conduct swaps trading, was 
diplomatically inappropriate. 
Faced with this international outrage (wholeheartedly 
supported by, for example, U.S. bank holding company swaps 
dealers and their representatives) other U.S. financial 
regulators applied strong pressure on the CFTC to provide 
relief to the complaining G20 countries.   
In response, the CFTC’s DSIO staff, inter alia, through 
informal “no-action” orders, suspended these important 
Dodd-Frank swaps rules as applied to foreign CFTC 
registrants even in countries with virtually no swaps 
regulation. That exemption originally was to expire January 
14, 2014, or days after Chairman Gensler (the strongest 
Obama administration supporter of the extraterritorial 
application of Dodd-Frank to large systemically risky U.S. 
swaps dealers) left the CFTC.512 When he left at the end of 
512 CFTC Staff Letter no. 13-71, No-Action Relief: Certain Transaction-
Level Requirements for Non-U.S. Swap Dealers (Nov. 26, 2013), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/13-71.pdf; Nihal S. Patel, United States: CFTC Extends 
No-Action Relief For Non-U.S. Swap Dealers, MONDAQ (Aug. 11, 2017), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/618862/Commodities+Derivative
s+Stock+Exchanges/CFTC+Extends+NoAction+Relief+For+NonUS+Sw
ap+Dealers (“The relief provided by the Divisions applies to swap dealers 
(‘SDs’) who are non-U.S. persons and enter into transactions with other 
non-U.S. persons (other than ‘guaranteed affiliates’ or ‘conduit affiliates’) 
using personnel or agents in the United States to ‘arrange, negotiate, or 
execute’ the transactions (referred to in the letter as ‘Covered 
Transactions’). In accordance with previous letters (CFTC Staff Letter 
Nos. 13-71, 14-01, 14-74, 14-140 and 15-48), the Divisions stated that they 
will not recommend enforcement action against non-U.S. SDs (whether 
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December 2013, Gensler was also unaware of the 
“deguarantee loophole,” which did not appear on the CFTC’s 
radar until May 2014; or of the assigning of swaps contracts 
to newly deguaranteed subsidiaries that were otherwise 
wholly arranged, negotiated, and executed in the U.S. by U.S. 
bank personnel—a practice that apparently did not come to 
light until 2016.513
However, because the G20 countries continued to 
move slowly in creating their own swaps regulatory regimes, 
and because of the ferocity of the G20 and U.S. bank swaps 
deals’ lobbying against the CFTC’s adherence to Dodd-Frank, 
the original preemption date of January 14, 2014, was 
extended on a “time limited” basis, by the CFTC staff five 
times: to September 15, 2014;514 December 31, 2014;515
or not the SDs are affiliated with U.S. persons) for failure to comply with 
the following requirements in connection with Covered Transactions: 
transaction-level requirements for Covered Transactions other than 
those made with other non-U.S. SDs; and transaction-level requirements 
(other than those in Regulations 23.503 (‘Portfolio compression’) and 
23.504 (‘Swap trading relationship documentation’)) for Covered 
Transactions with other non-U.S. SDs.”). 
513 See supra notes 451–58 and accompanying text. Nor did Gensler know 
before he left the CFTC in December 2013 that the original January 2014 
deadline for foreign swaps traders registered by the CFTC as, inter alia,
swaps dealers to comply with Dodd-Frank’s swaps rules would be 
extended by CFTC staff six times with the final January 25, 2017 
extension having no deadline for compliance in rules would be extended 
by CFTC staff six times with the final January 25, 2017 extension having 
no deadline for compliance in any way. See infra notes 514–19. 
514 CFTC Staff Letter no. 14-01, Extension of No-Action Relief: 
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (Jan. 3, 2014), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/14-01.pdf. 
515 CFTC Staff Letter no. 14-74, Extension of No-Action Relief: 
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (June 4, 2014), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/14-74.pdf. 
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September 30, 2015;516 September 30, 2016;517 and 
September 30, 2017.518 On July 25, 2017,519 CFTC staff for a
sixth time exempted foreign swaps dealers registered to trade 
swaps by the CFTC from certain important CFTC swaps 
rules. Unlike the five previous “time limited” exemptions, 
however, the July 25, 2017 exemption did not specify an end 
date, stating only and confusingly that: “the Divisions believe 
that an extension . . . is warranted until the effective date of 
any Commission action addressing whether a particular 
Transaction-Level Requirement is or is not applicable to a 
Covered Transaction.”520
Under the CFTC staff no action regime, foreign swaps 
dealers registered with the CFTC to do swaps business under 
Dodd-Frank, inter alia, need not comply with key Dodd-
Frank swaps regulations when trading with “non-U.S. 
persons” (which would include newly deguaranteed foreign 
subsidiaries of the four large U.S. bank holding companies). 
This is so, even if the foreign swaps dealers’ home country 
has no or inadequate applicable swaps regulation to take the 
place of the ignored and otherwise applicable CFTC swaps 
516 CFTC Staff Letter no. 14-140, Extension of No-Action Relief: 
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (Nov. 14, 2014), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/14-140.pdf. 
517 CFTC Staff Letter no. 15-48, Extension of No-Action Relief: 
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/15-48.pdf. 
518 CFTC Staff Letter no. 16-64, Extension of No-Action Relief: 
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/16-64.pdf. 
519 CFTC Staff Letter no. 17-36, Extension of No-Action Relief: 
Transaction-Level Requirements for Non-Swap Dealers (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral
/documents/letter/17-36.pdf. 
520 Id.
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rules. This then is yet another unending CFTC staff-directed 
exemption from key Dodd-Frank swaps regulation 
requirements.
C. “Substituted Compliance” Threatens Global 
Financial Stability and U.S. Taxpayers  

1. Japan 
On January 6, 2016, the CFTC made favorable “substituted 
compliance” comparability determinations for Japan’s 
margin requirements for uncleared swaps. However, CFTC 
Commissioner Bowen issued a withering and highly 
analytical dissent to this CFTC substituted compliance 
approval by the remaining two CFTC commissioners. 
Commissioner Bowen showed the extreme divergence of 
Japanese swaps rules from those of the CFTC regarding the 
Japanese: (1) lax requirements to keep customer margin safe 
from default;521 (2) allowance of trading with counterparties 
in bankruptcy-risky venues;522 and (3) the volatility and 
521 Sharen Y. Bowen, Comm’r, CFTC, Dissenting Statement Regarding 
Comparability Determination for Japan: Margin Requirements for 
Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants (Sept. 
8, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/bowenstate 
ment090816b. The Commissioner stated, “[o]ur rules require customer 
collateral to be held by a third party—not by either one of the 
counterparties. This is a safeguard for bankruptcy. If the money is held 
by one of the counterparties, then a bankruptcy court may use that money 
to meet the counterparty’s debts.” Id.
522 See id. (“There are certain developing countries where there is little 
certainty that collateral will be there if there is a bankruptcy (non-netting 
jurisdictions), and/or where they do not adequately protect customer 
funds from that of the dealer (‘non-segregation jurisdictions’). Under our 
rules, our US dealers have to limit the way they trade with counterparties 
in these bankruptcy-vulnerable jurisdictions because we are not 
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instability of the collateral allowed by the Japanese – but not 
the U.S.—to be eligible as margin.523   
Commissioner Bowen noted that these significant 
areas of divergence between Japanese and the United States’ 
margin rules would likely substantially compound 
difficulties for swaps customers in bankruptcy proceedings of 
failed Japanese swaps dealers where the collateral, unlike 
that required by the United States, was so unreliable that it 
would likely disappear by the time of bankruptcy. Bowen 
illustrated this concern by showing that  
Though these [Japanese-regulated] 
companies are physically located in 
Japan; their cash line runs right back 
to the United States.  That risk could 
be borne again [upon Japanese 
defaults or threatened defaults] by 
American households. A comp-
arability determination should not be 
the back-door way of undoing or 
weakening our regulations and 
thereby incentivizing our companies 
to send their risky business to their 
affiliates located in Japan.524
confident that our American investors will get their money back in a 
bankruptcy scenario.”). 
523 See id. (“There are significant differences in the treatment of collateral 
between our margin rule and the Japanese rule. First, while our rules 
limit daily variation margin to cash for dealer-to-dealer swaps, under 
Japanese law, variation margin could be in a number of much less liquid 
instruments. And second, while we require a 25% haircut for certain 
equities not included in the S&P 500, under Japanese law, equities 
included in major equity indices of certain designated countries just have 
a 15% blanket haircut.”). 
524 Id. (emphasis added). 
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2. The European Union 

a. EU financial regulation generally 
The EU has similarly been granted favorable CFTC 
“substituted compliance” determinations in replacing the 
CFTC’s rule requiring margin for uncleared swaps with a 
much weaker EU margin rule.525 However, there have been 
strong intimations that the EU extracted these favorable 
rulings from the CFTC by threatening a swaps “trade war” 
with the U.S. by threatening application of extremely harsh 
EU rules to U.S. persons seeking to trade swaps within EU 
countries. For example, EU “proposals would [have] force[d] 
US investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan 
to have additional capital and liquidity in the EU so their 
subsidiaries [in the EU supposedly] can better withstand a 
crisis and be separately wound up if needed by European 
authorities.”526
In this regard, the Bank of England concluded that:
[u]nder EU proposals, non-EU banks 
with significant activities in Europe 
would be forced to group their 
operation under “intermediate 
holding companies” . . . The[se] plans 
have largely been viewed as 
retaliation against the US, . . . [These 
EU] commission proposals “may not 
be aligned with US rules on the 
separation” of banks and broker 
525 See Comparability Determination for European Union: Certain Entity-
Level Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg. 78,923, 78,927–36 (Dec. 27, 2013). 
526 Alex Barker, Jim Brunsden, & Martin Arnold, EU to Retaliate Against 
US Bank Capital Rules, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/26078750-b003-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1. 
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dealers, . . . and are not in line with 
international standards.  [The 
British have] told [EU] counterparts 
that . . . [it] believes the [EU] 
measures are protectionist and anti-
competitive.527
Elsewhere, certain EU swaps rules, applied only to 
non-EU banks doing business in the EU, have been described 
as an “attempt to build ‘walls’ around the EU. [T]his would 
be an extreme version of extraterritorial effect of legislation, 
one that would not go down well in other capitals . . . . We 
have no trouble imagining that if the authorities in 
Washington were writing in such terms, Brussels would be 
up in arms.”528
The CFTC’s favorable EU “substituted compliance” 
comparability determination was therefore widely 
recognized as an “olive branch to Europe,” to end an EU 
inspired swaps trade war.529 In this regard, the CFTC’s 
favorable EU substituted compliance determination was a 
matter of rote, rather than guided by reality, in that that the 
U.S. agency merely compared swaps regulatory language of 
the EU to the U.S. rather than compare the regulatory effect
of the EU language. Just as one could not logically compare 
free speech rights within the old Soviet Union to those of the 
United Sates by merely reading those two countries’ 
527 Caroline Binham & Jim Brunsden, Bank of England Attacks Brussels 
Bank Capital Reforms, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/600df898-e4ac-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a. 
528 Phillip Stafford, Clearing Houses Saddled with ‘Too Big to Fail’ Tag,
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/3460ff68-edf0-
11e6-930f-061b01e23655.  
529 Frances Faulds, CFTC Offers Olive Branch to Europe, THE BANKER
(Mar. 11, 2014, 9:03 AM), https://www.thebanker.com/World/CFTC-
offers-olive-branch-to-Europe/(language)/eng-GB. 
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constitutional free speech language, by ignoring the complex 
and lax application of the EU’s swaps regime, the CFTC 
managed to mask a true comparability of the EU’s swaps 
regulation to that of the United States.   
For example, upon examination of the effect of EU 
financial directives in the “real world,” it is clear that there 
can be no viable comparability of the EU regulatory approach 
with that of Dodd-Frank. It has been widely recognized that 
“[t]here is no common regulatory philosophy between [EU] 
Member States, let alone a common legal system.”530 This 
starting premise of the EU swaps regulation certainly does 
not bode well for a “comparability” finding with the U.S. 
when there is so little comparability among EU members. 
Indeed, the “[n]ew European Union rules [, supposedly] 
designed to bring stability and clarity to opaque derivatives 
markets [,] are sowing confusion . . . raising more questions 
than answers.”531 The EU has “a rule book without totally 
defined rules . . . . Is it going to protect anybody? No. Will it 
stop rogue traders?  No. So what is it for?”532
The U.S. Department of the Treasury, in a report to 
President Trump, has at least tacitly acknowledged the 
problem of examining the language and not the effects 
regarding substituted compliance, by recommending that the 
CFTC and SEC “adopt substituted compliance regimes . . . in 
an outcomes-based approach, in their entirety, rather than 
530 Georges Ugeux, Can Europe Produce a Coherent and Effective 
Financial Regulation?, COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE at 4 (2012), 
https://galileoglobalgroup.com/gga/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/11-
gga_media_ColumbiaJournalofEuropeanLawOnline-102012.pdf.  
531 Alexander Winning, EU Derivatives Rules Sow Confusion in Metals 
Markets, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2014, 4:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/lme-derivatives-idUSL6N0LT1IL20140226. 
532 Id.
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relying on rule-by-rule analysis.”533 It also acknowledged the 
general issues in extra-territorial application of swaps 
regulation and the uncertainty caused by the CFTC’s 
constant extension of its no-action relief letter.534 However, 
the report does not explicitly recognize the deguarantee 
loophole or the risk that loophole may pose, and seems to 
favor less extraterritorial application overall.535 One of the 
claimed principal concerns of the Treasury Department’s 
recommendations is that market participants have argued 
that “the cross-border application of U.S. rules has 
contributed to . . . foreign entities avoid[ing] trading with 
U.S. counterparties for fear of being captured by the U.S. 
regulatory regime.”536 What the report’s concerns and 
proffered solutions seem to ignore, however, is the volume of 
trades that occur among “foreign” entities that have been set 
up expressly for the purpose of evading Dodd-Frank and not 
for the sake of vying for business from legitimate foreign 
counterparties. The report does not explain how its solutions 
would deal with such entities, reduce the systemic risk they 
might create, or how they would result in the “outcome’ of 
principal importance: avoiding another major financial crisis. 
As will be discussed immediately below, even if the CFTC 
adopted an “outcomes-based” cross-border application 
regime, it is unlikely that many EU member-states could 
truly meet its requirements.
The EU rules are often described as a “quagmire of 
uncertainties.”537 For example, because “Europe does not 
533 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 15, at 135 (emphasis added.). See 
also GIANCARLO WHITE PAPER, supra note 464 (also supporting an 
“outcomes-based” substituted compliance regime).  
534 See generally DEPT’ OF THE TREASURY, supra note 15.
535 Id.
536 Id. at 134.  
537 Winning, supra note 531; see also James Politi, Italian Central Bank 
Chief Blames Recession and EU rules for Bank Collapses, FIN. TIMES
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require [the] use [of] a regulated exchange to ensure 
transparency and the clearing of derivative transactions . . . 
[i]t is an area where the risk of regulatory arbitrage is real 
and could lead to market distortions.”538 Furthermore, 
several financial observers have sounded the alarm that, 
because of banking weakness throughout the EU and the 
increasing success of populist political parties within the EU 
member countries that want to abandon the union entirely, 
the  EU as a whole is nearing “economic crisis,”539 with many 
reasoning that it is because the EU "was always the most 
fragile and fragmented economic entity.”540
b. Greece and Cyprus
Because of the laxity in EU financial regulatory rules, EU 
country banking systems have shown substantial weakness 
under the EU financial regulatory paradigm. One example, 
as it has been shown extensively above, is the weakness of 
the Greek economy and banking system.541 Another EU 
country, Cyprus was so adversely affected by the Greek 
dysfunctions, it also required a bailout for its failing banks 
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/601d5637-f181-38ed-b8ff-
5efcb8d087c0. 
538 Ugeux, supra note 530, at 20-21. 
539 Zoltan Ban, The EU Serves as Early Warning as It Nears Economic 
Crisis, SEEKING ALPHA, Feb. 26, 2019. https://seekingalpha.com/article/ 
4244104-eu-serves-early-warning-nears-economic-crisis. See also Here 
Comes the Next Euro Crisis, POLITICO, Nov. 21, 2018, https:// 
www.politico.eu/article/here-comes-the-next-euro-crisis; Matt C. Klein, 
Get Ready for Europe’s Next Crisis, BARRON’S, Dec. 23, 2018, 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/europe-economic-crisis-is-coming-
51545951011 (stating that “[t]he latest official data show the euro area 
growing at the slowest annual rate in more than four years” and 
“Europe’s incomplete monetary union makes it especially fragile”).  
540 Ban, supra note 539.
541 See supra Part III.C.1. 
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from the EU in 2012.542 Despite being a “tiny island nation,” 
the Cyprus banking problems put “the entire Eurozone on 
red alert” because of the large number of wealthy Russians 
that had used the nation’s banks as a tax haven.543 As such, 
the amount of assets held by Cyprus’ banks was considerably 
larger than its GDP, and the fallout had global 
implications.544
c. Italy
By the end of fall 2018, Italian banks were reported to have 
211 billion euros in non-performing loans, which the World 
Bank estimates is about 14.4% of all Italian bank loans.545 As 
a widespread practice, Italian banks regularly “loaned money 
to hundreds of small companies that had no business taking 
on debt.”546 Consequently, it is considered by experts to be 
542 Cyprus Asks EU for Financial Bailout, AL JAZEERA (June 25, 2012), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/06/201262517189248721.h
tml. 
543 Ned Resnikoff, Cyprus Disaster Shines Light on Global Tax Haven 
Industry, MSNBC (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/the-ed-show/ 
cyprus-disaster-shines-light-global-tax-ha.  
544 Id.
545 Going South: Bad Loans Remain a Concern in Italy and Across 
Southern Europe, THE ECONOMIST, (May 26, 2018), https://www. 
economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/05/26/bad-loans-remain-a-
concern-in-italy-and-across-southern-europe (noting that the amount of 
non-performing loans held by Italian banks were the largest in the EU by 
the end of 2017); Bank Nonperforming Loans to Total Gross Loans—Italy,
THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER. 
ZS?locations=IT (last visited Apr. 23, 2019).  A non-performing loan is 
defined as “a loan on which the borrower is not making interest payments 
or repaying any principal.” Definition of Non-Performing Loan NPL, FIN.
TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=non_performing-loan--NPL (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
546 Jim Edwards, Italy’s Banks Might Need a €52 Billion Bailout, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 29, 2016, 8:54 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/stat 
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likely that the overwhelming majority of these Italian bank 
loans will remain unpaid.  
In the past four years, eleven Italian banks have been 
bailed out and wound down by the government or “rescued 
via takeover or the arrival of a big investor,” including Banca 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the oldest surviving and operating 
bank in the world.547
The dissatisfaction of Italians with that country’s 
deteriorating financial infrastructure were laid bare in the 
March 4, 2018 Italian election, resulting in substantial gains 
for the anti-establishment party, the Five Star Movement 
istics-non-performing-loans-npls-italy-banking-system-2016-11; see also 
Rachel Sanderson, Once-Thriving Veneto Becomes Heart of Italy’s Bank 
Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/04869eca-
b15e-11e6-9c37-5787335499a0 (“The banks’ close relationships with 
customers led to cozy banking practices, such as the award of azioni 
baciate, or kissing shares, which backfired as business failures mounted 
and the money ran out.”). 
547 Foo Yun Chee, Stephen Jewkes & Antonella Cinelli, EU Clears Italy’s 
$6 Billion State Bailout for Monte dei Paschi, REUTERS (July 4, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-montepaschi-stateaid/eu-clears-
italys-6-billion-state-bailout-for-monte-dei-paschi-idUSKBN19P1PQ 
(describing Italy’s bailout of MPS); Rachel Sanderson, Alex Barker & 
Claire Jones, Italy Sets Aside €17bn to Wind Down Failing Lenders, FIN.
TIMES (June 25, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/83ad52a8-59a5-11e7-
9bc8-8055f264aa8b (describing the bailout of Banca Popolare di Vicenza 
and Veneto Banca); Robert Smith, Banca Carige Shows that Italy 
Remains Master of the Bank Bailout, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/c0cb7604-1332-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e 
(discussing the Italian government’s decision to bailout Banca Carige 
despite promises not to support ailing lenders by the newly empowered 
Five Star Movement party and while working around “supposedly tough” 
new EU rules regarding bailouts).   
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(“M5S”).548 But little improvement has been seen.549
Currently, almost a third of young Italians are jobless and  
about twenty percent of the total population is deemed “at 
risk of poverty.”550
548 Larry Elliot, A Perfect Economic Storm Made Italy Ripe for a Protest 
Vote, GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2018, 1:15 PM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2018/mar/05/italy-election-perfect-economic-storm-ripe-for-a-
protest-vote (explaining that the stagnant Italian party facilitated 
substantial gains for anti-establishment political parties). 
549 See, e.g., Annalisa Merelli, Italy’s New “Political Government” Will be 
a Technical Government, Minus the Expertise, QUARTZ (May 22, 2018), 
https://qz.com/1284254/italy-analysis-five-star-movement-and-lega-nord 
-have-a-coalition-goxvernment (reporting that the Five Star Movement 
and the Far Right League had made a deal to have a coalition government 
after two and a half months). However, the Five Star Movement’s 
popularity has since begun to wane. See also Holly Ellyatt, Italy’s Anti-
establishment M5S Could be Headed for ‘Political Disaster’ as Support 
Collapses, CNBC (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/26/italy-
m5s-could-be-headed-for-political-disaster-after-regional-collapse.html 
(noting that despite its popularity in the 2018 elections, poor results for 
the Five Star Movement in a recent regional election may foreshadow 
similarly poor results in the European Parliament elections in May).  
550 Italy Youth Unemployment Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS, https:// 
tradingeconomics.com/italy/youth-unemployment-rate (last visited Apr. 
19, 2019); Freddy Tennyson & Claudio Lavanga, One-Fifth of Italian 
Citizens Deemed “At Risk of Poverty—Will New Income Scheme Inspire 
Them?, EURONEWS (Mar 6, 2019), https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/06/ 
one-fifth-of-italian-citizens-deemed-at-risk-of-poverty-will-new-income-
scheme-inspire-the; Miles Johnson, Italian Populists Concede Sharply 
Lower Economic Growth This Year, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019) 
https://www.ft.com/content/c48db112-5af9-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a 
(reporting that the Italian government “has formally conceded that 
economic growth will be sharply lower this year than it had previously 
forecast” which will mean the economy will “burst through the cap on its 
budget deficit [2.4% of GDP] that was only agreed with the European 
Commission late last year . . .). 
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The Italian economy is experiencing sharply lower 
economic growth.551 Worse, some economists believe Italy is 
now trapped in a “perma-recession” with its debt posing a 
“systemic risk for the euro-zone as a whole.”552
The International Monetary Fund projects that Italy’s 
budget deficit will continue to grow “in chronic violation of 
the Maastricht treaty.”553 This has contributed to the waning 
popularity of M56; however, anti-establishment, right-wing 
populist, and/or Eurosceptic political parties continue to gain 
momentum in Italy and the rest of the euro zone in the run-
up to the next European Parliament elections.554 These 
parties tend to see “Brussels, international banks, and 
multinational corporations” as the “enemy,”555 and a 
551 Miles Johnson, Italian Populists Concede Sharply Lower Economic 
Growth This Year, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
c48db112-5af9-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a (reporting that the Italian 
government “has formally conceded that economic growth will be sharply 
lower this year than it had previously forecast” which will mean the 
economy will “burst through the cap on its budget deficit [from 2% to 2.4% 
of GDP] that was only agreed with the European Commission late last 
year . . .). 
552 Jim Edwards, Italy’s ‘Perma-recession’ Could Trigger a €2 Trillion 
Financial Crisis that Threatens the Eurozone Itself, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 
22, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/italy-perma-recession-syste 
mic-crisis-threatens-eurozone-2019-4. 
553 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Macron’s Brexit Brinkmanship Risks 
Pushing Italy Over the Edge, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Apr. 11, 2019)
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/7ed22bf7-2d58-46ce-80c7-ba369 
33f1900/?context=1000516. 
554 See, e.g., Jon Stone, EU Election Polls: Right-wing Populist and 
Eurosceptic Parties Would be Biggest Single Group in European 
Parliament, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.indepe 
ndent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-election-polls-european-parliament-
salvini-orban-conservatives-a8876011.html (projecting that Eurosceptic 
parties may win 184 seats in the May European parliament elections).  
555 See, e.g., Alexander Stille, How Matteo Salvini Pulled Italy to the Far 
Right, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/ 
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nationalist-leaning power balance in the European 
Parliament could further diminish the possibility of forging a 
more uniform regulatory philosophy and application among 
EU member-states.     
d. Spain and Portugal  
Italy is far from an isolated example of European bank 
distress. For example, bank failures also threaten the 
financial security of both Spain and Portugal.556 In June 
2017, Spain’s sixth largest lender, Banco Popular, was sold 
to Banco Santander for 1 Euro.557 Three months earlier, 
Spain’s Bankia and Banco Mare Nostrum (BMN) both failed 
2018/aug/09/how-matteo-salvini-pulled-italy-to-the-far-right (analyzing 
the growing popularity of the Lega party and its leader after becoming a 
nationalist party).  
556 See, e.g., Sarah Gordon, Bankia A Symbol of Europe’s New Banking 
Wobble, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/1078df3a-
da55-11e5-a72f-1e7744c66818 (discussing how the near collapse of 
Bankia, one of Spain’s largest banking institutions, cost the country and 
its taxpayers billions in “a series of bailouts.”); see also Elena Holodny, 
Italy Isn’t the Only European Country with ‘a Systemic Banking Crisis’,
BUS. INSIDER (July 12, 2016, 4:45 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
portugal-banking-crisis-2016-7 (“Regarding Portugal’s financial system, 
its banks are loaded with bad debts and are starved for capital . . . . 
Portugal’s largest deposit taker, Caixa Geral de Depositors, needs a cash 
injection of 5 billion euros ($5.53 billion), while its largest private bank, 
BCP, is facing similar issues and may need an estimated 2.5 billion euros 
($2.76 billion) . . . .”). 
557 See, e.g., Jim Brunsden, Eurozone is Learning to Deal with Failed 
Banks, Regulator Says, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.ft.com/con 
tent/9816d9d6-04fc-11e9-9d01-cd4d49afbbe3 (describing the operations 
of the eurozone’s Single Resolution Board and its resolution of Banco 
Popular’s failure in 2017). 
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and had to merge.558 In 2018, Portugal had to prop up its “so-
called ‘good bank,’” Novo Banco with a €1.1 billion injection 
of funds.559
e. Germany 
Moreover, Germany has been plagued with banking crises. 
Since 2008, 
Deutsche Bank has faced numerous 
lawsuits and investigations over its 
alleged role in rigging of interest-rate 
benchmarks and commodity prices, 
violations of US sanctions and mis-
selling mortgage backed securities. 
Even after paying over $16 [billion] in 
fines and settlements worldwide . . . 
for serious misconduct, the troubles 
of [that bank] are not yet over[,] as it 
has lost more than half of its value in 
2016.560
Accordingly, Deutsche Bank, the largest continental 
European bank in deposits, has been widely recognized as 
being on the brink of possible collapse. Under the watchful 
eye of the EU financial regulators, “Deutsche Bank failed the 
U.S. Fed’s stress test . . . ,” and it is “sitting on a mountain of 
558 See, e.g., George Mills, Spain Greenlights Merger of Bankia and Banco 
Mare Nostrum, EL PAIS (Mar. 15, 2017), https://elpais.com/elpais/ 
2017/03/15/inenglish/1489573772_758618.html. 
559 Peter Wise, Portugal’s Novo Banco to Receive New Capital Injection 
after Posting €1.4 bn Loss, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www. 
ft.com/content/a8ded072-3c5e-11e9-b856-5404d3811663. Novo Banco 
was considered the “’good bank’ rescued from the ruins of Banco 
Espírito Santo in 2014.” Id.
560 WEED, supra note 352, at 13. 
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derivatives, estimated to be as high as $75 trillion.”561 During 
the first quarter of 2018, James von Moltke, Deutsche Bank’s 
chief financial officer, announced that the Deutsche Bank’s 
investment banking division would lose €450m in revenue 
due to “the strong euro and higher refinancing costs . . . .”562
Furthermore, Two Deutsche Bank traders have been 
convicted for manipulating the global benchmark listed in 
interest rate swaps.563
In this regard, “[i]n June 2016, the IMF in its report 
on Financial System Stability Assessment on Germany 
stated that ‘among the G-SIBs (globally systemically 
important banks), Deutsche Bank appears to be the most 
important net contributor to systemic risks, followed by the 
[United Kingdom’s] HSBC and [Switzerland’s] Credit 
561 Daryl Montgomery, Coming Soon from Europe: The Next Global 
Financial Crisis, SEEKING ALPHA (July 7, 2016, 5:50 PM), https:// 
seekingalpha.com/article/3987017-coming-soon-europe-next-global-finan 
cial-crisis. 
562 Olaf Storbeck, Deutsche Bank Slides After Warning on €450 Q1 
Headwind, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
4a8e0bba-2d13-11e8-a34a-7e7563b0b0f4. See also William Canny, 
“Deutsche Bank's Bad News Gets Worse With $35 Billion Flub”,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-04-19/deutsche-bank-flub-said-to-send-35-billion-
briefly-out-the-door (stating that Deutsche Bank “inadvertently 
transferred 28 billion euros ($35 billion) to one of its outside accounts . . . 
. The routine payment that went awry last month was one that 
Germany’s biggest lender unintentionally sent to an exchange as part of 
its daily dealings in derivatives, a person familiar with the matter said.”); 
Richard Milne, Latvia banking scandal leaves Europe’s regulators red-
faced, FIN. TIMES: INSIDE BUSINESS (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/b396d6ac-37f2-11e8-8eee-e06bde01c544. 
563 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Former Deutsche 
Bank Trader Convicted for Role in Scheme to Manipulate a Critical 
Global Benchmark Interest Rate [hereinafter “DOJ Press Release”] (Oct. 
17, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-former-deutsche-bank-trad 
ers-convicted-role-scheme-manipulate-critical-global-benchmark.  
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Suisse.’”564 It has been estimated that a “failure of Deutsche 
Bank may trigger a far bigger financial crisis than the 2008 
crisis. As Deutsche Bank is highly interconnected with other 
big banks and insurance companies in Germany, there is a 
valid concern that it could pose a systemic threat to 
Germany’s entire financial sector.”565
In result, and with the encouragement of the German 
government, Deutsche Bank had been in merger talks with 
Germany’s second largest bank, Commerzbank, because 
Deutsche Bank “has struggled to generate sustainable profits 
since the 2008 financial crisis.”566 The merger talks as of this 
writing seem to have failed,567 but not before news of the 
merger amplified concerns of systemic risk within the 
German banking system568 and caused financial observers to 
note that the problems which drove the banks to consider 
merger are a “sign that something is wrong at the heart of 
564 WEED, supra note 352, at 13. 
565 Id.
566 REUTERS, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank go Public in Merger Talks
(Mar. 17, 2019) https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/17/deutsche-bank-a nd-
commerzbank-go-public-on-merger-talks.html (reporting on Deutsche 
Bank’s struggle to generate profits); Silvia Amaro, Deutsche Bank Swings 
to First Full-Year Net Profit Since 2014, CNBC (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/01/deutsche-bank-earnings-q4-2018.html 
(but also noting that it still failed to meet market expectations and 
sustained a large fourth quarter loss). 
567 Silvia Amaro, Spriha Srivastava, Deutsche Bank-Commerzbank 
Merger Talks Collapse, CNBC (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2019/04/25/deutsche-bank-and-commerzbank-merger-talks-collapse. 
html. 
568 See, e.g., Olaf Storbeck, Officials ‘Unconcerned’ by Deutsche Bank-
Commerzbank Merger Risks, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www. 
ft.com/content/fe61ae6c-5c42-11e9-9dde-7aedca0a081a (stating officials 
are “unconcerned” of additional systemic risk posed by the merger 
because Deutsche Bank is already “too big to fail” regardless of the 
merger, and that “’German government obviously does not believe in the 
assumption that systemically important banks can be wound down”). 
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the euro zone’s half-formed banking union.”569 In light of the 
failed merger talks, those problems persist. 
If destabilizing financial infrastructure performance 
occurs in Germany, for example, it defies the imagination 
how any EU-driven swaps regulatory regime could serve as 
a proper ‘substitute’ for Dodd-Frank as applied to the four 
large U.S. bank holding company swaps dealers, especially 
when U.S.—not EU—taxpayers are understood to be those 
U.S. banks’ lender of last resort—as they were in 2008. 
3. The United Kingdom  

If the banking problems that are rippling through the 
continental European banks do not sufficiently raise the level 
of concern about deferring to EU financial regulatory law to 
regulate the swaps of, inter alia, the four biggest U.S. bank 
holding company swaps dealers, then the prospect of 
applying the United Kingdom’s financial regulation, 
especially if as seems likely the U.K. goes outside of the EU 
under “Brexit,” should certainly tip the scales. London’s 
financial services center, the so-called “City,” has been the 
home to many of the most troubling financial regulatory 
calamities immediately before, during, and after the 
financial 2008 meltdown.  
a. Northern Rock 
The massive 2007 failure at Britain’s Northern Rock bank 
demonstrates the nexus between the U.K.’s once highly 
lauded “light touch regulation” and the increased risk of 
569 Ferdinando Giugliano, There is an Alternative for Deutsche Bank, 
BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/arti 
cles/2019-03-29/deutsche-bank-there-is-an-alternative-to-commerzbank-
deal.
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systemically significant big bank failures. Relying on a 
business model which prioritized “short-term funding from 
the wholesale market to make long-term mortgage loans,”570
Northern Rock was forced to ask the Bank of England for an 
unprecedented, emergency bail out in 2007. The very-public 
€25 billion loan resulted in massive queuing outside of 
Northern Rock branches, as customers lined up to withdraw 
billions of pounds.571 The “lines of Northern Rock depositors” 
“through many main streets across the U.K. provided a vivid 
demonstration of [financial] regulatory crisis.”572 And, the 
regulatory response to that failure has been described as a 
“serious test of the workability of the regulatory model 
exemplified by” Northern Rock's then-U.K. financial 
regulator.573  One leading financial academic noted that, “in 
spite of the promise [by British financial regulators] of 
cohesive, clear, and consolidated [financial market] 
oversight, the conduct of [those regulators] in preventing the 
Northern Rock debacle, and in reacting to it subsequently, 
fell substantially short of expectations.”574
The U.K.’s own HM Treasury Select Committee, in its 
report on the failure of Northern Rock, noted that Britain’s 
inadequate financial regulatory structure, had contributed to 
the state of affairs that culminated in the U.K.’s first bank 
570 Brooke Masters, Northern Rock Exposed Regulatory Failings, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/7bb1ab1a-fc00-11e1-
af33-00144feabdc0. 
571 Alan G. Hallsworth & Frank Skinner, Visibly in Trouble: Northern 
Rock, a Post-Mortem on a Financial Crisis, 40 ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL 
SOC’Y 278 (2008). 
572 Yesha Yadav, Looking for the Silver Lining, Regulatory Reform After 
the Credit Crunch, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 314, 334 (2010). 
573 Id.
574 Id. (citing FIN. SVCS. AUTHORITY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE 
INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT (Mar. 26, 2008), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ 
other/exec_ summary.pdf. 
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run since the Victorian era.575 The then-prime British 
regulator, the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), 
identified numerous serious failures in its oversight in its 
report on its handling of the Northern Rock crisis. 576
Throughout the Northern Rock crisis, a major 
criticism leveled at British financial regulation was of the 
lack of readiness displayed in acknowledging and reacting to 
the extent and depth of Northern Rock's troubles.577 The 
dysfunction among British regulators during that crisis 
belied a fundamental incompatibility in the regulatory 
priorities of the U.K. financial regulatory institutions, rather 
than “demonstrating the coordination that had been 
promised and practiced in trial runs conducted by [those 
regulators] for just such a crisis.”578
Generously described, the U.K “[h]as a fragmented 
regulatory system, consisting of regulators that are keen to 
pass on their responsibilities to others. Overlapping U.K. 
financial regulatory structures squander time and resources, 
making it difficult for regulation to be both effective and 
timely.”579
575 TREASURY COMMITTEE, THE RUN ON THE ROCK, 2007-8, HC 56–I, at 5 
(UK). 
576 Id.
577 Id. at 34 (“The failure of Northern rock, while a failure of its own 
Board, was also a failure of its regulator . . . . [T]he Financial Services 
Authority exercises a judgment as to which ‘concerns’ about financial 
institutions should be regarded as systemic and thus require action by 
the regulator. In the case of Northern Rock, the FSA appears to have 
systematically failed in its duty as a regulator to ensure Northern Rock 
would not pose such a systemic risk . . . .”).   
578 Yadav, supra note 572, at 338. 
579 ‘Captured Regulators, Impunity Behind HSBCs Decision to Keep HQ 
in London’ — Experts, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016, 6:13 PM), 
https://www.rt.com/uk/332791-hsbc-city-hq-remain. 
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b. HSBC’s Money Laundering 
Britain’s HSBC laundered nearly $1 billion of drug and terror 
money on behalf of the Mexican Sinaloa and Colombian 
Norte del Valle drug cartels, and it violated international 
sanctions by offering banking services to Iran, Cuba, Burma, 
Libya, and Sudan.580 Despite this unprecedented illegal 
behavior, U.K. regulators did not prosecute, or otherwise 
sanction HSBC or its officers and employees involved in this 
widespread misconduct. Rather, British financial regulators 
and HSBC together exerted their influence within the British 
Government, to put unrelenting pressure on the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to: (1) not prosecute HSBC in 
the United States under U.S. criminal law; and (2) otherwise 
lobby hard and successfully for the lowering of the 
substantial proposed civil penalties to be assessed by DOJ on 
HSBC.581 The British lobbying of the DOJ consisted mainly 
of “warn[ings] that prosecuting a ‘systemically important 
financial institution’ like HSBC ‘could lead to [financial] 
contagion’ and pose ‘very serious implications for financial 
and economic stability, particularly in Europe and Asia.’”582
It was also contended: “If HSBC had been found guilty of the 
potential charges, the US government would have been 
required to review and possibly revoke HSBC’s charter to do 
business in the US. The [British government] repeatedly 
warned that even the threat of possible charter withdrawal 
could have caused a fresh global financial crisis.”583 In the 
580 Rupert Neate, HSBC Escaped US Money-Laundering Charges after 
Osborne’s Intervention, GUARDIAN (July 11, 2016, 3:36 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/11/hsbc-us-money-
laundering-george-osborne-report.         
581 Id.; 'Captured Regulators, Impunity Behind HSBCs Decision to Keep 
HQ in London' – Experts, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016, 6:13 PM), 
https://www.rt.com/uk/332791-hsbc-city-hq-remain. 
582 Neate, supra note 580 (second alteration in the original).   
583 Id. (emphasis added). 
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end, the DOJ did not prosecute HSBC; it lowered 
substantially the civil fines it assessed; and it did not trigger 
a review of HSBC’s right to conduct business in the U.S.  
That the “light touch” financial regulatory handling of 
HSBC by the U.K. government had no long-lasting remedial 
effect is made clear by recent investigative journalistic 
reports that HSBC has also laundered $740 million in 
Russian organized crime funds; whereas, RBS, majority-
owned by the U.K. government, handled $113 million in 
Russian laundered money from a network originally dubbed 
the “Global Laundromat,” Now widely referred to as the 
“Russian Laundromat,”584 it has been ranked as “the world’s 
biggest money-laundering scandal.585
Further damaging the U.K.’s financial regulatory 
regime’s reputation regarding this scandal, Danske, 
Denmark’s (a member of the EU) largest bank published a 
report acknowledging that it also had been—unwittingly—
involved in the Laundromat.586 While making this admission 
however, Danske’s report also found that even more UK 
financial entities were implicated through it, those entities 
being “vehicle[s] of choice for money launderers around the 
world” because of their “completely permissive attitude 
toward money laundering.”587
The Guardian broke the “Laundromat” scandal 
stating that financial records showed that Russians moved 
“at least $20 billion” out of the country between 2010 and 
584 Zeke Faux & Yalman Onaran, Laundered Russian Cash went Through 
Big Banks, Guardian Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2017, 2:08 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-20/laundered-
russian-cash-flowed-through-major-banks-guardian-says. 
585 Caroline Binhaim, London’s Role in Danske Dirty Money Scandal 
Under Spotlight, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
ba1a0c2a-bdb6-11e8-94b2-17176fbf93f5. 
586 Faux & Onaran, supra note 584.
587 Id.
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2014, and a portion of that amount “ended up at overseas 
banks.”588 In addition to HSBC, the records implicated a 
number of other prominent banks, including RBS, which 
allegedly handled $113 million of Global Laundromat cash.589
Other cited banks were Standard Chartered Plc, UBS Group 
AG, Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., Barclays Plc, and 
ING Group NV, which are said to have processed between $2 
million and $37 million.590 Moreover, U.S. regulators have 
begun probing Sweden’s Swedbank (also within EU financial 
regulatory jurisdiction) for involvement in this money 
laundering scandal.591 In response to these allegations, 
HSBC replied: “HSBC is strongly committed to fighting 
financial crime. The bank has systems and processes in place 
to identify suspicious activity and report it to the appropriate 
government authorities . . . .”592
c. The Libor Fixing Scandal 
At the center of the now notorious Libor London interest rate 
fixing scandal were the U.K.’s Barclays Bank and Barclays 
Capital, which, inter alia, were found to have manipulated 
and made false reports concerning the published Libor 
588 Id.
589 Id.
590 Id.
591 Richard Milne, US Regulator Starts Probe into Money Laundering at 
Swedbank, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.ft.com/ 
content/acc757b0-507a-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294 (“US regulators have 
launched multiple inquiries into the rapidly expanding money-
laundering scandal at Swedbank, demanding more information on the 
Swedish bank’s conduct amid new allegations that it handled €135bn 
from high-risk clients.”). 
592 Russian Money and the ‘Global Laundromat’: What Banks Said,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/ 
mar/20/russian-money-and-the-global-laundromat-what-uk-banks-said. 
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benchmark for interest rate swaps index.593 One Wall Street 
Journal editor and author has recently explained in a 
thorough analysis of this Libor bank manipulation: 
[Libor is] often known as the world’s 
most important number. Financial 
instruments all over the globe—a 
volume so awesome, well into the 
tens of trillions of dollars, that it is 
hard to accurately quantify—hinge 
on tiny movements in Libor.  In the 
United States, the interest rates on 
the most variable-rate mortgages are 
based on Libor. So are many auto 
loans, student loans, credit card loans 
. . . almost anything that doesn’t have 
a fixed interest rate. The amounts 
that big companies pay on 
multibillion-dollar loans are deter-
mined by Libor . . . . Pension funds, 
university endowments, cities and 
towns, small businesses and giant 
companies all use them to speculate 
on or protect themselves against 
swings in interest rates. So if 
something was wrong with Libor, the 
pool of potential victims would be 
vast. As it turned out, something
wasn’t wrong with Libor, everything
was.594
593 Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Orders Barclays to Pay $200 Million 
Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting Concerning 
LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates (June 27, 2012), 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12. 
594 See ENRICH, supra note 93, at 5. 
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One thing is certain: those harms from manipulating 
Libor far exceeded the fines and penalties that were 
extracted during settlement of the misconduct.595 In May 
2015, the Department of Justice announced that four major 
banks—Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase, Barclays PLC, and RBS 
— pled guilty to felony charges for “conspiring to manipulate 
the price of U.S. dollars and euros exchanged in the foreign 
currency exchange (FX) spot market.”596 In all, the criminal 
fines totaled over $2.5 billion, which was to be paid to the 
Department of Justice and U.S. regulators.597 Pleading guilty 
to one separate felony count of wire fraud in connection to its 
manipulation of Libor, UBS was fined $203 million.598
Attempts, however, by U.K. and U.S. prosecutors to gain 
criminal convictions after a trial have generally proven quite 
elusive.599
595 Id.; see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to 
Parent-Level Guilty Pleas (May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas. The criminal fines 
owed by each bank is as follows: Citicorp—$925 million, Barclays—$650 
million, JPMorgan—$550 million, and RBS—$395 million. Id.
596 DOJ Press Release, supra note 563. 
597 Id.
598 Id.
599 Chris Dolmetsch, Libor-Rigging Judge’s Musings Raise Doubt About 
U.S. Prosecution, BLOOMBERG MKT. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-29/libor-rigging-judge-s-musings-
raise-doubt-about-u-s-prosecution (“A judge voiced skepticism of a U.S. 
case against two former Deutsche Bank AG traders charged with rigging 
the Libor interest-rate benchmark, questioning whether the government 
will be able to present sufficient evidence to convict the pair.”); Chad 
Bray, Two Former Barclays Traders Acquitted in Libor Retrial, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/business/ 
dealbook/stylianos-contogoulas-ryan-reich-barclays-acquitted-libor.html 
(detailing how attempts to convict individual traders on criminal charges 
for manipulation of interest-rate benchmarks in both the U.K and U.S. 
have been difficult as six former brokers from financial firms and two 
former Barclays traders have been acquitted of conspiracy to defraud 
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Establishing Libor in 1986, the British Banker’s 
Association (“BBA”) oversaw the calculation of Libor rates for 
nearly three decades.600 In September 2012, the British 
Government commissioned a report to review Libor.601
Referred to as the Wheatley Review, the main 
recommendation issued by the report was that 
administration of Libor be transferred to a new 
administrator: “The BBA should transfer responsibility to a 
new administrator, who will be responsible for compiling and 
distributing the rate, as well as providing credible internal 
governance and oversight. This should be achieved through a 
tender process to be run by an independent committee 
convened by the regulatory authorities.”602 In 2014, the Hogg 
Tendering Advisory Committee replaced the BBA with the 
Intercontinental Exchange Group (ICE), which has since 
worked to impose greater transparency and oversight.603
charges in the U.K); see also Chad Bray, Convictions of 2 Former Traders 
in Libor Scandal Are Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/business/dealbook/convictions-of-2-
former-traders-in-libor-scandal-are-dismissed.html (noting that in 2017, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed 
conspiracy and fraud charges against two former traders in “what had 
been the first American criminal case to arise from investigations into” 
the Libor scandal); but see Barney Thompson, Jailed Libor Trader Hayes 
Loses Appeal Over Family House Sale, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/b27b5226-32a1-11e8-ac48-10c6fdc22f03 
(“Tom Hayes, the former UBS and Citigroup trader who was jailed for 
conspiring to rig the Libor benchmark interest rate, has lost his appeal 
against a confiscation order that forced his wife to sell their family 
home.”). 
600 John Kiff, What is Libor?, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/12/basics.htm. .   
601 Prableen Bajpai, Why BBA Libor Was Replaced by ICE Libor,
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/ 
investing/033115/why-bba-libor-was-replaced-ice-libor.asp. 
602 Id.
603 Id.
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d. Brexit 
The U.K.’s likely departure from the EU creates a further 
shroud of uncertainty over what form swaps regulations may 
take in the U.K. once it is freed of any EU constraints.604
Alarm bells have been ringing over Britain’s likely 
future loss of the EU “passport” rule, under which London 
banks would no longer automatically have license to do 
business throughout the EU.605 However, that potential lost 
business is likely to pale in comparison to the increased 
regulatory “race to the bottom” the U.K. will likely exhibit 
when it no longer needs to follow what certain U.K. bankers 
have referred to as the “idiot rules that the EU has tried to 
place upon The City [London].”606
The animosity expressed by U.K. banking institutions 
toward EU financial regulation is likely to inspire a dramatic 
undoing of the EU financial regulatory structure as it was 
applied to the U.K. Indeed, so worried has been the EU over 
604 Caroline Binham, BoE Warns of ‘Material Risks’ from Brexit, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4c79e2f2-28fc-11e8-
b27e-cc62a39d57a0 (explaining that outstanding derivative contracts 
between parties in the EU and U.K. are valued at €26 trillion). 
605 Tim Worstall, Brexit Effects: A Deregulated City Will Thrive Outside 
the European Union, FORBES (June 27, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/timworstall/2016/06/27/brexit-effects-a-deregulated-city-will-
thrive-outside-the-european-union/#49ae5ef13998. Firms will be able to 
use the passporting arrangement through the transitional period, 
scheduled to end December 2020. See Caroline Binham, Regulators Step 
Up Efforts to Safeguard City of London’s Status, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28, 
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/2fbb0c8c-3288-11e8-ac48-10c6fdc22f0 
3. 
606 Worstall, supra note 605; Binham, supra note 605; see also Laura 
Noonan, Caroline Binham & Chris Giles, Treasury Promises Further 
Work on Standards after Claims BoE Pressure Libor, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 10, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d9732af1-f3c0-3e5a-8c54-a88483bf4b4 
b. 
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the U.K.’s likely Brexit response to being freed of EU 
financial regulation, that it has already warned the U.K. that 
the latter’s likely relaxed resulting financial regulations will 
not be granted “equivalency” by the EU “if [the U.K.] 
conducts a regulatory bonfire or retreats to a light-touch 
supervision.”607 And, the head of the Bank of England’s 
Prudential Regulation Authority warned against a “retreat” 
by the U.K. to “‘light touch’ regulation after Brexit . . . .”608
Through the lens of the CFTC’s substituted 
compliance doctrine, the CFTC’s “comparability” approvals of 
what is sure to be lax post-Brexit U.K. swaps rules will 
present an untenable risk, which will ultimately fall on the 
U.S. taxpayer.  
XII. THE LONE SURVIVING EXTERRITORIAL 
REMEDY: STATE PARENS PATRIAE ACTIONS TO 
ENFORCE DODD-FRANK’S EXTRATERRITORIAL 
PROVISION 
As mentioned above,609 the CFTC’s October 18, 2016 
proposed rule and interpretations of Dodd-Frank’s 
extraterritorial framework would eliminate the 
“deguarantee”610 and “ANE” loopholes.611 With the 
subsequent election of President Donald Trump and with 
President Trump’s control of the CFTC by his nominations 
thereto, the October 18, 2016 proposal will almost certainly 
607 Jim Brunsden & Lindsay Fortado, Brussels Sets Out Tough New Line 
on Equivalence, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
f9f3ffc2-fc1a-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30. 
608 Caroline Binham, BoE Official Warns Against Return to ‘Light-Touch’ 
Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0e36 
b7fe-fac2-11e6-9516-2d969e0d3b65. 
609 See supra notes 454–56 and accompanying text. 
610 Id.
611 Id.
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never see the light of day as a final rule during his 
Presidency. Moreover, with Republicans in control of both the 
House and Senate, there will be no near-term Congressional-
led “fix” to the deguarantee and ANE problems.612 Even now 
that Democrats control the House after the mid-term, if they 
repeal the loopholes in question, that legislation would 
almost certainly be vetoed. 
However, there is one important remedy still 
available. The Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by 
Dodd-Frank, expressly allows a State (through its Attorney 
General, or its securities or other appropriate financial 
regulatory officials)613 to bring in federal district court an 
action, with exceptions not relevant here,614 to enjoin 
violations of Dodd-Frank insofar as residents of that state 
“may be threatened [to be] adversely affected” by those 
violations.615   
It is now common knowledge that the states’ attorneys 
general, for example, have been and are frequent litigants in 
federal court to enforce federal constitutional or statutory 
mandates.616 Their intense involvement in challenging many 
612 See supra notes 461–66 and accompanying text. 
613 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2 (2018). 
614 Id. Under this provision, states may not sue exchanges, 
clearinghouses, floor brokers or floor traders. But states would be free to 
sue the four large, systemically-risky U.S. bank holding company swaps 
dealers that are the subject of this paper and that are defying Dodd-Frank 
and the CFTC for misreading the extraterritorial provision of Dodd-
Frank. 
615 Id.
616 Charles Krauthammer, Revolt of the Attorneys General, WASH. POST
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/revolt-of-the-
attorneys-general/2017/03/02/13928c82-ff81-11e6-99b4-
9e613afeb09f_story.html; Cornell W. Clayton & Jack McGuire, State 
Litigation Strategies and Policymaking in the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 17 (2001); Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics 
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of the Wall Street practices that led to, or have aggravated, 
the 2008 financial crisis is well documented.617 Given the 
clarity of the Dodd-Frank’s extraterritorial provision that 
requires Dodd-Frank to be applied to “foreign” swaps 
transactions that have a “substantial and adverse” effect on 
U.S. commerce, or are an evasion of that statute, the case to 
invalidate the CFTC’s adherence to the bank’s “deguarantee” 
and ANE loopholes or to the “substituted compliance” 
doctrine is straightforward. The states are therefore likely to 
be the last bastion of defense against another financial 
meltdown from poor swaps regulation that results either in a 
second multi-trillion-dollar U.S. taxpayer bailout of Wall 
Street (and corresponding Second Great Recession); or, in the 
absence of such a bailout, the onset of the Second Great 
Depression. 
CONCLUSION 
By their own design, large U.S. bank holding company swaps 
dealers and their representatives have crafted their own 
massive loopholes from Dodd-Frank swaps regulations, 
which they can exercise at their own will. By arranging, 
negotiating, and executing swaps in the U.S. with U.S. 
and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National 
Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 552 (1994). 
617 The Final Bill, ECONOMIST (Aug. 11, 2016), https:// 
www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2016/08/11/the-final-bill; 
Jean Eaglesham, Ruling in Rate Probe Doesn't Slow Cases, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 4, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873239163 
04578400822011096476; Danielle Douglas & Brady Dennis, To Rein in 
Big Banks, States Go Solo, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2012, at A10; The 
National Mortgage Pact: A Glimpse of Four Key Players in the Accord,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2012, at A2; Michael Powell, The States vs. Wall St.,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at B1; Brooke A. Masters, States Flex 
Prosecutorial Muscle; Attorneys General Move into What Was Once 
Federal Territory, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at A1. 
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personnel and then “assigning” them to their “foreign” newly 
“deguaranteed” subsidiaries, these swaps dealers have the 
best of both worlds: swaps execution in the U.S. under the 
parent bank holding companies’ direct control, but the ability 
to move the swaps abroad out from under Dodd-Frank. As 
history has demonstrated all too well, unregulated swaps 
dealing almost always ultimately leads to extreme economic 
suffering and then too often to systemic breaks in the world 
economy, thereby putting U.S. taxpayers, who suffer all the 
economic distress that recessions bring, in the position of 
once again being the lender of last resort to these huge U.S. 
institutions. The Obama CFTC tried to put an end to these 
loopholes through a proposed rule and interpretations in 
October 2016. However, those efforts were never finalized 
before Donald Trump assumed the Presidency. There will 
almost certainly be no relief from these dysfunctions during 
the Trump Administration or Congress. However, state 
attorneys general and various state financial regulators have 
the statutory legal tools to enjoin these loopholes and save 
the world’s economy and U.S. taxpayers from once again 
suffering a massive bailout burden and an economic 
Armageddon. 
